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The present issue of the Working Papers series of the Dipartimento di Economia Politica at Milano-
Bicocca reproduces the contributions presented at the mid-year ESHET Conference which took place 
at the Universities of Pavia and Milano-Bicocca on 16 and 17 November 2001. The program was 
arranged jointly by Gianni Vaggi and Pier Luigi Porta and the Conference was jointly organised by 
ESHET with the Department of Political Economy and Quantitative Methods of the University of 
Pavia and the Department of Political Economy of the University  of Milano-Bicocca.   
The idea around which the Conference was built referred basically to Luigi Pasinetti’s conception of 
structural change and structural dynamics in a history-of-thought perspective. Luigi Pasinetti, 
Eshet’s first President, opened the Conference at the University of Pavia. The program included two 
sessions taking half a day each: the opening session was in Pavia on 16 November 2001 and the final 
session in Milan the 17 November. Luigi Pasinetti chaired the session held at the University of Pavia  
and Andrew Skinner was the chairman in Milan. 
 
The Conference has been an attempt to focus on the way in which great economists of the past 
analyse some specific processes of economic and social change. Structural change is a phenomenon 
that too often the modern economic theory neglects. As it has often been emphasized by Luigi 
Pasinetti in his lifelong research work on structural dynamics, this was not the case in past and above 
all for some of the greatest authors.
1 The Conference ran through some of the major topics and tried 
to focus on the implications for the methodology of economic science and its evolution. The 
Conference thus brought into focus some of the fundamental aspects of structural change, in 
particular on the role of technology and of institutions. A special attention was devoted to money.   
In general terms, the Conference, through new readings of a number of the vital contributions in the 
history of the economic thought, highlighted some of the key analytical and methodological 
problems for a better understanding of the real world. In particular, the function of studying the 
Classical economists in the light of Luigi Pasinetti’s scientific work is to understand what ZH are 
doing, for a notion of what the frontier of latter-day analysis actually LV, can in fact only be acquired 
through awareness and fully-fledged openness to the historico-analytic background.  
 
The scheme described here is reflected in the contributions printed in this booklet. The papers are 
given in the order of their presentation during the Conference. 
In particular, the ILUVWVHVVLRQ included research work on Smith and other classical authors such as 
Ricardo and other contributions from the Continent. The session examined in particular the role of 
technology and of trade policies in the process of structural change. Andrew Skinner’s and Erich 
Streissler’s papers focus on the British Classics, Adam Smith and Ricardo in particular.   Bertram 
Schefold goes backwards in time and treats Mercantilist and Cameralist aspects of German 
economic thought.  Philippe Steiner develops knowledge, division of labour and growth in Jean-
Baptiste Say.  
 
                                                           
1  See, e.g.,  Porta, P.L. “Structural Analysis in Retrospect. A Note on Luigi Pasinetti’s 6WUXFWXUDO(FRQRPLF'\QDPLFV”, 
in  6WRULD GHO SHQVLHUR HFRQRPLFR, n. 35, 1998, pp.  43-60, where it is argued that “under the historico-analytic 
perspective, Pasinetti’s work emerges as an original and independent voice within the reconstruction of Classical 
analysis”.  Cp. also  L. Lambertini “Il concetto di integrazione verticale come strumento analitico e come comportamento 
strategico”, LELG, pp. 169-200.   II
The VHFRQGVHVVLRQ of the Conference dealt with the evolution of the monetary theory, from the 19
th 
century onwards and with the formation and the role of the central banks.  It also highlighted the 
importance of modern instruments for the understanding of long-run social changes. Thus Cristina 
Marcuzzo’s paper discusses the relationship of Keynes to the quantity theory of money also on the 
basis of an interesting collation of documents from the Cambridge archives. Walter Eltis gives a 
stimulating Wicksellian interpretation of the present crisis; his contribution is then taken up and 
discussed by Pascal Bridel. Finally Christian Schmidt’s contribution focuses the attention on the 
relevance of game-theoretical concepts to structural dynamics. 
 
The editors wish to thank the authors for their prompt response in making their papers available for 




































































This contribution is primarily concerned with Smith’s approach to political economy seen as theory.   
It is also designed to draw attention to Smith’s wider purposes and to confirm the significance of 





Smith was elected to the Chair of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow on 9 January 
1751. In the following year he was translated to the Chair of Moral Philosophy. As his pupil John 
Millar recalled: 
 
  ‘His course of lectures on this subject was divided into four parts. The first contained 
Natural Theology; in which he considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and 
those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded. The second 
comprehended Ethics strictly so called, and consisted chiefly of the doctrines which he 
afterwards published in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. In the third part, he treated at more 
length of that branch of morality which relatives to MXVWLFH, and which, being susceptible of 




  ‘In the last part of his lectures, he examined those political regulations which are founded, 
not upon the principle of MXVWLFH, but that of H[SHGLHQF\, and which are calculated to 
increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity of a State…What he delivered on these 
subjects contained the substance of the work he afterwards published under the title of An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ (Stewart, I.20). 
 
 
It only became possible to evaluate the third part of the major programme when Edwin Cannan 
discovered the /HFWXUHVRQ-XULVSUXGHQFH. Cannan recalled that: 
 
 ‘On April 21, 1895, Mr Charles C. Maconochie, whom I then met for the first time, 
happened to be present when in course of conversation with the literary editor of the Oxford 
Magazine, I had occasion to make some comment about Adam Smith. Mr Maconochie 
immediately said that he possessed a manuscript report of Adam Smith’s lectures on 
jurisprudence, which he regarded as of considerable interest (Cannan, 1896, xv). 
 
 









One of the most interesting sections of the course is that which deals with public jurisprudence.   
Smith began the argument by discussing the pattern of development known to have taken place in 
the classical world, before going on to consider those forces which caused the decline and fall of the 
Roman Empire in the West. This argument, with its attendant emphasis on the ‘four stages’, made it 
possible to appreciate the significance of, and the inter-relations between, Books V and III of the 
WN. We are now familiar with the point that the first two socio-economic stages, hunting and 
pasture, are most fully developed in the treatment of justice and defence. Book III, (and parts of 
Book V) on the other hand, contain one of the most sophisticated analyses of the origin and 
breakdown of the agrarian (allodial and feudal) stage before going on to consider the emergence of 
the exchange economy – the ‘final’ stage of commerce. 
 
The links between the first two parts of the great plan are many and various. The TMS for example, 
may be regarded as an exercise in social philosophy, which was designed in part to show the ways 
in which so self-regarding a creature as man erects barriers against his own passions, thus 
explaining the fact that he is typically found in ‘troops and companies’. The argument places a good 
deal of emphasis on the importance of general rules of behaviour which are related to experience, 
and which may thus vary in content, together with the need for some system of government as a 
pre-condition of social order. 
 
The historical analysis, with its four socio-economic stages, complements this argument by formally 
considering the origin of government and by explaining to some extent the forces which cause 
variations in accepted standards of behaviour over time. Both are related in turn to Smith’s 
treatment of political economy. There are a number of links. 
 
First, Smith suggests that the economic structure which is consistent with the stage of commerce is 
not to be regarded as a model, but rather as a structure with a history. The historical process which 
is outlined in WN Book III culminates in a system wherein all goods and services command a price. 
 
Secondly, he argued that this new structure would feature new forms of activity and sources of 
wealth; developments which would feature a shift in the balance of economic and therefore of 
political power. The point owned much to David Hume, as Smith acknowledged. Hume wrote that 
in England ‘the lower house is the support of our popular governments, and all the world 
acknowledges, that it owned its chief influence and consideration to the increase of commerce, 
which threw such a balance into the hands of the commons’ (Essays, 277-8). 
 
Third, Smith confirmed that in the case described there must be a major change in the pattern of 
dependence and subordination as compared to the feudal period. Since all goods and services 
command a price, it follows that while the farmer, tradesman or artificer must depend upon his 
customers, ‘though in some measure obliged to them all,…he is not absolutely dependent upon any 
one of them’ (WN, III.iv.12). 
 
Finally, it is suggested that the type of institutional structure described will be associated with what 
Hume described as a particular set of ‘customs and manners’. The link here is once again with the 
analysis of the TMS and man’s desire for social approbation. 
 
For Smith, ‘Power and riches appear…then to be, what they are, enormous and operose machines 
contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences to the body, consisting of springs the most nice   3
and delicate, (TMS IV.i.8). But Smith continued to emphasise that the pursuit of wealth is related 
not only to the desire to acquire the means of purchasing ‘utilities’ but also to the need for status. 
 
  ‘From whence, then arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, 
and what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we 
call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of …are all 
the advantages which we can propose to derive from it’ (TMS, I.iii.2.1). 
 
 
Smith also suggested that in the modern economy, men tend to admire not only those who have the 
capacity to enjoy the trappings of wealth, but also the qualities which contribute to that end. 
 
Smith recognised that the pursuit of wealth and ‘place’ was a basic human drive which would 
involve sacrifices which are likely to be supported by the approval of the spectator. The ‘habits of 
oeconomy, industry, discretion, attention and application of thought, are generally supposed to be 
cultivated from self-interested motives, and at the same time are apprehended to be very 
praiseworthy qualities, which deserve the esteem and approbation of everybody’ (TMS, IV.2.8).   
Smith developed this theme in a passage which was added to the TMS in 1790: 
 
 ‘In the steadiness of his industry and frugality, in his steadily sacrificing the ease and 
enjoyment of the present moment for the probable expectation of the still greater ease and 
enjoyment of a more distant but more lasting period of time, the prudent man is always both 
supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of the impartial spectator’ (TMS, VI.1.11). 
 
The most polished accounts of the emergence of the exchange economy and of the psychology of 
the ‘economic man’ are to be found, respectively, in the third book of WN and in Part VI of TMS 
which was added in 1790. Yet both areas of analysis are old and their substance would have been 
communicated to Smith’s students and understood by them to be a preface to the treatment of 
political economy. 
 
It is a subtle argument taken as a whole. Nicholas Phillipson has argued that Smith’s ethical theory 
‘is redundant outside the context of a commercial society with a complex division of labour’ (1983, 
179, 182). John Pocock concluded that: 
 
 ‘A crucial step in the emergence of Scottish social theory, is, of course, that elusive 
phenomenon, the advent of the four stages scheme of history. The progression from hunter to 
farmer, to merchant offered not only an account of increasing plenty, but a series of stages of 
increasing division of labour, bringing about in their turn an increasingly complex 
organisation of both society and personality’ (1983, 242). 
 
 
Others have associated these trends with the emergence of what has been described as a particular 
pattern of ‘manners’ – a bourgeois ideology. 
 










The early analyses of questions relating to Political Economy are to be found in three documents:  
The (DUO\ 'UDIW (Scott, 1937), the lectures delivered in 1762-63 (Lothian, LJA) and the text 
discovered by Cannan (1896, LJB). Cannan’s discovery is the most significant in respect of both 
date and content. The version contained in LJ(B) is the most complete and polished and provides an 
invaluable record of Smith’s teaching in this branch of his project in the last year of his 
Professorship (1763-64). 
 
The Cannan version yielded two important results. 
 
First, Cannan was able to confirm Smith’s debts to Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson’s economic 
analysis was not presented by him as a separate discourse, but rather woven into the broader fabric 
of his lectures on jurisprudence. Perhaps it was for this reason that historians of economic thought 
had rather neglected him. But the situation was transformed as a result of Cannan’s work who first 
noted that the RUGHU of Smith’s lectures on ‘expediency’ followed that suggested by Hutcheson, 
albeit, significantly, in the form of a single discourse. The importance of the connection was noted 
by Cannan (1896, xxv-xxvi;  1904, xxxvi-xli). Cannan was soon followed by the entry in the 
3DOJUDYH (1899). Hutcheson’s economic analysis received its most elaborate treatment in W R 
Scott’s  )UDQFLV+XWFKHVRQ (1900) in this period. 
 
Renewed interest in Hutcheson’s HFRQRPLF analysis revealed that it had its own history. It is 
evident that he admired the work of his immediate predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy, 
Gerschom Carmichael (1672-1729), and especially his translation of, and commentary on, the 
works of Pufendorf. In Hutcheson’s address to the ‘students in Universities’, the ,QWURGXFWLRQWR
0RUDO3KLORVRSK\ (1742) is described thus: 
 
  ‘The learned will at once discern how much of this compend is taken from the writings of 
others, from Cicero and Aristotle, and to name no other moderns, from Pufendorf’s small 
work, 'H 2IILFLR +RPLQLV HW &LYLV -X[WD /HJHP 1DWXUDOHP which that worthy and 
ingenious man the late Professor Gerschom Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best 
commentator on that book, has so supplied and corrected that the notes are of much more 
value than the text’ (Taylor, 1965, 25). 
 
 
It is to W L Taylor that we are indebted for the reminder that Carmichael and Pufendorf may have 
shaped Hutcheson’s economic LGHDV, thus indirectly influencing Smith (op cit, 28-29). 
 
 
Undoubtedly, both men followed a particular RUGHU of argument. Starting with the division of 
labour they sought to explain the manner in which disposable surpluses could be maximised, before 
going on to emphasise the importance of security of property and freedom of choice. This analysis 
led naturally to the problem of value and hence to the analysis of the role of money. What is 
distinctive about the analysis is the attention given to value LQ H[FKDQJH where both writers 
emphasised the role of utility and disutility:  perceived utility attaching to the commodities to be 
acquired, and perceived, disutility embodied in the labour necessary to create the goods to be 
exchanged. The distinction between utility anticipated and realised is profoundly striking (Skinner, 
1996, ch 5). This tradition was continued by Smith both in LJ and WN, but with a change of 
emphasis towards the PHDVXUHPHQW of value – thus explaining Terence Hutchison’s point that 
Smith retained VRPH of his heritage (1988, 199; see ch 11). Hutchison has noted that the   5
Pufendorf/Hutcheson line was continued most notably by Beccaria, Condillac (and much later by 
Walras; see ch 17). 
 
Secondly, it is apparent that the account which Smith provides in LJ(B) is concerned with an 
HFRQRPLF system which features the activities of agriculture, manufacture, and commerce (LJ (B) 
210) where these activities are characterised by a division of labour (LJ(B) 211-23) with the 
patterns of exchange facilitated by the use of money (LJ(B) 235-43). There are three main features 
of the central analysis: the treatment of the division of labour, the analysis of price and allocation, 
and the exposure of the mercantile fallacy.    
 
The division of labour is central to the analysis. It is by reference to this institution that Smith 
explains the growth in opulence which is associated with the development of the arts under the 
stimulus of the ‘natural wants’ of man (LJ(B) 209-211).  
 
As in the case of the :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV, Smith’s handling of price theory is amongst the most 
successful aspects of the study, featuring as it does a clear distinction between natural and market 
price together with an examination of their inter-dependence. 1DWXUDO price is defined in effect as 
the supply price of a commodity, where the latter refers to labour cost (LJ(B), 227). 
 
0DUNHW price, on the other hand, is the price which may prevail at any given point in time and will 
be determined, Smith argued, by the ‘demand or need for the commodity’, its abundance or scarcity 
in relation to the demand (a point which is used to explain the ‘paradox’ of value), and, finally, the 
‘riches or poverty of those who demand’ (LB(B) 227-8). Smith then went on to suggest that 
although the two prices were logically distinct, they were also ‘necessarily connected’. Thus in the 
event of market price rising above the natural level, the reward of labour in this employment will 
rise above its natural (long-run equilibrium) rate, leading to an inflow of labour and an expansion in 
supply (and vice-versa). In equilibrium, therefore, the market and natural price will be the same; a 
point which allowed Smith to go on to argue that ‘whatever police’ tends to prevent this 
coincidence will ‘diminish public opulence’ (LJ(B) 230). The familiar examples which contributed 
to keep the market above the natural price, include taxes on industry, monopolies, and the exclusive 
privileges of corporations, all of which affect price by virtue of their direct impact on selling price. 
 
Smith’s understanding of the interdependence of economic phenomena was quite as sophisticated as 
that of his master. Yet at the same time, it must be noted that his lecture notes do not confirm a clear 
distinction between factors of production (land, labour, capital) nor between those categories of 
return which correspond to them (rent, wages, profit). Nor is there any evidence of a macro-






Adam Smith’s visit to France was his only journey outside Great Britain. The fact that the visit took 
place at all was due to the success of the 7KHRU\RI0RUDO6HQWLPHQWV; Hume, in a rather more 
serious tone, also reported that ‘Charles Townshend, who passes for the cleverest Fellow in 
England, is so taken with the Performance, that he said to Oswald he wou’d put the Duke of 
Buccleugh under the Author’s care’. Hume bestirred himself on Smith’s behalf, but assumed that he 
would wish to welcome the Duke as a student in Glasgow, as distinct from giving up his chair. This 
was a reasonable assumption, bearing in mind Smith’s enjoyment of his post and the programme of 
publication which was announced in the closing pages of the first edition of 7KH7KHRU\RI0RUDO
6HQWLPHQWV.   6
 
Smith’s resignation from the Chair at the early age of forty-one would no doubt surprise Hume, but 
it may well be that the proposed visit to France was attractive precisely because it afforded an 
opportunity to meet a group of thinkers whom Smith so much admired.  
 
Smith left Glasgow in January 1764 and arrived in Paris on 13 February. He resigned from his 
academic post the following day (Corr, letter 81). On 4 March he was in Toulouse which was to be 
his base for many months. David Hume arranged a number of introductions but few of his contacts 
were available, causing Smith to write to Hume that the ‘life which I led at Glasgow was a 
pleasurable dissipated life, in comparison of that which I lead here at present’. He added that ‘I have 
begun to write a book in order to pass away the time. You may believe I have very little to do’ 
(Corr, letter 82).    
But the situation soon improved, partly as the result of a series of expeditions to Bordeaux, the 
Pyrenees, and Montpelier. 
 
Smith arrived back in Paris in February 1766, to begin a stay of some ten months. The visit was 
clouded by the developing quarrel between Rousseau and Hume. Further, in August, Smith was 
caused real anxiety by the illness of the Duke. The Duke recovered, but sadly his brother was taken 
ill in October and died on the nineteenth of the month. At this point, the party left for home, and 
reached London on 1 November. Smith never left Britain again. 
 
But from an intellectual point of view, the visit was a resounding success. Hume’s contacts and the 
reputation of TMS ensured an entry to both English and French circles. The latter were especially 
important in that Smith was afforded an opportunity to meet Diderot, Helvetius and Holbach. But 
there were other important contacts to be made, which are of particularly interest to the economist 
and to commentators on WN. These included Quesnay, Mirabeau, Dupont de Nemours and, 
amongst others, Mercier de la Riviere whose book /¶RUGUH QDWXUHO HW HVVHQWLHO GHV VRFLHWLHV
SROLWLTXHV (1767) was considered by Smith to be ‘the most distinct and best connected account’ of 
Physiocratic doctrine.  
 
When Smith arrived in Paris, the School was at the zenith of its influence. Two journals, the 
-RXUQDOG¶$JULFXOWXUH and the (SKHPHULGHVGX&LWR\HQ carried articles of a professional nature 
while in addition the central texts were already published, most notably Quesnay’s 7DEOHDX (1758), 
Mirabeau’s )ULHQGRI0DQ (1756, 1760) and the 3KLORVRSKLH5XUDOH (1763).  
 
The content of Smith’s library confirms his interest in the School. But it is also important to notice 
that he enjoyed the friendship of Quesnay, whom he described as ‘one of the worthiest men in 
France and one of the best physicians that is to be met with in any country. He was not only 
physician but the friend and confident of Madam Pompadour, a woman who was no contemptible 
judge of merit’ (Corr, letter 97). In addition, we have Dugald Stewart’s authority that ‘Mr Smith 
had once an intention (as he told me himself) to have inscribed to him his :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV’ 
(Stewart, III.12). 
 
Much Physiocratic writing was to prove unattractive to some, most obviously, perhaps, the doctrine 
of legal despotism and a political philosophy which envisaged a constitutional monarch modelled 
upon the Emperor of China. The uncritical attitudes of the disciples to the teaching of the master, 
Quesnay, were also a source of aggravation.  
 
But Smith did recognise that the system: 
   7
  ‘with all its imperfections, is, perhaps, the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet 
been published upon the subject of political economy, and is upon that account well worth the 
consideration of every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very 
important science’ (IV.ix.38). 
 
 
The reason for this assessment may be found in the Physiocratic definition of wealth, in their liberal 
attitude to trade policy, but above all else in the quality of the basic model (in sharp contrast to 
Linguet who wrote off the 7DEOHDX as ‘an insult to common sense, to reason, and philosophy’ 
(Rothbard, 377). Quesnay’s purpose was both practical and theoretical. As Meek has indicated, 
Quesnay announced his purpose in a letter to Mirabeau which accompanies the first edition of the 
7DEOHDX
 
  ‘I have tried to construct a fundamental 7DEOHDX of the economic order for the purpose of 
displaying expenditure and products in a way which is easy to grasp. And for the purpose of 
forming a clear opinion about the organisation and disorganisation which the government 






The model in question sought to explore the inter-relationships between output, the generation of 
income, expenditure and consumption – or in Quesnay’s words, a ‘general system of expenditure, 
work, gain and consumption’ (Meek, 1962, 374) which would expose the point that ‘the whole 
magic of a well ordered society is that each man works for others, while believing that he is 
working for himself’ (Meek, 1962, 70).    
 
Peter Groenewegen has confirmed that 7XUJRW was in Paris between July and September 1766 
(Groenewegen, 1969, 272). The belief that the two men met and that they discussed economic 
questions is supported by the Abbe Morellet who, in a passage which refers to Smith, confirmed 
that: 
 
  ‘M. Turgot, who like me loved things metaphysical, estimated his talents greatly. We saw 
him several times; he was presented at the house of M. Helvetius; we talked of commercial 




But it is not known how often the two men met, and it appears that they did not correspond. In a 
letter to the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, dated 1 November 1785, Smith referred to the ‘ever-to-be-
regretted Mr Turgot’ and added that ‘tho’ I had the happiness of his acquaintance, and I flattered 
myself, even of his friendship and esteem, I never had that of his correspondence’ (Corr, letter 248).   
But if the two men ZHUH friends it is perhaps hardly surprising in view of the fact that their scientific 
temperaments were so similar. 
 
The purely economic analysis must also have made an immediate impact on Smith not least because 
Turgot opened his argument, as he had originally done, with the division of labour. In this 
connection, Turgot drew attention to the causes of increased productivity and to the associated point 
that ‘the reciprocal exchange of needs, renders men necessary to one another and constitutes the 
bond of society’ (Meek, 1973, 122).   8
 
But Turgot also offered a more familiar account of the ‘bond’ by offering a model which linked the 
different sectors of activity, and the various socio-economic groups, in a cycle of activities which 
involve the generation of income, expenditure, and productive activity. 
 
The first class may be represented as that of the cultivators. Turgot effectively re-stated the by-now 
time-honoured dictum that ‘it is always the land which is the primary and unique source of all 
wealth’ (147).   Strictly speaking the Husbandman: 
 
  ‘is therefore the unique source of all wealth, which, through its circulation, animates all the 
industry of society;  because he is the only one whose labour produces anything over and 
above the wages of labour’ (123). 
 
 
As before, the &XOWLYDWRUV are designated as the ‘productive class’. 
 
The second social group is represented by the 3URSULHWRUV of land (the disposable class) who 
receive an income in the form of UHQW. This class: 
 
  ‘may be employed to meet the general needs of the Society, for example, in war and the 
administration of justice, whether through personal service, or through the payment of a part 
of its revenue’ (127). 
 
 
Turgot added, in a passage whose implications would be uncomfortable for some, that: 
 
 
  ‘The Proprietor enjoys nothing except through the labour of the Cultivator … but the 
Cultivator has need of the Proprietor only by virtue of human conventions and the 
civil laws’ (128). 
 
 
Finally there are the DUWLVDQV, who do not generate any net revenue; also the VWLSHQGLDU\ class, who 
are ‘supported by the product of the land’ (127). 
 
These would have been regarded as fairly conventional points, and so too would Turgot’s emphasis 
on the role of capital (fixed and circulating). But it is at this stage that Turgot advanced beyond 
Quesnay, by introducing a distinction between Entrepreneurs and Wage Labour, and, therefore, a 
further distinction between profits and wages as categories of return. 
 
It is worthy of note that Turgot should have defined SURILW as the reward accruing to Entrepreneurs 
for the risks incurred in combining the factors of production (ie, fixed and circulating capitals), 
while the ‘simple workman, who possesses only his hands and his industry, has nothing except in so 
far as he succeeds in selling his toil to others’ (122). 
 
The relevant passages deserve some elaboration. The industrial stipendiary class: 
 
 ‘finds itself, so to speak, subdivided into two orders: that of the Entrepreneurs, 
Manufacturers and Masters who are all possessors of large capitals which they turn to account 
by setting to work, through the medium of their advances the second order, which consists of   9
ordinary Artisans who possess no property but their own hands, who advance nothing but 
their daily labour, and who receive no profit but their wages’ (153). 
 
 
Turgot also remarked that the position of the Entrepreneurs engaged in agriculture ‘must be the 
same as that of the Entrepreneurs in Factories’ (ibid), adding that: 
 
 ‘We also see that it is capitals alone which establish and maintain great Agricultural 
enterprises, which give the land, so to speak, an invariable rental value, and which ensure to 




Turgot isolated four distinct factors of production (land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship), and 
three categories of return (rent, wages, and profit). He also supplied a distinctive version of the 
circular flow. 
 
If we map these points against Quesnay’s basic model it now emerges that the entrepreneurs 
engaged in agriculture advance rent to the proprietors, thus providing this group with an income 
which is available for use in a given time period. The Entrepreneurs advance wages to labour as a 
group and also effect purchases EHWZHHQ the sectors in which they are engaged, as well as ZLWKLQ 
the sectors to which they belong. 
 
Looked at from another point of view, Turgot’s model indicates that output is made up of consumer 
and investment goods; that the income thus generated may be divided into two streams 
(consumption and saving) and used to make purchases of consumer and investment goods. The 
goods withdrawn from the market in a given period are then replaced by virtue of current 
productive activity. While aware of the possibility of contraction, it is interesting to note that Turgot 
believed that savings will normally be converted into capital expenditure ‘sur le champ’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954, 324; Groenewegen, 279). 
 
Smith’s commentary of Physiocratic teaching is readily accessible and provided his readers with a 
broadly accurate account of the $QDO\VH. The detailed account which Smith offered (WN, IV.ix) is 
made even more intriguing by the fact that while remaining faithful to the original, he went to great 
pains to associate the ‘super model’ with a clear division between factors of production and 






That Smith benefited from his examination of the French system was quickly noted by Cannan. In 
referring to the theories of distribution and to the macro-economic dimension, Cannan noted that: 
 
  ‘When we find that there is no trace of these theories in the /HFWXUHV, and that in the 
meantime Adam Smith had been to France … it is difficult to understand, why we should be 
asked, without any evidence, to refrain from believing that he came under physiocratic 
influence after and not before or during his Glasgow period’. 
 
 




  ‘Adam Smith, as his chapter on agricultural systems shows, did not appreciate the minutiae 
of the table very highly, but he certainly took these main ideas and adapted them as well as 
he could to his Glasgow theories’ (1904, xxxi). 
 
 
Smith’s debts to the physiocratic PRGHO may be seen in the content of the analytical apparatus 
which was developed in the first two books of WN.   In these books, Smith in effect transformed his 
earlier, sophisticated, analysis of the interdependence of economic phenomena in such a way as to 
permit him to create a system which was at once descriptive and analytical. Building upon an 
analysis which owed much to the /HFWXUHV and to the Physiocrats, Smith developed a synthetic 
system which offered an opportunity to understand the full range of problems which should be 





The concept of an economy involving a flow of goods and services, and the appreciation of the 
importance of intersectoral dependencies, were familiar in the eighteenth century. Such themes are 
dominant features of the work done, for example, by Sir James Steuart and David Hume. But what 
is distinctive about Smith’s work, at least as compared to his 6FRWWLVK contemporaries, is the 
emphasis given to the importance of WKUHHGLVWLQFWIDFWRUV of production (land, labour, capital) and 
to the three categories of return (rent, wages, profit) which correspond to them. What is distinctive 
to the modern eye is the way in which Smith deployed these concepts in providing an account of the 
flow of goods and services between the sectors involved and between the different socio-economic 
groups (proprietors of land, capitalists, and wage-labour). The approach is also of interest in that 
Smith, following the lead of the French Economists, worked in terms of period analysis – the year 
was typically chosen, so that the working of the economy is examined within a significant time 
dimension as well as over a series of time periods. Both versions of the argument emphasise the 
importance of capital, fixed and circulating. 
 
Taking the economic system as a whole, Smith suggested that the WRWDOVWRFNRIVRFLHW\ could be 
divided into three parts. There is, first, that part of the total stock which is reserved for immediate 
FRQVXPSWLRQ, and which is held by all consumers (Capitalists, labour and proprietors) reflecting 
purchases made in previous time periods. The characteristic feature of this part of the total stock is 
that it affords no revenue to its possessors since it consists in the stock of ‘food, cloaths, household 
furniture, etc, which have been purchased by their proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely 
consumed’ (WN, II.i.12). 
 
Secondly, there is that part of the total stock which may be described as ‘IL[HGFDSLWDO’ and which 
will be distributed between the various groups in society. This part of the stock, Smith suggested, is 
composed of the ‘useful machines’ purchased in preceding periods but currently held by the 
undertakers engaged in manufacture, the quantity of useful buildings, and of ‘improved land’ in the 
possession of the ‘capitalist’ farmers and the proprietors, together with the ‘acquired and useful 
abilities’ of all the inhabitants (WN, II.i.13-17), that is, human capital. 
 
Thirdly, there is that part of the WRWDO stock which may be described as ‘FLUFXODWLQJFDSLWDO’, and 
which again has several components, these being: 
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1  The quantity of money necessary to carry on the process of circulation. 
 
2  The stock of provisions and other agricultural products that are available for sale during the 
current period, but are still in the hands of either the farmers or merchants. 
 
3  The stock of raw materials and work in process, held by merchants, undertakers, or those 
capitalists engaged in the agricultural sector (including mining). 
 
4  The stock of manufactured goods (consumption and investment goods) created during the 
previous period, but which remain in the hands of undertakers and merchants at the 
beginning of the period examined (WN, II.i.19-22). 
 
The logic of the process can be best represented by separating the activities involved much in the 
manner of the physiocratic model with which Smith was familiar. Let us suppose that, at the 
beginning of the time period in question, the major capitalist groups possess the net receipts earned 
from the sale of products in the previous period, and that the undertakers engaged in agriculture 
open by transmitting the total rent due to the proprietors of land for the current use of that factor.   
The income thus provided will enable the proprietors to make the necessary purchases of 
consumption (and investment) goods in the current period, thus contributing to reduce the stocks of 
such goods with which the undertakers and merchants began the period. 
 
Secondly, let us assume that the undertakers engaged in both sectors, together with the merchant 
groups, transmit to wage labour the content of the wages fund, thus providing this socio-economic 
class with an income that can be used in the current period. It is worth noting in this connection that 
the capitalist groups transmit a fund to wage labour which formed a part of their VDYLQJV, providing 
by this means an income that is available for current FRQVXPSWLRQ. 
 
Thirdly, the undertakers engaged in agriculture and manufactures will make purchases of 
consumption and investment goods from each other, through the medium of retail and wholesale 
merchants, thus generating a series of expenditures linking the two major sectors. Finally, the 
process of circulation may be seen to be completed by the purchases made by individual 
undertakers within their own sectors. Once again, these purchases will include consumption and 
investment goods, thus contributing still further to reduce the stocks of commodities that were 
available for sale when the period under examination began, and which formed part of the 
circulating capital of the society in question. Looked at in this way, the ‘circular flow’ could be seen 
to involve purchases that take goods from the circulating capital of society, which are in turn 
matched by a continuous process of UHSODFHPHQW by virtue of current production of materials and 
finished goods – where both types of production require the use of the fixed and circulating capitals 
of LQGLYLGXDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV, while generating the income flows needed to purchase commodities 
(and services). Smith elaborated on the argument. 
 
The expenditure of the consumers of particular commodities in effect replaces the outlays of those 
who retail them, just as the capital of the retailer replaces, together with its profits, that of the 
wholesale merchant from whom he purchases goods, thereby enabling him to continue in business 
(WN, II.v.9). In turn, the capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, together with their profits, the 
capitals of the farmers and manufacturers of whom he purchases the rude and manufactured 
products which he deals in, and thereby enable them to continue their respective trades (WN, 
ii.v.10). At the same time, part of the capital of the master manufacturer is ‘employed as a fixed 
capital in the instruments of his trade, and replaces, together with its profits, that of some other   12
artificer of whom he purchases them. Part of this circulating capital is employed in purchasing 
materials, and replaces, with their profits, the capitals of the farmers and miners of whom he 
purchases them. But a great part of it is always, either annually, or in a much shorter period, 
distributed among the different workmen whom he employs’ (WN, II.iv.11). The farmers perform a 
similar function with regard to the manufacturing sector. 
 
Smith can be seen to have addressed a series of problems which begin with an analysis of the 
division of labour, before proceeding to the discussion of value, price and allocation, and thence to 
the issue of distribution in any one time period and over time. 
 
The analysis offered in the first book enabled Smith to proceed to the discussion of both macro-
statics and macro-dynamics, in the context of a model where all magnitudes are dated. What Smith 
had produced was a model of conceptualised reality which was essentially descriptive, and which 
was further illustrated by reference to an DQDO\WLFDO system which, if on occasion subject to 
ambiguity, was none the less so organised as to meet the requirements of the Newtonian ideal. The 






J S Mill, the archetypal classical economist of a later period, is known to have remarked that ‘The 
:HDOWKRI1DWLRQV is in many parts obsolete and in all, imperfect’. Writing in 1926, Edwin Cannan 
observed: 
 
  ‘Very little of Adam Smith’s scheme of economics has been left standing by subsequent 
enquirers. No one now holds his theory of value, his account of capital is seen to be 
hopelessly confused, and his theory of distribution is explained as an ill-assorted union 
between his own theory of prices and the Physiocratic fanciful Economic Table’ (1926, 123). 
 
 
In view of authoritative judgements such as these, it is perhaps appropriate to ask what elements in 
this story should command the attention of the historian and economist. A number of points might 
be suggested. 
 
First, there is the issue of VFRSH. As we have seen, Smith’s approach to the study of political 
economy was through the examination of history and ethics. The historical analysis is important in 
that he set out to explain the origins of the commercial stage. The ethical analysis is important to the 
economist because it is here that Smith identifies the values which are appropriate to the modern 
situation. It is here that we confront the emphasis on the desire for status (which is essentially 
Veblenesque) and the qualities of mind which are necessary to attain this end: industry, frugality, 
prudence. 
 
The TMS also reminds us that the pursuit of economic ends takes place within a VRFLDO context, and 
that men maximise their chances of success by respecting the rights of others. In Smith’s sense of 
the term, ‘prudence’ is essentially rational self-love. In a famous passage from the TMS (II.ii.2.1) 
Smith noted, with regard to the competitive individual, that: 
 
  ‘In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and 
strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should   13
justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a 
violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of’. 
 
 
Smith’s emphasis upon the fact that self-interested actions take place within a social setting and that 
men are motivated (generally) by a desire to be approved of by their fellows, raises some interesting 
questions of continuing relevance. For example, in an argument which bears upon the analysis of 
the TMS, Smith noted in effect that the rational individual may be constrained by the reaction of the 
spectator of his conduct – a much more complex case than that which more modern approaches may 
suggest. Smith made much of the point in his discussion of Mandevilles ‘licentious system’ which 
supported the view that private vices were public benefits, in suggesting that the gratification of 
desire should be consistent with observance of the rules of propriety – as defined by the spectator, 
ie, by an external agency. In an interesting variant on this theme, Etzioni has recently noted that we 
need to recognise ‘at least two irreducible sources of valuation or utility: pleasure and morality’ 
(1988, 21-24). 
 
Secondly, there are a series of issues which arise from Smith’s interest in political economy as a 
system. The idea of a single all-embracing conceptual system, whose parts should be mutually 
consistent, is not easily attainable in an age where the division of labour has increased the quantity 
of science through specialisation. Smith was aware of the division of labour in different areas of 
science, and of the fact that specialisation often led to systems of thought which were inconsistent 
with each other ($VWURQRP\, IV.35, 52, 67; Skinner, 1996, 43). But the division of labour within a 
EUDQFK of science, eg, economics, has led to a situation where sub-branches of a single subject may 
be inconsistent with one another. 
 
As a third point, it may be noted that one of the most significant features of Smith’s vision of the 
economic process lies in the fact that it has a significant time dimension. For example, in dealing 
with the problem of value in exchange, Smith made due allowance for the fact that the process 
involves judgements with regard to the utility of the commodities to be acquired, and the disutility 
involved in creating the goods to be exchanged. In the manner of his predecessors (Hutcheson, 
Carmichael and Pufendorf), Smith was aware of the distinction between utility (and disutility) 
anticipated and realised, and, therefore, of the process of adjustment which would inevitable take 
place through time. 
 
Smith’s theory of price, which allows for a wide range of changes in taste, is also distinctive in that 
it allows for competition DPRQJ and EHWZHHQ buyers and sellers, while presenting the allocative 
mechanism as one which involves simultaneous and inter-related adjustments in ERWK factor and 
commodity markets (Skinner, 1996). 
 
As befits a writer who was concerned to address the problems of change, and adjustment to change, 
Smith’s position was also distinctive in that he was not directly concerned with the phenomenon 
even of SDUWLDO equilibrium. For Smith, the ‘natural’ (supply) price was, as it were: 
 
 ‘the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating … 
whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of response and 
continuance, they are constantly tending towards it’(WN, I.vii.15). 
 
 
But perhaps the most intriguing feature of the PDFUR model is to be found in the way in which it 
was linked to the analytics of Book I and in the way in which it was specified. Smith argued that 
incomes are generated as a result of productive activity, thus making it possible for commodities to   14
be withdrawn from the ‘circulating’ capital of society. The consumption goods withdrawn from the 
existing stock may be used up in the present period, or added to the stock reserved for immediate 
consumption;  or used to replace more durable goods which had reached the end of their lives in the 
current period. In a similar manner, undertakers and merchants may also add to their stocks of 
materials, or to their holding of fixed capital, while replacing the plant which had reached the end of 
its operational life. It is equally obvious that undertakers and merchants may add to, or reduce their 
LQYHQWRULHV in ways which will reflect the change patterns of demand for consumption and 
investment goods, and their past and current levels of production. 
 
Smith’s emphasis upon the point that different ‘goods’ have different life-cycles (which may derive 
from Steuart) also means that the pattern of purchase and replacement may vary continuously as the 
economy moves through different time periods, and in ways which reflect the various age profiles 
of particular products as well as the pattern of demand for them. If Smith’s model of the circular 
flow is to be seen as a spiral, rather than a circle, it soon becomes evident that this spiral is likely to 
expand (and contract) through time at variable rates. 
 
It is perhaps this total vision of the complex working of the economy that led Mark Blaug to 
comment on Smith’s distinctive and sophisticated grasp of the economic SURFHVV and to distinguish 
this from his contribution to particular DUHDV of economic analysis. 
 
Blaug noted that: 
 
 ‘In appraising Adam Smith, or any other economist, we ought always to remember that 
brilliance in handling purely economic concepts is a very different thing from a firm grasp of 
the essential logic of economic relationships. Superior technique does not imply superior 
insight and vice-versa. Judged by standard of analytical competence, Smith is not the greatest 
of eighteenth century economists. But for an acute insight into the nature of the economic 
process, it would be difficult to find Smith’s equal (1985, 57). 
 
Joseph Schumpeter, not always a warm critic of ‘A Smith’, yet regarded the WN as ‘the peak 
success of (the) period: 
 
 ‘though  the  :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV contained no really novel ideas, and though it cannot rank 
with Newton’s 3ULQFLSLD or Darwin’s 2ULJLQ as an intellectual achievement, it is a great 
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The theory of comparative advantage, commonly – and with some justice - attributed to David 
RICARDO, is one of the most successful and most durable explanatory notions of international 
economic exchange. I take it up here for two related reasons, the one forward -looking, the other 
backward-looking in time. The forward-looking aspect is the question whether RICARDO´s model 
will provide a useful tool for analysing the economic consequences of the future European 
enlargement which will concern economies at much lower stages of economic development and of  
per capita national incomes. The backward looking question is whether RICARDO really provided 
a model that was so much more technically advanced than what Adam SMITH had already stated in 
the :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV.  
 
In this paper  I attempt to put the history of economic analysis to its noblest use: namely to find in 
the ideas of the past a hint or germ of such solutions for the economic problems of the future as are 
better suited to the future´s  changing circumstances than the standard modes of analysis; or, in 
short, to activate the innovatory power of past thought over that of the present.  
 
As HAYEK among others pointed out, the social world is much too complicated to be analysed 
completely by our limited human understanding. Economics therefore is purposeful simplification, 
and, if done well, we can hope it is inspired simplification. Thus it is also historically specific. In 
international economics particularly, the basic assumptions tend to show a high degree of built-in 








One of the  most interesting features of the leading modern text-book in International Economics, 
that by P. KRUGMAN and M. OBSTFELD
1, is its forcefully voiced doubt that the HECKSCHER-
OHLIN model, which dominated foreign trade theory (and practice) during the 1960s and 1970s,  
has any explanatory power left. As is well-known, the above named model, now usually called the 
“HOS-model” (as embodying also the important contributions by Paul SAMUELSON together with 
Gustav STOLPER
2) is a two country, two commodity and two factor model, the factors commonly 
                                                           
1 Paul R. KRUGMAN and Maurice OBSTFELD; ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(FRQRPLFV±7KHRU\DQG3ROLF\, Now: Addison – 
Wesley Publishing, 4
th  edition 1994, 5
th edition 1997, 6
th edition 2000. 
 
2 See Paul A. SAMUELSON, “International Trade and the Equalisation of Factor Prices”, Economic Journal 58 (1948), 
pp. 163-184; the same, “International Factor Price Equalisation Once Again”, Economic Journal 59 (1949), pp. 181-
196. 
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assumed to be labour and capital, the relative quantities and (with imperfect trade substitution)  
possibly also the relative prices of these factors differing between countries. The country relatively 
abundant in one of these factors will mainly provide the commodity the production of which uses 
this abundant factor relatively intensively, and vice versa. The model assumes free commodity trade 
but no factor movement. Now KRUGMAN points out that, as capital is once more freely mobile 
world-wide, there is no such thing as relative abundance or scarcity of capital anywhere in the 
world. Thus the model founded on the availability of capital relative to labour breaks down.
3 And, 
indeed, empirical tests of this type of HOS model commonly already showed rather poor results,
4 
even before a general movement of capital became overwhelming once more. Therefore 
KRUGMAN concludes that the Ricardian model is still the best explanation of international trade 
available; and, of course, likewise his own “new trade theory model”, based on monopolistically 
competitive markets, is best suited to the trade between the most developed countries. The latter 
tend to trade much in heterogeneous commodities, whose production is best described by a cost 
structure with considerable fixed costs and constant marginal costs, i. e. KRUGMAN´s own 
modelling structure. 
 
It may be disputed whether KRUGMAN´s objection to the explanatory power of the “HOS-model” 
has in recent years been fully convincing. First of all, the rates of return on capital expected by 
investors in emerging markets differ substantially from those achieved in the economically most 
advanced nations: Obviously, firms in emerging markets often have to pay substantial risk premia, 
basically due to higher country risks. Thus, in spite of free international capital mobility, capital 
cannot be imported perhaps at the same conditions as in the exporting country and, if so, cannot be 
considered an internationally homogeneous factor. Less developed countries still remain poorer in 
capital. They remain economies with a higher capital price due to a greater scarcity of capital. It 
must be pointed out, however, that the concept of riskiness is not easily introduced into pure trade 
models.  
Secondly, it may well be doubted that –  among the many possible stylised groupings of the factors 
of production in international trade – the deepest insights are provided by the capital-labour 
                                                           
 
3 KRUGMAN-OBSTFELD have progressively toned down their explicit criticism of the HECKSCHER-OHLIN model, 
evidently more for commercial reasons than others. The fourth edition, p. 79, after speaking of the “negative results of 
tests”, said: “there is by now strong evidence against the pure HECKSCHER-OHLIN model. The best answer at this 
point seems to be to return to the Ricardian idea that the trade pattern is largely driven by international differences in 
technology rather than resources”. From the fifth edition, p. 85, the results are no longer “negative” but “mixed”. The 
second sentence above is dropped and substituted by: “Most trade theorists now believe that to explain…the pattern of 
international trade…. it is necessary to drop the HECKSCHER-OHLIN assumption that countries share the same 
technologies”. The sixth edition, p. 85, only repeats the first sentence quoted. 
 
4 See, e.g., Alan DEARDORFF, “Testing Trade Theories and Predicting Trade Flows”; in: Ronald W. JONES and Peter 
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dichotomy, or, more precisely, a dichotomy of all the different kinds of labour on the one hand and 
all the different kinds of capital on the other. A HOS-type model using as the stylised factor 
dichotomy qualified labour on the one hand and unqualified labour on the other may provide much 
better results than models with the usual capital-labour dichotomy.
5  But such an improved 
modelling structure has its own difficulties. The qualification of labour is a continuous variable of 
infinitely small gradations relative to unqualified labour, and it may be doubtful where exactly this 
continuum should be split. And if one finds a meaningful split does such a concept as, e. g., “higher 
education” mean the same thing in two geographically widely separated areas? It is also quite 
possible that after appropriate classification one is stuck with the rather trite conclusion that a 
country cannot produce commodities for which it lacks essential factors, e. g. highly qualified 
labour. A HOS-type model breaks down if one country does not have enough of each factor needed, 
or, technically speaking, it breaks down when corner solutions have to be expected. 
 
Now KRUGMAN may have somewhat overdone his criticism of the present empirical relevance of 
HOS modelling: For Europe, e. g., or, at least, for the Europe of a quarter century ago, the HOS 
model did provide some useful insights into patterns of specialisation. But the model of 
international trade due to comparative advantage, i. e. Ricardos model, still provides a much more 
valid insight, an insight into both a more easily measurable and a more frequently relevant 
difference between conditions of production. What still seems to matter most are the technological 
differences between countries. In particular, developed countries obviously trade much in goods 







Ricardo´s original insight, however, is based on the assumption of a lack of factor movements. And 
the problem of integration within the European Community and the new members acceding to it is 
precisely one of a continually more integrated factor market. As to the newly acceding countries 
and their lag  in total factor productivities relative to the former core countries of the EU the most 
important question is: What sort of integration will come about: Will there be only an integration of 
the markets for goods and services, or will there mainly  occur a movement of capital from the old 
member countries, or will the dominant feature be a movement of labour from the new members to 
the old? Perhaps, more precisely: What mixture of these three possibilities will we get? The 
Ricardian model is singularly ill-suited to answer these questions. 
RICARDO´s own defence of his modelling structure is both logically weak and historically 
counterfactual. Immediately after his rather brief treatment of the theory of trade due to comparative 
advantage, RICARDO says: 
“Experience, however, shows that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the 
immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit 
the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself, with all his habits fixed, to a strange 
government and new laws, check the emigration of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry 
to see weakened, induce most men of property to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own 
country, rather than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations”.
6 
 
                                                           
5 See as a short analysis, e.g., Jeffrey D. SACHS and Howard J. SHATZ, “U. S. Trade with Developing Countries and 
Wage Inequality”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 86 (1996), pp. 234-239. 
6 7KH:RUNVDQG&RUUHVSRQGHQFHRI'DYLG5LFDUGR, ed. P. SRAFFA, vol. I, 2QWKH3ULQFLSOHVRI3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\DQG
7D[DWLRQCambridge, Univ. Press, 1970, ch. VI, p. 136f.   20
This is an astonishing and highly “ad hoc” statement, coming, as it does, from the son of an 
immigrant! Note that it is, implicitly and counterfactually, assumed by RICARDO that labour 
cannot move without its complement of capital and, on the other hand, capital can only move 
together with its owner. 
 
Historically, RICARDO´s statement was incorrect. The first decade after the Napoleonic wars, in 
which RICARDO published the three editions of his 3ULQFLSOHV, saw a particularly large volume of 
international capital transfers. The House of BARING, specialized in large international loans, was 
then called the “sixth world power”. Admittedly, the capital transfers were more between 
governments and less between private persons. Furthermore, in this period British mechanics 
emigrated to the continent in noticeable numbers, bringing with them the know-how as how to run 
factories efficiently. The British mechanics were advertised proudly by their Continental employers 
as personal proof of the quality of the commodities to be produced by newly founded factories. 
 
Nevertheless, the RICARDIAN emphasis on commodity trade instead of international factor 
movements did not fare badly historically, although for reasons other than those directly implicit in 
his theory. During the middle two quarter centuries of the 19
th  century commodity trade became 
much cheaper due to innovations in transport, i. e. due to the railways and the steam boat. Then it 
was the availability of as yet hardly cultivated land in the New World – or, rather the New Worlds – 
which stimulated remunerative comparative advantage trade. Therefore, an unprecedented increase 
in international factor movements during the last quarter of the 19
th  century and up to 1914 did not 
invalidate the assumptions of comparative advantage trade: Factor movements basically just meant 
that more of the same could be produced in the then rapidly developing world without much 
substitution between factors. As Robert MUNDELL showed so admirably in his Nobel Lecture,
7 
international factor movements went into a progressive decline after 1914, reaching their nadir in 
the middle of the 20
th  century. MUNDELL does not stress that labour movements also were more 
and more restricted. There is the well-known switch of the USA to more restrictive immigration 
laws after the First World War. So in a sense the RICARDO model became the ideal model of 
international exchange during the Bretton Woods period with its emphasis on goods market 
integration but not on factor market integration. It has to be added that most trade in basic 
agricultural products was limited due to ever increasing protection in agriculture. Thus comparative 
advantage had to work only within the range of industrial products and not between industry and 
agriculture or, on the other hand, between industry and services, also often protected for political 
reasons. From 1980 onwards, the mobility of both labour and capital was once more on the 
increase, however. This is true particularly within the EU. Thus RICARDO´s idea of comparative 
advantage is not likely to help us understand the probable effects of the forthcoming European 
integration. It might even be a source of false hopes for the poor acceding countries. One of the 
leading German labour economists, a US-citizen teaching in Berlin, has even suggested that the 
most plausible effect might be increased unemployment in the new member countries;
8 and, one 
might add, immiserisation (at least in parts) instead of integration and income convergence. A tell-
tale example of difficulties of integration could be provided by Eastern Germany. It is quite 
possible, though not suggested by RICARDO, that up to a sufficiently small difference in per capita 
incomes trade may cause integration, while – in spite of political integration - economic 
disintegration or rather divergent developments may occur  whenever income differences are too 
large.  
 
                                                           
7 Robert A. MUNDELL, “A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century”, American Economic Review, 90 (June 2000), 
pp. 327-340. 
 
8 Michael C. BURDA, “Mehr Arbeitslose – Der Preis für die Osterweiterung?”; in: (UZHLWHUXQJGHU(8, Jahrestagung 
1999, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik N. F. 274, Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2000, pp. 79-102.   21
IV. 
 
In fact, Adam SMITH´s analysis in the :HDOWKRI1DWLRQVmay provide a better model than the 
Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. One reason is that RICARDO´s analysis is static as to 
technology while SMITH´s is not. Secondly, SMITH stresses above all economies of scale, which 
are ignored by RICARDO. For the enlargement of markets, economies of the scale of production 
may be crucial. For, as SMITH famously remarked, “the extent of (the division of labour) must 




One can often hear it said that SMITH did not yet have the insight of the theory of comparative – in 
contrast to absolute – advantage, the latter being an innovation of RICARDO’s. But the theory of 
comparative advantage is fully stated in the :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV, and is illustrated by an empirically 
more convincing case study than the weird example of RICARDO, who assumes that Portugal is 
more productive than England in everything. The theory of comparative advantage is stated already 
in the very first chapter of WN in the course of the analysis of the division of labour
10, where, of 
course it rightly belongs. SMITH says:  
 
“The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in 
manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in 
the former. Their lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and expense 
bestowed upon them, produce more, in proportion to the extent and natural fertility of the ground. 
But this superiority of produce is seldom much more than in proportion to the superiority of labour 
and expense. In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than 
that of the poor; or, at least it is never so much more productive, as it commonly is in manufactures. 
The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the same degree of goodness, come 
cheaper to market than that of the poor. ….The corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is 
as cheap as that of France, notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the latter 
country. The corn of France is, in the corn provinces, fully as good, and in most years nearly about 
the same price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and improvement, France is perhaps 
inferior to England. The corn-lands of England, however, are better cultivated than those of France, 
and the corn-lands of France are said to be much better cultivated than those of Poland. But though 
the poor country, notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in some measure, rival the 
rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can pretend to no such competition in its 
manufactures; at least if those manufactures suit the soil, climate, and situation of the rich country. 
The silks of France are better and cheaper than those of England, because the silk manufacture, at 
least under the present high duties upon the importation of raw silk, does not so well suit the climate 
of England as that of France. But the hard-ware and the coarse woollens of England are beyond all 
comparison superior to those of France, and much cheaper too in the same degree of goodness. In 
Poland there are said to be scarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of those coarser household 
manufactures excepted, without which no country can well subsist.”  
 
Note that SMITH’s example is nearly as detailed as that of RICARDO and that the latter uses as 
examples similar articles, wine and cloth, as those examined by SMITH. What is missing, in 
SMITH, however, is an aspect at least implied by RICARDO, the shift in employment in order to 
keep full employment as far as possible. The main technical difference in treatment is that 
RICARDO uses a numerical demonstration, which seems to impress the primitive mind more 
forcefully – and this in spite of the fact that his example is evidently factually absurd, Portugal 
                                                           
9  WN, I.iii.1, p. 31, in the Glasgow Edition, Oxford UP 1976. 
 
10 WN, I.i.4, 16f. My stress by underlining the key sentence.   22
being in his case in every industry absolutely more productive than the then “workshop of the 
world”. 
 
In another chapter SMITH concludes: “The natural advantages which one country has over another 
in producing particular commodities are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all the 
world to be in vain to struggle with them… Whether the advantages which one country has over 
another, be natural or acquired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country has 
those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the latter, 
rather to buy of the former than to make.” 
11 
 
If we now perform a mental jump in time over two and a quarter centuries and turn to the problems 
of present-day Poland, we find that its former comparative advantage in the production of corn (i.e. 
wheat) has waned by now. In SMITH’s time wheat for export was produced very cheaply on a large 
scale on the vast estates of the aristocracy, using cheap servile labour. Communism and post-
communist development have turned most of these large estates into small peasant holdings which 
produce wheat very inefficiently. Very few “natural or acquired“ advantages of Eastern Europe 
appear to be overwhelming; in fact by now it is not clear where any comparative advantage of 
Poland relative to the developed countries of EU Europe lies, while it is clear that its absolute 
productivity is vastly lower. Due to this misguided international specialisation – or, rather, non-
specialisation – the most likely outcome of EU integration of Poland is merely large scale 
emigration from Poland toward the West, particularly to Germany and Austria. Remember that, 
against RICARDO´s assumption of the fullest possible factor use, unemployment in Poland is at 







SMITH’s main contribution to foreign trade theory, however, does not lie in the static theory of 
comparative advantage, but in dynamic aspects. He stresses above all what we would now call 
economies of scale and positive external effects in production. Economies of scale and positive 
external effects have, indeed, proved very important for the success of the European Union over the 
past four decades. But it should be remembered that economies of scale favour in particular the 
most highly developed countries and much less so emerging nations. Economies of scale are by 
their very nature largest when the proportion of fixed costs relative to variable costs is highest. But 
high proportions of fixed to variable costs are typical exactly of the most advanced industries using 
highly qualified labour, the latter mostly lacking as yet in emerging economies. 
 
A high proportion of fixed capital occurs usually in industries with a high share of research and 
development costs, pharmaceuticals being a typical case: By definition, research and development 
provides an example of fixed costs, as they are run up prior to actual production. Thus it is the most 
highly developed economies which profit most by the extent of the market. Therefore, the opulent 
older EU-members are likely to profit more from EU enlargement than the countries newly 
acceding. Furthermore, in trying to catch up the new member countries may run into great 
difficulties because their few valuable research experts are likely to emigrate. SMITH justly 
remarks: “As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his 
neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation.   … A nation that would enrich itself by 
foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious and 
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commercial nations”.
12 From this point of view economic integration into EU-Europe of the 
Countries of Eastern Europe is likely to favour the latter; and that is, indeed, their hope. But this 
maxim presupposes that they do produce commodities meeting the high quality standards of 
Western Europe – and that is not so certain, at least in parts. 
SMITH’s central claim is, however: “By means of (foreign trade), the narrowness of the home 
market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from 
being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the 
produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its 
productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real 
revenue and wealth of  the society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually 
occupied in performing, to all the different countries between which it is carried on”.
13 
 
Thus, SMITH claims that foreign trade “encourages” each nation “to improve its productive 
powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost”. In contrast to RICARDO he emphasizes 
not only economies of scale but above all the stimulation of technical advances, and perhaps also 
(because his language is not quite clear here) the possibility that foreign trade may help to avoid 
temporary short-falls in home demand. Technical advances frequently presuppose a large and a 
stable market. These effects, indeed, have prevailed in the development within the European Union, 
rather than the static comparative advantages. 
 
Once more, however, it is not so clear whether these effects will be strong and ubiquitous in Eastern 
Europe, when it is likely that these countries will lose the best members of their labour force to the 
West: And this is particularly true of Poland with a tradition of migration. With not too large a gap 
in development – and consequently  not too large a gap in personal incomes – emigration of the 
most highly qualified person may often turn out to be only temporary: The most capable youngsters 
will acquire advanced skills in neighbouring countries, but after some years may return to practice 
them in their native environment. In such cases, the foreign country serves merely as a vocational 
college writ large. In the long run such migration rather rebounds to the advantage of the original 
home country. But if the development gap is too large, no such “return of the natives” may take 
place: There are just not enough opportunities at home.  
 
It remains to be seen which of these scenarios with be acted out on the stage of future European 
integration between, be it repeated, in part very unevenly developed aspirants. Adam SMITH, after 
all, only sketched one possibility. 
                                                           
12 WN, IV.iii.c.11, p. 494f. 













Wechselvoll wie Deutschlands äußere Geschichte ist die seines wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen 
Schrifttums. Dem mit dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg verbundenen Niedergang folgte eine Epoche, 
während deren der deutsche Kameralismus zwar zahlreiche Bücher minderen Ranges über die 
Verwaltung fürstlicher Domänen oder die Hebung des Landbaus hervorbrachte, aber nur wenige 
Werke, die als Wegbereiter moderner ökonomischer Theorie angesehen werden
2.  
 
Nicht viele Dogmenhistoriker wissen, daß dagegen im 16. Jahrhundert, während Humanismus und 
Reformation, ein neues ökonomisches Denken zum schriftlichen Ausdruck drängte. Hier spiegelte 
sich der Aufschwung, den vor allem Deutschlands Süden im Zeitalter der Entdeckungen ergriff. 
Roscher, der so viel zur Erforschung der Frühgeschichte der deutschen Nationalökonomie
3 leistete, 
hat auch auf die drei Flugschriften
4 aufmerksam gemacht, die wir hier im Faksimile vorlegen. Es 
handelt sich möglicherweise um das früheste Beispiel einer mit gedruckten Pamphleten 
ausgetragenen Kontroverse zu wirtschaftlichen Fragen.  
 
                                                           
1    This is a modified version of my Introductory Essay to 9DGHPHFXP ]X GUHL NODVVLVFKHQ 6FKULIWHQ
IUKQHX]HLWOLFKHU0Q]SROLWLN, edited by Bertram Schefold, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 
2000. Companion volume to the facsimile reprint of *HPH\QH6WLPPHQYRQGHU0XQW]GLH0QW]
%HODQJHQGH'VVHOGRUI: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 2000. 
2  In der Reihe der .ODVVLNHUGHU1DWLRQDO|NRQRPLH erschienen  
 Becher,  J.J.:  3ROLWLVFKHU 'LVFXUV. Repr. Frankfurt 1668, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 
1990; 
  Hörnigk, P.W. von: 2HVWHUUHLFKEHUDOOHV. Repr. o.O. 1684, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 
1997 und  
  Justi, J.H.G. von: *UXQGVlW]H GHU 3ROLFH\:LVVHQVFKDIW. Repr. Göttingen 1756, Düsseldorf: Verlag 
Wirtschaft und Finanzen 1993. 
  Herrn Dr. Karl Kunze verdanke ich die Anregung, die sehr seltenen, dem Gedankengut der deutschen 
Ökonomie zuzurechnenden Bände von Carl, E.L.: 7UDLWpGHODULFKHVVHGHVSULQFHVHWGHOHXUVpWDWVHWGHV
PR\HQVVLPSOHVHWQDWXUHOVSRXU\SDUYHQLU, Nachdr., hg. v. B. Schefold, 3 Bände, Hildesheim: Olms 
2000, wieder aufzulegen.  
3 Roscher,  W.:  *HVFKLFKWH GHU1DWLRQDO2HNRQRPLNLQ'HXWVFKODQG. Repr. München 1874, Düsseldorf: 
Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 1992 (.ODVVLNHUGHU1DWLRQDO|NRQRPLH) und 
  Roscher, W.: "Über die Blüte deutscher Nationalökonomik im Zeitalter der Reformation", in: +LVWRULVFK
SKLORORJLVFKH%HULFKWHGHU.VlFKVLVFKHQ*HVHOOVFKDIW v. 12. Dec. 1861, S. 145-174. 
4  'LHGUHL)OXJVFKULIWHQEHUGHQ0Q]VWUHLWGHUVlFKVLVFKHQ$OEHUWLQHUXQG(UQHVWLQHUXP. Hg. v. W. 
Lotz. Leipzig: Duncker 1893. Lotz gibt die Texte in dem schönen und kräftigen, uns heute nicht mehr 
immer leicht verständlichen Deutsch der Lutherzeit wieder; eine Übersetzung, die zugleich eine 
Interpretation ist, hat er beigegeben. Das klassische Werk wurde von Stadermann mit einer eigenen 
Einleitung und derjenigen von Lotz wieder abgedruckt, und zwar in der modernen Fassung, so daß unser 
Leser, wenn es nötig sein sollte, bequem auf diese Übersetzung zurückgreifen kann (Stadermann, H.-J.: 
'HU6WUHLWXPJXWHV*HOGLQ9HUJDQJHQKHLWXQG*HJHQZDUW. Tübingen: Mohr 1999). Die ersten beiden 
Flugschriften wurde für unsere Reihe nach der Erstausgabe faksimiliert, wobei der Anhang der zweiten 
Flugschrift, der aus einem Wiederabdruck der ersten besteht, weggelassen ist. Die Erstausgabe der dritten 
Flugschrift scheint verschollen; hier bildete der früheste der uns bekannt gewordenen Wiederabdrucke 
(Leipzig 1548) die Vorlage.    25
Bevor Roscher die Münzschriften als Keimlinge nationalökonomischer Wissenschaft zu würdigen 
lehrte, wurden sie als Quellen der Geld- und insbesondere der Münzgeschichte herangezogen
5. Ro-
scher, dem man schon die Wiederentdeckung des Oresmius
6 verdankte, sah das Hauptverdienst der 
Münzschriften in der Feststellung der Grundsätze, nach denen gutes Geld geprägt werden soll, wie 
das Oresmius - der sich freilich vorwiegend auf eine ethische Argumentation stützte - schon 
gefordert hatte. Diesen Standpunkt nimmt hier die albertinische Seite in der Debatte ein. Sachsen 
war nämlich aus dynastischen Gründen geteilt. Der eine (katholische) Teil stand unter der 
Herrschaft der Albertiner, die sich dafür einsetzten, den Silbergehalt der Münzen nicht zu ändern, 
während der andere Teil von den (protestantischen) Ernestinern regiert wurde, die eine 
Herabsetzung des Silbergehalts befürworteten. Der Streit mußte ausgetragen werden, weil sich 
beide Seiten durch eine Münzeinung und die regierenden Häuser durch gemeinsame Besitzinteres-
sen an den Silberminen verbunden fanden. Er endete mit einer vorläufigen Aufhebung der 
Verbindung - aus Gründen, die jenen ähneln, welche von Skeptikern der europäischen 
Währungsunion als mögliche Gründe eines künftigen Scheiterns derselben genannt werden. 
 
Wäre es nur um die Frage der Beibehaltung oder der Änderung des Münzfußes gegangen, hätten die 
wenigen erhaltenen Exemplare der Schriften in Bibliotheken und Archiven halbvergessen weiter ru-
hen können. Roscher erkannte jedoch, daß sie frühe Formulierungen merkantilistischer Lehrsätze 
enthalten. Heute sehen wir, daß in ihnen auch schon klassische Gesichtspunkte eingenommen wer-
den, daß um theoretische Begründungen gerungen wird und sich wirtschaftspolitische 
Schicksalsfragen der Reformationszeit angesprochen finden. Zu den Ursachen und Wirkungen des 
Binnen- und des Außenhandels, den Vorzügen der Geldwertstabilität und der 
Beschäftigungswirkungen von Abwertungen, der Vorteile der Konkurrenz- und der Gefahr der 
Monopolbildung, den erhofften oder eingebildeten wirtschaftlichen Besserstellungen dank 
politischer Bindung in Zünften oder durch staatliche Lenkung werden Ansichten geäußert, 
bestritten, verworfen und doch wieder aufgegriffen. Im Gespräch der beiden Namenlosen, von 
denen wir nicht einmal wissen, welche Stellungen sie bekleideten und woher sie ihr Wissen über 
Tatsachen und Zusammenhänge bezogen, schwingen auch die Leidenschaften der Zeit mit: welcher 
Glaube zu bekennen sei, wie sich Bauern, Handwerker und Edelleute versöhnen ließen, ob man sich 
für den von den Handelsgesellschaften herangetragenen Sturm der Neuerungen öffnen müsse, wie 
man den leicht ausführbaren Reichtum des Landes, das Silber, verwerten dürfe und wie man den 
eigenen Nutzen mit dem der Gemeinschaft zu vermitteln habe.  
 
Die in der Sprache Luthers vorgetragenen Argumente lassen sich also als ein Streit um den Umgang 
mit den wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen der Moderne lesen. Sie erscheinen insofern vielseitiger 
als die zeitlich nahestehende monetäre Schrift des Copernicus
7, die für die Klassikerreihe geeigneter 
gewesen wäre, wenn es sich nur darum handelte, in das geldtheoretische Wissen der Zeit einzufüh-
ren.  
 
Die Zentren der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Deutschland lagen zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts 
im Süden, als Städte wie Augsburg und Ulm den Verkehr mit Venedig und Antwerpen aufrecht 
erhielten, eine Heimindustrie (Weberei) sich entwickelte und bei einzelnen Gütern die ersten 
Schnüre zum künftigen Netz eines weltumspannenden Handels verknüpft wurden. Sachsen, das sich 
erst später zu einer industrialisierten Region wandeln sollte, hatte nicht viel zu bieten außer dem 
Silberexport. In den Münzschriften deutet sich der Zwiespalt an, vor dem Länder, die durch einen 
                                                           
5  Vgl. Klotzsch, J.F.: 9HUVXFKHLQHUFKXUVlFKVLVFKHQ0Q]JHVFKLFKWH9RQGHQlOWHVWHQELVDXIMHW]LJH
=HLWHQ. 1. Theil. Chemnitz: Stößel 1779, S. 250-254. 
6 Oresmius,  N.:  7UDFWDWXVGHQDWXUDRULJLQHMXUHHWPXWDWLRQLEXVPRQHWDUXP. Repr. 1485, Düsseldorf: 
Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 1995 (.ODVVLNHUGHU1DWLRQDO|NRQRPLH). 
7 Copernicus,  N.:  'LH*HOGOHKUHQGHV1LFRODXV&RSHUQLFXV7H[WHhEHUVHW]XQJHQ.RPPHQWDUH. Hg. v. E. 
Sommerfeld. Vaduz/Liechtenstein: Topos 1978.   26
Rohstoff reich sind, immer stehen: ob sie diesen Reichtum genießen dürfen, so lange er anhält, oder 
ob sie um den Preis von Lenkungsmaßnahmen den Aufbau einer Wirtschaftsstruktur fördern sollen, 
die künftig auch andere Exporte ermöglichen wird.  
 
Die Wirtschaftsformen der frühen Neuzeit sind von den unseren nicht so scharf unterschieden wie 
die der Antike oder des Hochmittelalters. Die vorher mit den ökonomischen Erwägungen organisch 
verbundenen philosophischen, juristischen und theologischen Überlegungen lösen sich ab wie eine 
alte Haut. Beide Autoren möchten ihren Lesern an mehreren Stellen zu verstehen geben, daß es 
ihnen mit dem Glauben ernst ist, aber die Verbindungen zwischen den Glaubensinhalten und den 
wirtschaftlichen Zielen spielen nur noch eine zurückgehende Rolle.  
 
Ich will versuchen, für die sächsischen Münzschriften einen geistesgeschichtlichen Hintergrund zu 
geben, indem ich anhand der Beispiele anderer Schriften aus dem deutschen Raum im 16. 
Jahrhundert den zeitgenössischen Umgang mit besonders strittigen Fragen beleuchte: Peutinger zur 
Rolle der Handelsgesellschaften und der sogenannten Monopole, Fronsperger zum Eigennutz als 
Triebkraft des wirtschaftlichen Handelns, Luther zur versuchten, in der Reformation erneuerten 
Rückbindung der Wirtschaft in die christliche Vorstellung von einem gottgefälligen Leben in der 
Gemeinschaft. Dann soll eine Zusammenfassung der Münzschriften, bezogen auf diese 








Die rechts- und wirtschaftspolitische Auseinandersetzung über die sogenannten Monopole war die 
"erste wirtschaftspolitische Debatte unserer Geschichte, die alle Stände und Volksschichten erregte 
und gezwungen hat, ihren Willen kund zu tun"
8. Das Staunen über das Aufsteigen der großen 
bürgerlichen Häuser, die Zweifel, ob der Erwerb ehrlich war, die Bewunderung für die 
unternehmerischen Leistungen und die Furcht vor der eigenen Verarmung, absolut oder im 
Vergleich zu den Erfolgreichen, klingen heute noch nach. Richard Ehrenbergs
9 Darstellung der 
Wirtschaftsmacht der Fugger wurde zu einem in mehrere Sprachen übersetzten Klassiker der 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Das späte 19. Jahrhundert sah eine Verwandtschaft zur Bildung von 
Unternehmerdynastien in der eigenen Zeit, und Ehrenberg
10 ließ eine populärwissenschaftliche 
Fassung folgen, in der er die Parallele zu den Rothschild und Krupp zog.  
 
Die Fugger, um uns nun an dieses Beispiel zu halten, waren bedeutende Kaufleute im Handel mit 
Venedig, begannen dann, sich im Bergbau zu engagieren, und betrieben die vor- und 
nachgelagerten Geschäfte, die mit der Silbergewinnung zusammenhingen. Die Verlagerung der 
Handelswege von Venedig nach Lissabon und Antwerpen erschwerten den Großhandel; sie 
erweiterten daraufhin das Kreditgeschäft und entschieden die Kaiserwahl 1519. Sie ermöglichten es 
Karl V. von Habsburg, den Sieg über Franz I. von Frankreich davonzutragen. Schrittweise, zögernd 
stiegen sie in den Adelsstand auf (denn er war ja im Geschäft hinderlich) und zogen mit dem Ruhm 
auch Hass auf sich.  
                                                           
8  Bog, I.: "Geleitwort", in: Blaich, F.: 'LH 5HLFKVPRQRSROJHVHW]JHEXQJ LP =HLWDOWHU .DUOV 9 ,KUH
RUGQXQJVSROLWLVFKH 3UREOHPDWLN. Stuttgart: G. Fischer 1967 (Schriften zum Vergleich von 
Wirtschaftsordnungen, H. 8), S. VII-VIII. 
9 Ehrenberg,  R.:  'DV=HLWDOWHUGHU)XJJHU*HOGNDSLWDOXQG&UHGLWYHUNHKULP-DKUKXQGHUW. 2 Bände. 
Jena: G. Fischer 1896. 
10  Ehrenberg, R.: 'LH)XJJHU5RWKVFKLOG.UXSS. 3. Aufl. Jena: G. Fischer 1925 [1901].   27
 
Zu einer Monopolbildung im engeren Sinn kam es kaum. Bei Silber und Barchent nie, bei Kupfer
11 
und Pfeffer nur vorübergehend. Man versuchte, in einer Periode fallender Preise die Produktion 
zurückzubinden. Der König von Portugal besaß ein Monopol über den Pfefferhandel, das er zur 
fiskalischen Absicherung der Kosten des Unterhalts seiner Kolonien nutze. Im Weitervertrieb des 
Pfeffers standen die Handelsgesellschaften jedoch im Wettbewerb. 
 
Die Fugger betätigten sich als Mäzene der Kunst und Wissenschaft und gaben den Armen, wovon 
noch heute die von ihnen für die Bedürftigen gebauten Wohnungen in Augsburg zeugen. Der 
Fugger-Mythos wurde seither zum selbständigen historischen Untersuchungsgegenstand
12. Die neue 
wirtschaftliche Erscheinung stellte solche Traditionen wie die Bindung von Unternehmensgröße 
und Preisbildung durch die Zünfte und die kirchliche Ächtung des Wuchers auf verschiedenen 
Ebenen in Frage. Die Politik ging gegen die Handelsgesellschaften vor. Sie waren ein 
Verhandlungsgegenstand auf dem Reichstag zu Köln von 1512. Auf dem Reichstag von Nürnberg 
von 1522/1523 suchte man ihr Kapital zu beschränken. Das Reichsgericht ermittelte gegen mehrere 
Augsburger Handelshäuser wegen Monopolverdacht, während andererseits der Kaiser seine 
Kreditgeber zu schützen suchte. Es wurden Gutachten geschrieben, unter denen die des Augsburger 
Stadtschreibers Conrad Peutinger
13 herausragen. Sie verdienen nicht nur das Interesse des Histo-
rikers, sondern sollten von der Theoriegeschichte wegen der Klarheit und Schärfe der 
Argumentation beachtet werden. Wir wollen sie in Auszügen verfolgen.  
 
Unter mehreren greifen wir besonders die zeitlich letzte und umfassende Denkschrift Peutingers aus 
dem Jahre 1530 heraus, die als Widerlegung des "Ratslag der monopolia halb"
14 des Monopol-Aus-
schusses des Augsburger Reichstags anzusehen ist.  
 
Schon 1523 hatte sich Peutinger gegen die Zunftvorschriften gewandt, welche die Zahl der 
Lehrlinge und Gesellen beschränkten und dadurch den besseren und fleißigeren Handwerkern die 
Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten raubten. "Et exempla quottidie habemus, quod si inter artifices 
conventum est, quod unus habeat nisi tot famulos, vel hoc tantum in suo artificio exerceat, in ista 
quidem conventione meliori artifici et qui bene suum artificium curat, prodigalitatem fugit, parsi-
moniam amat, semper obstat egens, pauper, prodigus, nihil curans et decoctor."
15  
 
So behindere man die Verwirklichung von Gottes Willen, des Glücks ("fortuna") und die bessere 
Leistung. Die traditionelle Ordnung ist nun gerade nicht die gottgewollte, sondern das Ziel ist, wie 
er dann in deutscher Sprache sagt: "In summa in kauffen, verkauffen, arbeit zue bestellen oder auf 
sich zu nemen, soll yederman frey sein"
16. 
 
Die Gegenposition wurde im "Ratslag der monopolia halb" (1530) formuliert
17. Da werden die 
Vorwürfe gegen die Gesellschaften - wenn man will, gegen eine Kartellbildung - erhoben: 
"erhalltung des fierkauffs sonnderliche verainigung ... aufrichten, den kauffer oder verkeuffer 
andingen, sollch gwar niemand dann inen zu kauffen zu geben, oder das er die nit neher geben woll, 
                                                           
11 Ehrenberg veröffentlichte im Anhang des ersten Bandes [1896, S. 417-420] zwei Verträge großer 
Augsburger Handelsgesellschaften über die Bildung eines Syndikats für den Kupferhandel.  
12 Burkhardt,  J.:  $XJVEXUJHU+DQGHOVKlXVHULP:DQGHOGHVKLVWRULVFKHQ8UWHLOV. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 
1996 (Colloquia Augustana, Bd. 3). 
13  Bauer, C.: "Conrad Peutingers Gutachten zur Monopolfrage. Eine Untersuchung zur Wandlung der 
Wirtschaftsanschauungen im Zeitalter der Reformation", Teil 1, in: $UFKLYIU5HIRUPDWLRQVJHVFKLFKWH, 
1954, Jg. 45, Heft 1, S. 1-43; sowie ders. Teil 2, HEHQGD, Heft 2, S. 145-196.  
14  A.a.O., S. 16. 
15  A.a.O., S. 4. 
16  A.a.O., S. 13. 
17  A.a.O., S. 16.   28




Gegen solche Monopolbildung sprächen das römische Recht und die Beschlüsse des Kölner 
Reichstags und des Kaisers Maximilian. Das Pfeffermonopol des Königs von Portugal gebe zu 
Absprachen der Gesellschaften Anlaß, man lasse die Preise steigen - allerdings nicht alle auf 
einmal, damit es niemand leicht merke
19. Die Gesellschaften werden für den Edelmetallexport 
verantwortlich gemacht, der unnützen Luxusgüterimporten dient; sie bringen den Metallhandel 
überhaupt in ihre Hände und verkaufen gar den Ungläubigen. Ihre Händlertätigkeit erfaßt 
schließlich auch traditionelle Handelsbereiche wie den von Vieh oder Getreide und "so werden die 
armen kaufleut durch dise reiche gesellschafften und furkauffer verderbt"
20. Verbote und 
Größenbegrenzungen sollen Abhilfe schaffen
21.  
 
In Peutingers sorgfältiger und auf die Einzelheiten der Vorwürfe eingehender Antwort werden 
zunächst die Absprachen bestritten, da sie unglaubwürdig seien.  
 
Zwar habe, was den Pfeffer anlange, der portugiesische König sein Monopol, aber er verkaufe an 
mehrere
22, und er verweist auf eine Substitutionskonkurrenz: "similes species aromatum eciam in 
magna quantitate urbi Venetiarum et aliis emporiis apportari solent"
23. Teuer zu verkaufen sei nicht 
notwendig ein Ausdruck eines Monopols, sondern das Recht des Händlers. Der Preisauftrieb könne 
diesem auch nicht allein zugeschoben werden, denn er leite sich von der Macht des portugiesischen 
Königs als Einzelverkäufer ab, ferner von Ernteschwankungen und schließlich von einer 




Auch beim Bergbau sei es ganz unmöglich, die Konkurrenz aufzuheben, da so viele Minen 
existierten ("pluribus diversis societatibus eciam simul coniunctis impossibile esset, has mineras et 
metalla omnia in unam manum deportare vel constringere"
25). Er fügt hinzu, daß, selbst wenn es 
gelänge, im Bergbau die Preise durch ein Kartell hochzutreiben, ein Vorteil sich ergäbe: man könne 
dann die Minen als großes Gottesgeschenk besser unterhalten
26. (Das Monopol verletzt die 
Bedingungen statischer Effizienz, nach Paretos Kriteri-um, aber es kann, wenn die 
Monopolgewinne für Verbesserungen der Produktionstechnik eingesetzt werden, dynamisch 
effizienter sein als Wettbewerb.) 
 
Die Edelmetallausfuhr wird mit der Arbeitsteilung unter den am Welthandel beteiligten Ländern 
verteidigt ("licet una provincia alteram naturali quodam instinctu alat et eidem subvenit"
27). Die 
Gesellschaften machen nicht arm, sondern sie haben Viele reich gemacht. Sie allein, dank ihrer 
Größe, können ferne Länder erschließen
28, und wollten die Händler einzeln mit Antwerpen handeln, 
würden die Waren teurer.  
 
                                                           
18  A.a.O., S. 17. 
19  A.a.O., S. 18. 
20  A.a.O., S. 19. 
21  A.a.O., S. 20 ff. 
22  A.a.O., S. 29 f. 
23  A.a.O., S. 30. 
24  A.a.O., S. 31. 
25  A.a.O., S. 33. 
26  A.a.O., S. 33. 
27  A.a.O., S. 34. 
28  A.a.O., S. 35.   29
Man werfe den Gesellschaften Eigennutz vor (er zitiert das deutsche Wort: "aigennutzig 
handtierungen"), aber das Handeln im eigenen Interesse ("proprium commodum quaerere"
29) sei 
nicht verboten, und wenn die Kaufleute sich nicht nur mit ihren Gütern und dem Vermögen, 
sondern auch mit leiblicher Beschwernis und Gefahren den Reisen aussetzten, werde auch den 
Müßigen und Seßhaften Nutzen gebracht. So klingt an, daß sich mit der Verfolgung des Eigen-
nutzes ein öffentliches Interesse verbindet. 
 
Ein Monopol, wenn es das denn gäbe, müßte man untersagen, aber beim Handel mit Gewürzen und 
Erzen bestünde es nicht. Eine Größenbegrenzung der Gesellschaften sei nicht tunlich, denn sie wür-
den infolge einer solchen ins Ausland abwandern, und es sei unerhört, einem, der aus der Gnade 
Gottes Reichtum erworben habe, nun zu verbieten, im Einklang mit Gott, der Ehre und dem Recht 
durch Fleiß, Arbeit und Leistung den Erwerb zu vermehren und ihn abzuhalten, sich und die Seinen 
in bessere Umstände zu versetzen. Daher sei der Versuch, die Gesellschaftsgröße zu begrenzen, 
"contra non solum privatam, sed eciam contra omnem publicam utilitatem et ideo maius 
monopolium induceret quam forte hactenus est auditum
30".  
 
Auch Tarife (Preisfixierungen) seien unmöglich, denn Preise schwankten unvermeidlich bei 
Landfrüchten, und die Produktion müsse zurückgehen, wenn Preise festgelegt würden, die die 
Kosten nicht deckten. Den Handel zu verbieten, führe nur dazu, daß andere ihn übernähmen. Er 
schließt, indem er Städte und Händler dem Kaiser empfiehlt und ihn ihres Gehorsams versichert. 
 
Die Interessen der Städte des Reiches waren dabei nicht gleichgerichtet
31. Den Städten der Hanse 
lag an den alten Privilegien, Ulm und Frankfurt fürchteten die Augsburger Konkurrenz. So sieht 
sich Peutinger gezwungen, Argumente der Gegner aufzunehmen und diese unter ihren 
Voraussetzungen vorzutragen. Im Kern aber geht es ihm um die Verteidigung eines freien 
Unternehmertums, das er als gottgewollt empfindet und nur durch den Rahmen der Ehrbarkeit und 
der Gesetze beschränkt sein läßt.  
 
Diese entschiedene, späteren naturrechtlichen Begründungen der Handelsfreiheit vergleichbare 
Stellungnahme läßt Peutinger als einen großen Vorläufer erscheinen. Seine sachliche Begründung 
legt er klug an, indem er behauptet, es gäbe in Deutschland überhaupt keine Monopole und dabei 
voraussetzt, daß nur das Monopol im Wortsinn, und nicht etwa auch unvollkommene Konkurrenz, 
anstößig sei. Einzig das Monopol des Königs von Portugal gibt er zu. Da-gegen bemerkt Höffner: 
"Wir sahen jedoch, daß der Fernhandel mit Vorliebe gerade auf dem Fürstenmonopol weitere 
Monopole aufbaute. Davon schweigt Conrad Peutinger, obwohl ihm zum Beispiel die Kupfer-
Monopolversuche der Fugger sehr wohl bekannt waren ..."
32.  
 
Peutinger sah offenbar das Dynamische des Marktprozesses, der sich vorübergehend ausbildende 
Unvollkommenheiten und Machtballungen immer wieder auflöst, und wenn die Dynamik des 
nationalen Marktes nicht genügte, berief er sich auf die internationale Konkurrenz. Entsprechend 
schwebte ihm eine abgestufte Vermögensverteilung vor und nicht eine Polarisierung zwischen 
Kapitalbesitzern und Abhängigen. Marx hat in den Schlußkapiteln des Ersten Bandes von "Das 
Kapital" bei seinen Überlegungen zur sogenannten "ursprünglichen Akkumulation" die Anfänge 
kapitalistischer Entwicklung mit der Abscheidung einer besitzenden Klasse vom Proletariat in 
Verbindung gebracht; das Proletariat entstand durch Vertreibung aus selbständiger Landarbeit, das 
Kapital überschritt die Schwelle, jenseits deren das Vermögen zum Ankauf von Produktionsmitteln 
                                                           
29  A.a.O., S. 37. 
30  A.a.O., S. 38. 
31  Bauer, a.a.O. [FN 12], S. 154. 
32  Höffner, Joseph: :LUWVFKDIWVHWKLNXQG0RQRSROHLPIQI]HKQWHQXQGVHFK]HKQWHQ-DKUKXQGHUW. Jena: G. 
Fischer 1941, (Freiburger Staatswissenschaftliche Schriften, Heft 2), S. 59.   30
und ihrem Einsatz zur "Ausbeutung" fremder Arbeit ausreicht, durch Gewalt und Plünderung, 
besonders außereuropäischer Gebiete. Peutingers Unternehmer gelangen zu erstem Reichtum durch 
Fleiß und eigene Arbeit, durch wagemutigen Handel, dann, auf höherer Stufe, durch das 
internationale Handelsgeschäft und die Bergwerke, während das Kreditwesen im Gutachten kaum 
zur Sprache kommt. Sombart hatte die Marxsche Fragestellung wieder aufgenommen und eine erste 
Vermögensbildung aufgrund der Akkumulation von Grundrenten vermutet. Strieder
33 zeigte später 
für Augsburg, daß die Vermögen der reichen Familien und Patrizier überwiegend im Handel selbst 
entstanden, der oft aus zunftgebundener Tätigkeit hervorging und sich allmählich entwickelte. 
Danach erwarben Kaufleute und Gewerbetreibende das Kapital zur Ausdehnung ihrer Geschäfte im 
wesentlichen selbst und ohne ihre berufliche Stellung zu wechseln. Obwohl das den Humanisten 
sonst fernlag, hat Peutinger so im Rahmen eines Rechtsgutachtens zur Monopolfrage die 
Entstehung und die eigentümliche gesellschaftliche Zwischenstellung des frühneuzeitlichen 








Die Autoren der im 16. Jahrhundert heraufkommenden Merkantilperiode, die so oft Kaufleute 
waren, wollten zumeist dartun, daß sie die Gesellschaft nicht zersetzten, sondern den Fürsten und 
der Gemeinschaft dienten. Die weitergehende Behauptung, die Verfolgung des Eigennutzens könne 
auch der Gesamtheit dienen, wie dies die moderne Ökonomie seit Mandeville und Smith vertritt, 
ließ länger auf sich warten. Bei Peutinger klingt der Gedanke zwar an, wird aber nicht näher 
ausgeführt. Die antike Stoa vertrat ihn bereits - zunächst ohne wirtschaftlichen Bezug -, doch 
Christentum und Mittelalter forderten die Hingabe an Gott und den Nächsten, und so sah man die 
Verfolgung von Eigennutz und von Gemeinwohl als Gegensätze.  
 
Da muß es uns erstaunen, obwohl es die Kraft und Richtung der deutschen Wirtschaftsentwicklung 
im 16. Jahrhundert kennzeichnet, daß 1564 in Frankfurt am Main ein Büchlein erschien, das den Ei-
gennutzen lobt wie Mandeville es 1714 (seine Schrift wurde gerade 150 Jahre später als Buch 
gedruckt) wieder wagen sollte
34. Der Text steht unter dem gereimten Motto:  
 
Der Eigen Nutzen bin ich genannt / 
Hoch und nidren Stenden wol bekañt. 
Doch nicht so böß als man mich macht / 
Wo man die Sachen recht betracht. 
Manchem vil guts durch mich beschicht / 




Auf dem Holzschnitt des Titelbildchens prangt ein munter prassender Mann in freier Landschaft, 
die Haare windzerzaust, in der einen Hand eine Ente, in der anderen eine Schweinshaxe. Er sitzt auf 
                                                           
33 Strieder,  Jakob:  =XU *HQHVLV GHV PRGHUQHQ .DSLWDOLVPXV )RUVFKXQJHQ ]XU (QWVWHKXQJ GHU JURHQ
EUJHUOLFKHQ.DSLWDOYHUP|JHQDP$XVJDQJHGHV0LWWHODOWHUVXQG]X%HJLQQGHU1HX]HLW]XQlFKVWLQ
$XJVEXUJ. 2. Aufl. München: Duncker & Humblot 1935. 
34  Mandeville, B. de: 7KH)DEOHRIWKH%HHVRU3ULYDWH9LFHV3XEOLFN%HQHILWV. Repr. 1714. Düsseldorf: 
Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen 1990. 
35  9RQGHP/REGH(LJHQ1XW]HQ0LWYLOVFK|QHQ([HPSHOQYQG+LVWRULHQDXKH\OLJHU*|WWOLFKHU6FKULIIW
]XVDPPHQJH]RJHQGXUFK/HRQKDUG)URQVSHUJHUDQWDJJHEHQ. Getruckt zu Franckfurt am Mayn 1564.   31
einem Hügel, mit Weinflasche und Broten zu seinen Füßen, und auf seinem Bauch steht 
geschrieben: "Alls in Mein Sack.". 
 
Die ständische Gesellschaft erfüllt sich in Herrschaft und Dienst - so zumindest stellt sie sich dar. 
Ein Gemeinnutzen geht dem einzelnen voran, heißt es in den Schriften. Die Oberen haben die 
Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, die es den Unteren erlauben, die Nahrung aller hervorzubringen. Die 
Glieder der Gesellschaft sind wie die Organe jedes Lebewesens aufeinander angewiesen, wie im 
Gleichnis des römischen Menenius Agrippa, der das Patriziat als Magen, die Plebs als Arme und 
Beine des Volkskörpers darstellte. Da war es eine große Überraschung, als 1985 in einem Vortrag 
in der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften hingewiesen wurde auf "eine Schrift, die sich bei 
näherer Prüfung als nicht weniger als eine Vorwegnahme all dessen erwies, was Mandeville zu 
Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts schrieb"
36. An die Stelle der Vorstellung eines durch Normen 
gestifteten Gesellschaftszusammenhangs trat die einer Vermittlung durch die individuellen 
Eigeninteressen.  
 
Fronsperger war Ulmer Bürger. Er berichtet im Vorwort, er habe mit einem bekannten Freund, 
einem Doktor Oswald Gut, der "Marggräffischer Cantzler" gewesen sei, jahrelang besprochen, 
weshalb es nicht auf den Gemeinnutzen, sondern den Eigennutzen ankomme. Gut habe vorgehabt, 
ein Werk über den Eigennutz zu schreiben. Es sei schließlich Guts Wunsch gewesen, Fronsperger 
solle das Werk zu Ende führen. Von Gut wissen wir, daß er 1530 von Karl V. geadelt wurde und 
daß ihn im Jahr darauf Markgraf Ernst zum Kanzler ernannte; 1554 starb er. Fronsperger hat Bücher 
über Kriegführung und über praktische Fragen der städtischen Wirtschaft geschrieben; nach 
Schulze
37 haben sie nur kompilatorischen Charakter. 
 
Da wir von den persönlichen Abhängigkeiten so wenig wissen, bleibt nur übrig, das Werk aus sich 
selbst heraus zu kommentieren. Es beginnt in heiter bis ironischem Ton mit der Bemerkung, man 
lobe das Angenehme, tadele das Unangenehme, lobe aber nicht den Eigennutz, obwohl man seit 
Adams Zeiten nach ihm lebe. Beschimpft werde vielmehr der Eigennutz (der in der Ich-Form 
spricht), "als ob ich sey ein Landtverderber / ein zerstörer aller guter Pollicey / Erbarkeit / Sitten / 
Einigkeit / Fridens ..."
38. Kinderverse würden auf ihn gereimt:  
 
"das Evangelium wer nicht so schwer / 
Wenn der Eigen nutz nicht wer"
39, 
 
aber die Welt könne nicht ohne ihn bestehen! 
 
Zum Beweis wird der Leser durch die Auflösung einer Reihe von Selbsttäuschungen 
hindurchgeführt. Man glaubt, die Wahrheit zu ertragen, aber muß erfahren, daß oft die 
Schmeichelei den Frieden erhält. Wie verdreht die Welt sein kann, hat man von Erasmus und 
seinem Lob der Narrheit gelernt: "Als die Göttin Narrheit … durch den Hochgelehrten 
vbertrefflichen beredten Mann / Erasmus von Roterdam / also gelobt vnd herfür gestrichen ist / das 
man jetzt darfür halt / vnd glaubt / das sie Menschlichem Geschlecht nicht geringen verstand und 
nutz schaffe" ... 
40 - doch meint der Eigennutz, das der Narrheit gespendete Lob stehe ihm zu. 
 
                                                           
36 Schulze,  Winfried:  9RP *HPHLQQXW] ]XP (LJHQQXW] hEHU GHQ 1RUPHQZDQGHO GHU VWlQGLVFKHQ
*HVHOOVFKDIW GHU )UKHQ 1HX]HLW. München: Stiftung Historisches Kolleg 1987, (Schriften des 
Historischen Kollegs, Vorträge 13), S. 20. 
37  A.a.O., S. 27, S. 26.  
38  Fronsperger, a.a.O.[FN 34], S. 2 (links).  
39  A.a.O., S. 2 (rechts).  
40  A.a.O., S. 9 (links).    32
Wie es sich für ein politisches Buch alter Art gehört, beginnt die Reihe der Illustrationen mit der 
Ehe, die man nicht aus Gemeinnützigkeit, sondern aus eingepflanzter Begierde eingeht. Dasselbe 
gelte von der Freundschaft, und ohne diese wäre das Leben wie die Erde ohne Sonne. Und nachdem 
so auf den Eigennutz zurückgeführt wurde, was andere eher der Liebe zugeschrieben hätten, geht es 
leichter weiter mit der Güterversorgung - welcher Bauer würde sich um des Gemeinwohls willen 
plagen? - mit dem Handwerk und den Kaufleuten. Eine gelegentliche Tat für den Gemeinnutz 
breche die Regel nicht. Die Geistlichkeit und die Regenten schließlich erstrebten ihre Ämter um 
ihrer selbst willen, aber nicht, wie Erasmus meinte, aus Narrheit. Wollte einer die Schafe um ihrer 
selbst willen hüten (wie es nämlich die Antike und die christliche Tugendlehre verlangten)? Der 
Eigennutz entgegnet: "... kan ich nicht wissen / ob jemand denn allein Christus der Welt 




Dahinter steht, daß Gott die Welt wie eine einzige "Policey", also wie ein einziges Staatsgebilde, 
geschaffen habe; man fände dies bei Cicero aus dem Naturrecht ("auß Natürlichem liecht"
42) 
entwickelt. Gott habe nämlich die Welt so eingerichtet, daß jedes Land des anderen bedarf und, was 
die Menschen betreffe, sei es wie bei Bryson: Die Menschen seien untereinander abhängig, daß sie 
wie die Glieder einer Kette aneinandergeschmiedet erschienen. Offenkundig handelt es sich bei 
dieser Erklärung, wie das Gute aus dem Eigennutz entsteht, um einen Rückgriff auf die stoische 
Tradition, auf der, wie wir heute wissen, zweihundert Jahre später die Smithsche Lehre fußen sollte. 
So habe Gott einen Menschen um des anderen willen erschaffen, und die Güter der Welt seien für 
alle da, aber nicht, wie der Pöbel meine, zur gewaltsamen Teilung, auch nicht zum Gemeinbesitz. 
Sondern "… durch die vngleicheit vnnd streitende gegensatzung erscheint die allergröst gleichheit / 
und aller lieblichest Hermoney und einigkeit / die kein zung genug außsprechen oder voll loben / 
noch kein hertz sich gnugsam verwundern kan / gleichsam als in einer Orgel vil vnd mancherley 
Pfeiffen sind / kurz vnd lang / groß vnd klein / deren keine auch in jrem gethön einander gleich / 
aber auß solchen vngleichen stimmen die aller süssest Hörmoney der Music entspringt …"
43. So 
treffen wir also bei Fronsperger auch schon die durch den musikalischen Vergleich untermauerte 
Harmonievorstellung an. Er wagt sodann eine stoische Deutung der christlichen Lehre: der Mensch 
solle sich als Verwalter eines von Gott anvertrauten Gutes fühlen. Den Gemeinnutzen kennt 
niemand so recht, den Eigennutzen aber wohl, und so versteigt dieser sich zur Versicherung, " … ob 
ein gemeinen Nutz auff Erden ist / oder seyn kan / so hat er doch von mir seinen ... vrsprung / also / 
daß ich wol sein Vatter mit recht genennt werden möchte / etc."
44. 
 
Schließlich wird in kühner Wendung auch Gott dank dem Eigennutz gelobt, denn man wünscht, des 
ewigen Lebens teilhaftig zu werden, während der Autor andererseits jeden verbrecherischen 
Mißbrauch des Eigennutzes von sich weist, mit dem Gleichnis des Chrysipp: den Eigennutz solle 
man verfolgen wie der Wettläufer, der den Gegner zu überholen trachten darf, dem es aber verboten 
bleibt, den Rivalen durch Stöße und Abschneiden des Weges zu behindern. Schließlich verteidigt 
der Eigennutz den Reichtum. In der Geschichte von Lazarus sei der Reiche nicht verdammt worden, 
weil er viel besaß, sondern weil er versäumte, von seinem Überfluß abzugeben. 
 
So entsteht die Denkwelt Fronspergers aus dem Zusammenströmen antiker und biblischer 
Einflüsse: "Man sol arbeiten und schaffen als wolten wir ewig leben / vnd gegen Gott versünen / als 
wolten wir augenplicklich sterben"
45. Während Mandeville seinen Leser durch zynische Untertöne 
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beunruhigt, will ihn Fronsperger durch Humor erfreuen und durch weltoffene Gelehrsamkeit und 








Man hat festgestellt, daß nicht nur Fronsperger, sondern auch Mandeville von Erasmus abhängig 
war, und vermutet, es sei der im "Lob der Torheit" entwickelte Begriff der Eigenliebe (philautia), 
der den Weg zur Bestimmung des Eigennutzens als des allgemeinen Antriebs zum Handeln eröffnet 
habe
46. Die heitere Ironie des Erasmus steht freilich einem einfachen Reduktionismus entgegen. 
Gewiß läßt er erkennen, daß die Narrheit (verstanden als Beschränktheit) eine wesentliche 
Bedingtheit aller menschlichen Hervorbringung sei. Die Narrheit meint etwa von den 
Bücherschreibern: "Diese Leute haben mir alle gar viel zu danken ... . Bald setzen sie noch etwas 
dazu, bald ändern sie es wieder; bald streichen sie etwas hinweg, bald setzen sie es wieder drüber; 
bald wiederholen die das Nemliche, bald arbeiten sie es wieder um; bald bringen sie es ans Licht, 
und bald lassen sie es wieder viele Jahre lang liegen. Sie sind nie mit sich zufrieden; und wie theuer 
erkaufen sie diese nichtige Belohnung, den Ruhm ... Durch so viele Beschwerden und Übel glaubt 
es dann ein Weiser dahin zu bringen, daß er von dem oder jenem Triefäugigen gelobt werde ..."
47. 
Wahrheitsgemäß oder auch nur, um seinem literarischen Unterfangen den Anschein übertriebenen 
Ernstes zu nehmen, berichtet Erasmus in seiner Zueignung an Thomas Morus, er habe die Schrift 




Die humanistische Bewegung, die Erasmus als einen der gelehrtesten und geistreichsten Köpfe 
anerkannte, stand dem praktischen Leben eher fern. Immerhin enthielt der 1516 in Basel von 
Erasmus veröffentlichte Fürstenspiegel "Institutio Principis Christiani" auch vorausweisende 
Bestimmungen, wie daß die Natur alle Menschen frei geboren habe und Dienstbarkeit und 
Leibeigenschaft wider die Natur aufgebracht und eingeführt worden seien. Während Erasmus Fleiß 




Als, von Erasmus geistig mitvorbereitet, aber nicht gewollt, die Reformation über Deutschland und 
Europa hereinbrach und jeden Menschen vor schwierigste Gewissensfragen stellte, richtete sich die 
agitatorische Wucht nicht nur gegen die herrschende Kirche, sondern auch gegen wirtschaftliche 
Erscheinungen, die als Mißstände empfunden wurden. Diese Kräfte, die auch der Katholizismus 
kritisiert, aber nicht bewältigt hatte, wollte der Protestantismus brechen. Wir erinnern an einige 
Zitate aus Luthers in der Reihe der "Klassiker der Nationalökonomie" erschienenem Buch
50.  
 
                                                           
46  Schulze, a.a.O.[FN 35], S. 23.  
47 Erasmus  von  Rotterdam:  /REGHU1DUUKHLW. Aus dem Lateinischen übers. und mit Anm. begl. von W. G. 
Becker. Basel: J. J. Turneysen 1780. 
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50 Luther,  Martinus:  9RQ.DXIIVKDQGHOXQG:XFKHU. Vuittenberg 1524. Repr. Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft 
und Finanzen 1987 (.ODVVLNHUGHU1DWLRQDO|NRQRPLH).   34
Es ist hier nicht der Ort, auf seine sonstigen ökonomischen Ansätze einzugehen, also auf seine 
Polemik gegen den Wucher und überhöhte Gewinne oder seine Lobrede der Arbeit, des gerechten 
Lohnes und eines auf die Bemessung der Arbeitsanstrengungen gestützten Preises der 
Arbeitsprodukte. Hier interessiert uns die Monopolfrage, zu der er andeutet: "Von den 
Gesellschaften sollt ich wol viel sagen / Aber es ist alles grundlos vnd bodelos / mit eyttel geyz vnd 
vnrecht ... Monopolia: Wilche auch die weltliche heydenische rechte verbieten / als ein offentlich 
schedlich ding ... Heur steygern sie den yngber / Vber eyn jar den saffran ...." (Blatt D III). 
 
Die Polemik nimmt nicht nur den Unwillen des Volkes gegen das neue Unternehmertum auf, 
sondern auch den Ärger über den Edelmetallabfluß und den als unnötig empfundenen 
Luxuskonsum: "Gott hat vns deutschen dahyn geschlaudert / das wyr vunser gollt vnd sylber 
mussen ynn frembde lender stossen / alle welt reych machen / vnd selbst bettler bleyben / Engeland 
sollt wol weniger gollts haben / wenn deutschland yhm seyn tuch liesse / vnd der König von Porti-
gal sollt auch weniger haben / wenn wyr yhm seyne wurtze liessen ... Franckfurt ist das sylber vnd 
gollt loch / da durch aus deutschen land fleusst / was nur quillet und wechst / gemuntzt odder 
geschlagen wird bey vns" (Blatt A II-III).  
 
So leidenschaftlich, wie Luther predigte, wollte man auch handeln. Es war der Überschwang junger 
Menschen, die zu den Vordenkern der Reformation wurden. "Die Anhängerschafter Luthers von 
Anbeginn an war vor allem eines, sie war jung"
51. Die Professoren um Luther waren bei ihrer 
Berufung unter 30, Wittenberg, mit vielleicht 2.500 Einwohnern, war bevölkert von etwa halb so 
vielen Studenten, und diese Jugend sah sich den alten Prälaten in der katholischen Hierarchie 
gegenüber.  
 
Roscher, dem Luther der größte Deutsche in der Geschichte war, hat in seinen Untersuchungen zur 
Nationalökonomik der Reformationszeit erstaunliche Forderungen aus den "Wilden Flugschriften" 
der Zeit vor dem Bauernkrieg zusammengetragen. So habe Eberlin von Günzburg eine 
Ämterhierarchie gefordert, in der kein Amt mehr erblich war, alle Amtsträger besoldet, die 
Schulpflicht allgemein, und 1524 habe Thomas Müntzer vor den Ernestinischen Fürsten auf Schloß 
Allstedt gepredigt: "Die Grundsuppe des Wuchers, der Dieberei und Räuberei sind unsere Fürsten 
und Herren, nehmen alle Creaturen zum Eigenthum ... darum schinden und schaben sie den armen 
Ackersmann, Handwerksmann ... so er sich dann vergreift an dem Allergeringsten, so muß er 
hängen ... . Die Herren machen das selber, daß ihnen der arme Mann Feind wird."
52 1534 verlangten 
dann die Wiedertäufer in Münster, zum Gemeinbesitz nach dem Vorbild der Apostel 
zurückzukehren.  
 
Das ist das geistige Umfeld, in welches Roscher seine Beschreibung der drei Münzschriften 
einreiht, die er "zu den merkwürdigsten Monumenten der älteren Volkswirthschaftslehre zählt; die 
beiden Albertinischen Flugschriften sprechen ein "so reines, klares, einfach sachgemäßes und doch 
kraftvoll schönes Deutsch, wie man es nur irgend von einem Zeitgenossen Luthers und Huttens 
erwartet". Den Ernestiner lobt er, weil er "die Grundgedanken des sog. Mercantilsystems" enthalte, 
ein Jahrhundert vor Thomas Mun
53. Müller-Armack bestätigte dieses Urteil in seiner "Genealogie 
der Wirtschaftsstile", wo er insbesondere schrieb: "Die erste Schrift zur Rechtfertigung 
merkantilistischer Weltpolitik, die ernestinische Streitschrift von 1530, leitet bereits die 
Notwendigkeit der unterwertigen Binnenwährung aus dem Ziel der Entwicklungsförderung ab."
54  
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Um uns schließlich der Lage in Deutschland im Jahre 1530 anzunähern, als die erste der 
Münzschriften erschien, sei noch an das politische Geschehen erinnert. Karl V., auf der Höhe seiner 
Macht von Italien nach Deutschland zurückkehrend, versuchte, der Reformation zunächst ohne 
Drohungen zu begegnen. An dem Reichstag, der mit großem Gepränge in Augsburg stattfand, rief 
er die protestantischen Großen zu sich und suchte sie zu überreden, das Predigen abzustellen. Da 
erwiderte Markgraf Georg von Brandenburg: "Herr, ehe ich von Gottes Wort abstünde, wollte ich 
lieber auf dieser Stelle niederknien und mir den Kopf abhauen lassen." Ranke, dem wir nun folgen, 
fährt fort: "Der Kaiser, der nichts als Worte der Milde von sich hören lassen wollte und von Natur 
wohlwollend war, erschrak selbst über die Möglichkeit, die ihm hier aus fremdem Munde 




Die Protestanten hatten gehofft, der Kaiser werde als Schiedsrichter auftreten; er fand sich aber 
gedrängt, für die katholische Mehrheit zu sprechen. Daß die protestantischen Fürsten bei seiner 
wachsenden Strenge festblieben, hing vor allen an Johann von Sachsen, von dem Ranke schreibt: 
"... für Vergnügungen und Weltlust war er nicht geboren; das Unangenehme, das dabei nicht zu 
vermeiden ist, ging ihm allzu tief und quälte ihn mehr, als ihn der leichte Genuß erfreute ... . Vom 
ersten Auftreten Luthers an widmete er der Lehre desselben die freudigste Teilnahme; sein von 
Natur ernstes und in der Tiefe religiöses Gemüt war von derselben allmählich ganz durchdrungen ... 
. Nach dem Bauernkrieg erhoben sich die Ideen der Reaktion auf das Gewaltigste; so sehr sie ihm 
von seinem weltklugen und in den Geschäften geübten Vetter empfohlen wurden, so ließ Johann 
sich nicht von ihm übermeistern. ... In alledem hatte nun Luther den großen Einfluß auf ihn. ... So 
geschah denn auch unter Johanns Vortritt die Protestation, die der ganzen Partei Name und 
Weltstellung gegeben hat. ..."
56  
 
Indessen wurde der Reichstag für Johann teuer. "Wir liegen mit großen Kosten hier, haben etwa 
12.000 Gulden aufnehmen müssen: kaiserliche Majestät hat uns noch mit keinem Worte 
zugesprochen ..." schrieb Johann am 28. Juli (am 15. Juni war Karl V. in Augsburg eingezogen). 
"Luther versicherte, hätte dieser Fürst gewankt, so würde keiner seiner Räte festgehalten haben."
57 
Wäre die türkische Gefahr nicht gewesen, hätte der Kaiser vielleicht bereits Gewalt angewendet. - 
Diese wenigen Andeutungen mögen genügen, um zu veranschaulichen, wie der Ernestiner in 
religiösen Dingen mutig und radikal auf Seiten der Neuerer stand und dabei zuweilen die wirt-
schaftlichen Grundlagen seiner Herrschaft vernachlässigte, während sein katholischer albertinischer 








Wir haben nun die unmittelbare Vorgeschichte der sächsischen Lande darzulegen, von welcher der 
Münzstreit ausging. Hier folgen wir den Darstellungen von Lotz und Klotzsch
58. 
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Angesichts des überall schwachen Steueraufkommens mußten sich auch die sächsischen Fürsten in 
der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts der Münzverschlechterung als einer Einnahmequelle bedie-
nen; in der zweiten fanden Reformbemühungen statt. In der aus dynastischen Gründen 1485 
vorgenommenen sächsischen Teilung war beschlossen worden, die Bergwerke nicht zu teilen, 
sondern sie gemeinsam zu nutzen und jährlich abzurechnen. Der Inhaber der Kurwürde, der 
Ernestiner Friedrich der Weise, der bis 1525 lebte, und sein albertinischer Vetter, Herzog Georg, 
erstrebten zusammen eine stabile Münzpolitik. 1525 löste Johann der Beständige Friedrich den 
Weisen ab. Wie wir sahen, unterstützte er den evangelischen Glauben, während der albertinische 
Herzog Georg katholisch blieb. Graf Albrecht von Mansfeld, der in Münzeinung mit den beiden 
Sachsen stand, schlug vor, den Silberpreis zu erhöhen und damit eine Münzverschlechterung zu 
verbinden; ein Grund dafür war, daß der hohe Silbergehalt der Münzen dazu verführte, sie 
einzuschmelzen und schlechtere Münzen aus dem Ausland in Umlauf zu bringen (die guten 
Münzen wurden im Inland seltener - nach Greshams Gesetz). 
 
Zunächst waren beide Sachsen für die Reform, aber Herzog Georg sprach sich ab 1526 dagegen 
aus; es ist unbekannt, ob nur Sachgründe oder auch die religiöse Entzweiung eine Rolle spielten. 
Klotzsch meint, Herzog Georg habe sich verpflichtet gefühlt, sein den Untertanen gegebenes Wort, 
die Münze nicht zu verringern, halten zu müssen. "Immittelst gab selbiger dem wiederholten Vor-
schlage des Churfürsten, zu einer persönlichen und gemeinschaftlichen Ueberlegung nach, welche 
in der Stadt Zeitz, Montags nach Valentini 1526, gehalten, und wobey der Gegenstand vertheidiget, 
und bestritten, nichts aber entschieden ward. Herzog George behauptete standhafft die Gründe 
seines Widerspruchs, und beyde Fürsten schieden, nicht ohne heimlichen Unwillen, von 
einander."
59 Der Kurfürst ließ jedoch in seinen Bestrebungen nicht nach. "Nachdem nun Herzog 
George sich, je länger desto mehr überzeugte, daß er, anhaltend, nur vergeblich sich demjenigen 
widersetzen würde, was er nicht ganz verhindern konnte, gab er endlich dem Verlangen des 
Churfürsten zu einer Münztrennung stilleschweigend nach."
60 Die beiden Fürsten hoben die 
gemeinsame Münzstätte in Schneeberg auf und teilten während einiger Jahre das aus dem Bergwerk 
gewonnene Silber in natura; sie prägten daraus je eigene Münzen. So kam es zu den Münzschriften, 




Die Folge war, daß beide Parteien getrennt prägten, je mit eigenem Namen und Wappen. Herzog 
Georg fand sich schließlich veranlaßt, der Münzverschlechterung ein Stück weit nachzukommen. 
Die Versammlungen der Landstände wurden einbezogen und Johanns Nachfolger, Johann 
Friedrich, wünschte ab 1534 wieder zur gemeinschaftlichen Prägung zurückzukehren. "Und es 
kamen auch, mit dem Anfange des Jahres 1534, neue gemeinschaftliche Gepräge, unter beyder 
Fürsten Bildnissen, Rahmen und Wappen zugleich, wieder zum Vorscheine."
62 Am Ende hatten 
sich die Gegner der Münzverschlechterung nur teilweise durchgesetzt. Später entriß der Albertiner 
Moritz den Ernestinern die Kurwürde und erließ 1549 eine Münzordnung, welche die 
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Die sächsische Münzgeschichte ist grundsätzlich nicht isoliert zu sehen; sie steht im 
Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Münzen im deutschen Reich überhaupt, wo immer wieder 
eine Vereinheitlichung der Münzordnungen angestrebt wurde. Doch ließen sich die Fürsten ihr 
Münzregal nicht rauben, das ihnen Einkünfte sicherte und mit Wappen und Bild ihre Souveränität 
in umlaufenden Prägungen zum Ausdruck brachte. Daß die Münzen sich entwerteten, lag dabei 
nicht nur an den wiederholten Herabsetzungen, die der Erhöhung der Einnahmen dienen sollten, 
sondern sie waren auch nie ganz zu vermeiden, weil Münzen sich im Verkehr selbst dann abnut-
zen, wenn sie nicht illegal beschnitten und abgerieben werden
64. Die Inflation des 16. Jahrhunderts, 
die man hauptsächlich mit dem Import amerikanischer Edelmetalle in Verbindung zu bringen 
pflegt
65, hatte schon im vorangehenden Jahrhundert eingesetzt; ihr Anfang wird für München, 
Augsburg und Frankfurt auf die Jahre zwischen 1460 und 1470 datiert. In den Münzschriften von 
1530-1531 wird die Einfuhr der Edelmetalle aus der neuen Welt noch nicht erwähnt. So ist klar, daß 
die Inflation nicht ausschließlich aus dem Edelmetallimport erklärt werden kann; neben der 
Münzverschlechterung kommen noch verschiedene kosten- und nachfrageseitigen Faktoren in 
Frage








Gleich mit den Eingangsworten gibt der Albertiner, der Autor der ersten Flugschrift "Gemeyne 
stimmen”, zu verstehen, woran er festzuhalten gedenkt. Die staatliche Ordnung ist so gefügt, seit 
dem Sünenfall, daß 
 
"die vnderthanen der Obirkeyt / sollen gehorsam sein / ynn allen ehrlichen / zimlichen dingen / die 
nicht widder yhn sein. Widerümb ist der Obirkeyt auffgelegt / der vnderthanen nutz vñ bestes zu-




Die Obrigkeit soll die Untertanen auf dem Weg der Tugend erhalten, diese mögen gehorsam 
bleiben und sehen, wie sie ihrerseits die Obrigkeit stützen, um gut regiert zu werden. Unter solchem 
Regiment gedeihen beide Seiten. Man sehe, wie in Sachsen, Thüringen und Meißen schöne Kirchen 
und Spitäler und Häuser des Adels gebaut worden seien. Damit stieg die allgemeine Wohlfahrt. 
 
"Als haben sich auch die vndern merglich gebessert / wie es augenscheinlich an gepewden / an viel 
örttern erscheinet" (S. 5). 
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Der Albertiner sagt nun nicht, eine solide Rechtsordnung und die Entfaltung der freien Wirtschaft 
habe dieses Wachstum ermöglicht, obwohl er kaum andere Maßnahmen hätte empfehlen können, 
wenn er so modern dachte, sondern er drückt sich anders aus. Gott habe dem Lande eine Obrigkeit 
gegeben, die mehr den allgemeinen Nutzen als den eigenen suchte, die an den Ausgaben für den 
guten Frieden nicht sparte und die - womit wir endlich zum Thema gelangen - eine ehrliche gute 
Münze prägte. Namentlich wurde für die Bergwerke viel aufgewandt, 
 
"die [nicht]
68 on sunder gros darlegen erregt vnd erhalten werden" (S.7),  
 
 
und daraus leitet sich der gestiegene Wohlstand ab, denn es mehrte sich die Bevölkerung, der 
Absatz der Waren, damit die Einkommen des Adels, der Bürger, Handwerker und Bauern. Der 
erfaßte Kausalzusammenhang ist wohl einfach dieser: wachsende Verdienstmöglichkeiten und 
wachsende Bevölkerung bedingen sich gegenseitig, wobei ein besserer Geldumlauf den Verkehr 
erleichtert. 
 
"Dann wue mennige des volcks / da ist vortreib der wahr" (S.7). 
 
 
Es wächst also die Zahl der Menschen, die Beschäftigung und der Umfang der Produktion. Die 
Lebensqualität nimmt zu. Von technischem Fortschritt im Sinne einer Produktivitätssteigerung ist 
jedoch nicht die Rede. 
 
Leider hat man das wirtschaftliche Gedeihen mit der Frage angefochten 
 
"Abs gut sey / gute aber geringe Müntz ym Lande zuschlahen / vnd zu haben" (S. 7). 
 
 
Es folgt eine sehr klare Zusammenfassung der Argumente der Gegenpartei. Diese meine, es werde 
zuviel des Silbers exportiert, und in Notlagen seien die Steuern zu hoch. Man solle aus der Menge 
des Silbers, aus der gegenwärtig 81/4 Gulden geprägt würden, künftig 10 Gulden prägen. Der 
zusätzliche Münzgewinn der Herren betrüge 13/4 Gulden, also mehr als eine Steuer, und dieser 
Ertrag flösse, solange man am Bergbau festhielte. Die (abgewertete) Münze bliebe im Lande, 
weniger Luxusgüter würden importiert, und auch die Grundnahrungsmittel seien dann billiger, das 
Silber aber teuerer und insofern besser verwertet. 
 
Die Gegenargumentation des Albertiners setzt mit dem Argument ein, das auch dem modernen 
Leser am leichtesten eingeht: der Kritik der Auffassung, daß der Münzgewinn eine gute und 
dauerhafte Form der Besteuerung sei. Die Steuer sei zu hoch, solange die Preise ungeändert blieben, 
aber man habe zu beachten, 
 
"das die Müntz wie alles andere / so aus Metal gemacht...dornach gewirdert werde / was es an yhm 
selbst von Silber vñ Metall ynn sich hat..." (S.11). 
 
 
Der Albertiner ist also Metallist; der Wert der Münze bestimmt sich nach ihrem Metallgehalt, so 
daß infolge der Herabsetzung die Geldpreise aller Güter steigen müssen. Daß gemäß der 
Quantitätstheorie die Kaufkraft der Münze als Geld über ihrem Metallwert stehen könnte, so wie 
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heutzutage die Kaufkraft der Banknote über ihrem Papierwert steht, zieht er nicht in Betracht. Wir 
werden weiter unten sehen, daß der Ernestiner konsequent verlangt, nach der Herabsetzung den 
Geldumlauf nicht anschwellen zu lassen und eine "Übermünzung" zu vermeiden. Insofern liegt der 
Stellungnahme des Ernestiners eine quantitätstheoretische Vorstellung zugrunde. 
 
Die metallistische Auffassung wirkt im Außenverkehr überzeugender, wo die Währungen 
zahlreicher Fürstentümer und Prägungen jeden Alters gehandelt werden. Der Albertiner bemerkt 
ironisch, daß niemand im Ausland die verschlechterte Münze haben wolle, und in der Tat kann im 
Ausland solange mit ihr nicht gekauft werden, als der Halter im Inland gemäß ihrem Nennwert 
mehr erhält, als sie im Ausland wert ist, wenn sie dort, alter Gewohnheit folgend, nach ihrem 
Metallgehalt geschätzt wird. Es wird dem Ernestiner schwer fallen, hierauf zu anworten, denn die 
moderne Erfahrung, daß Banknoten außerhalb des Landes unter normalen Bedingungen zu stabilen 
Kursen gewechselt werden können, die auf der Handelsbilanz, den Kaufkraftparitäten und weiteren 
Einflußfaktoren beruhen, steht ihm nicht vor Augen, und noch viel weniger verfügt er über eine die-
ses Phänomen erklärende Theorie.  
 
Wir können unsererseits jedoch nachvollziehen, weshalb die Münze im Ausland nach ihrem 
Metallgehalt bewertet wurde. Sie war jedenfalls nicht weniger wert, weil sie eingeschmolzen 
werden konnte, und andererseits nicht mehr, wenn die höhere Kaufkraft, die sie im Inland besaß, im 
Ausland nicht zur Geltung kam, weil es sonst nicht viel zu exportieren gab. Das 
Hauptexportprodukt der Sachsen war (darin sind sich die Gegner einig) das Silber selbst, und ihre 
Währung wäre bei vermindertem Silbergehalt nur gestiegen, wenn sich die Außenhandelsposition 
verbessert hätte. 
 
Diesen Zusammenhang durchschauten beide Autoren immerhin ansatzweise. Der Ernestiner möchte 
nicht so sehr die Ausfuhr erhöhen als die Einfuhr drosseln, da diese ihm hauptsächlich aus Luxus-
waren zu bestehen scheint, die er als verwerflich empfindet. Durch seine Wertung vermengt sich die 
wirtschaftliche Frage mit gesellschaftspolitischen Zielen, die beider regiliösen Standpunkt berühren. 
Der Albertiner will die Argumentationsebenen getrennt halten; er verspricht sich von ökonomischen 
Maßnahmen keine moralische Besserung und versteigt sich zur Behauptung: 
 
"So würde man doch des fürwitz ym Lande nich los / dann man manchen funde / ehr er seinen 
willen brech / er schickte ehr gen Venedig dornach / alßdann verlöre yhe er die zerung doran / vnd 
stünde fahr / wie er das vber Land zu sich brechte / das man yhme vmb sonst vors haus zu kauffen 
schaffte ..." (S. 13). 
 
 
Wenn der Händler die Gewürze nicht mehr importiert, wird sie ihr Liebhaber selber in Venedig 
holen lassen! Was aber den Kauf der Güter des Grundbedarfs betrifft, kommt es immer auf die 
Qualität des Geldes an: 
 
”Brodt / Bier / vnd alle andere wahr wird gegeben werden / wie man Müntz hat / man teuscht den 
hendeler nicht" (S. 13). 
 
 
Damit läßt sich dann auch zeigen, daß die Müntzherabsetzung schon gar nicht zu niedrigeren 
Preisen führt, wie von der ernestinischen Seite vermutet wurde. 
 
Die metallistische Grundposition scheint auf eine klassische Wertlehre vorauszuweisen, die den 
Preis aus den Produktionsbedingungen der langen Periode unter Absehung von subjektiven 
Einflüssen bestimmt. In der Tat heißt es vom Kaufmann, daß er    40
 
"sich alwege nach der natürlichen wirderung der Müntz / so sie des silbers halben hat / vnd nicht 
auff die zufellige die aus der achtung komet / pfleget zurichten" (S.15). 
 
 
Der Albertiner behandelt seinen Satz, daß die Kaufkraft der Silbermünze nach dem Wert des in ihr 
enthaltenen Silbers geschätzt werden müsse, wie ein Axiom, also wie eine Aussage, die allen 
weiteren Ableitungen als Voraussetzung zugrundeliegt und selbst nicht streng begründet, sondern 
nur plausibel gemacht wird. Plausibel scheint ihm das Axiom vor allem in der Anwendung auf das 
Ausland, denn wenn dort vollwertige Silbergulden fremder Prägung zirkulieren, wird man 
unterwertige sächsische Gulden diesen nicht gleichstellen. Wir würden vielleicht sagen, daß die 
Kaufkraft der Münze ihren Silberwert in einer Welt, in der der Staat noch schwach war, nicht weit 
übersteigen konnte, weil sonst die Versuchung, die Münze zu fälschen, gefährlich zunahm. Er 
meint, ein überhöhter Kurs ließe sich nur durchsetzen, wenn er von allen Ländern angenommen 
würde, was ihm ebenso unwahrscheinlich scheint, wie daß alle Menschen in Sprache und Sitte 
übereinstimmen und dieselbe Religion annehmen. So begründet er, 
 
"das der Silberkauff nich kan noch mag erhöhet werden / es würde dann das silber bey allen Nation 
höher vnd grösser geacht" (S. 15). 
 
 
Damit der erhöhte Prägegewinn übrigbleibt, wird nach dem ernestinischen Schema vorausgesetzt, 
daß die Bergwerke ihr gefördertes Silber zum selben nominalen Preis abgeben müssen wie bisher. 
Wenn der Albertiner dazu schreibt: 
 
"So man den Gewergken das silber nicht anders der anzall nach wolt bezalen / dann bißhero / vnd 
es gleichwol viel höcher yn die Müntz vnd kauff bringen / das dañ aller Göttlichen vñ natürlichen 
billigkeit entkegen" (S.17 f.), 
 
 
scheint er sich auf eine gottgesetzte und naturrechtliche Begründung des Metallismus zu berufen, 
wie wir sie bei Oresmius finden. Wenn er den Satz aber fortsetzt mit  
 
"dann die Gewergken erbawens ye mit grosser darlegung" (S. 19), 
 
 
verweist er auf die Produktionskosten des Silbers, die, wie dann angedeutet wird, bei der 
nachfolgenden, für unvermeidbar gehaltenen Inflation infolge der Herabsetzung der Münze steigen 
müssen. Insofern bestätigt sich, daß der Metallismus auf die Produktionskostentheorie vorausweist. 
Die Bergwerke wurden in Gesellschaftsform betrieben, deren Anteilseigner zum Teil in entfernten 
Städten wohnten (schwindelhafte Verkäufe von Anteilen an in schlechtem Zustand befindlichen 
Bergwerken kamen bereits vor). Die Warnung, die Anteilseigner würden sich zumindest teilweise 
aus dem Bergwerksbau zurückziehen, wenn infolge der Inflation die Rentabilität sänke, ist 
begründet. Der Bergwerksbesitzer würde künftig mehr Silber produzieren müssen, um eine 
gegebene Menge anderer Güter kaufen zu können.  
 
Im Fortgang des 16. Jahrhunderts wurden viele europäische Silberminen unrentabel. Das lag nicht 
nur an der hier beklagten heimischen Münzverschlechterung, sondern auch an der Konkurrenz der 
Silberproduktion aus der Neuen Welt. Sie bedeutete, daß nicht nur die Münzen, sondern auch das 
Silber selbst an Kaufkraft verloren; beides geschah auch dann, wenn die Zahl und der Gehalt der   41
Münzen, in die eine gegebene Menge Silber ausgeprägt wurde, sich nicht änderten. Die 
amerikanischen Minen produzierten billiger. 
 
Der Albertiner, der den darzulegenden Stoff überlegt anordnet, untersucht nun, wie die Inflation die 
Gesellschaftsschichten verschieden trifft und erinnert dazu wieder an die Fürsorgepflicht der Obrig-
keit. Er verweist auf Städte, die, wie Prag und Regensburg, verarmt seien, "der bösen geringen 
Müntze halben" (S. 21). Die Verarmung drückt sich ihm kurioserweise darin aus, daß in den alten 
Häusern das Eisenwerk, also die Nägel und Klammern, mehr wert seien als diese selbst. 
 
Es folgt, für uns nicht überraschend, eine zutreffende Beschreibung der Wirkung der Inflation auf 
Darlehen und Renten, mit dem unvermeidlichen Konflikt zwischen Schuldnern und Gläubigern, 
und das Fazit 
 
"So hetten wir mit der geringen Müntze den handel vorterbet / die Zöll vnd Glayte geschwecht / das 
Bergwergk vordrugkt / vnd den vnfrieden am halse / doraus ewigs vorderb / leibes vnd der Seele 
erfolgt" (S. 23). 
 
 
Die Störung des sozialen Friedens zieht die Sünde nach sich. Zu den Inflationsgewinnern könne 
man auch die Händler rechnen, die, wie es schon Oresmius beobachtet hatte, aufgrund der besseren 
Marktkenntnis beim Münzwechsel gewinnen können. Der Albertiner macht aber darauf 
aufmerksam, daß diese Händler zumeist auch Geldverleiher sind, so daß sie als Gäubiger 
vermutlich sehr viel mehr verlieren würden, als sie als Wechsler gewinnen könnten, denn die Sum-
me der ausstehenden Darlehen sei weit größer als die Bargeldmenge. 
 
Nach dieser überraschenden und fortschrittlichen Abschätzung wird noch weiter abgerechnet mit 
den Mißgünstigen und jenen, die gerne sähen, daß keine Juden im Land wären 
 
"domit sie den wucher allein hetten / das seind böse leute" (S. 25). 
 
 
Die Schrift schließt, wie sie begonnen hat, mit der Berufung auf den Herrn, mit der Hoffnung auf 








Auf die abgewogenen und überlegten, auf gute Ordnung und den Fortschritt im gegebenen Rahmen 
zielenden Ausführungen des katholischen Albertiners folgen die längeren, oft bissigen, zuweilen 
widersprüchlichen, ebenso oft in eine erwünschte Zukunft wie in eine verschönerte Vergangenheit 
weisenden und dabei mehrfach auffallend originellen Kritiken des protestantischen Ernestiners. 
Auch er sei wohlmeinend und untertänig, wird im Titel versichert, dann heißt es aber gleich, der 
andere Schreiber gliche dem Wolfe, der den Schafen empfahl, vor dem Wald zu weiden. Er vertrete 
das Interesse der Kaufleute. Diesen und ihrem Anhang würden Vorteile verschafft, nicht dem 
Gemeinwohl ("der gemeine Landnütz", S: 29). Voll Empörung fügt der Ernestiner hinzu: 
 
"Darzu müssen sie das Heilwertige wort Gottes / zu einem schanddeckel jhrer wucherlichen laster-
werck gebrauchen" (S. 29).   42
 
 
Schließlich wird ausgerechnet dem auf Ordnung bedachten Albertiner Agitation vorgeworfen. Man 
solle sich aber in Ruhe beraten. Wenn man schon von den Fürsten verlange, den Silberpreis zum 
Vorteil der Kaufleute festzusetzen, weshalb verlange man dann nicht auch - so wird ironisch gefragt 
-, den Kaufleuten Maximalpreise vorzuschreiben, um sie an der Preistreiberei zu hindern (S. 31)? 
Ob es einem lieber sei, in einer Stadt 50 - 60 reiche Kaufleute zu haben, bei Verarmung der übrigen 
Bevölkerung, oder das Gedeihen der Vielen? 
 
Der Ernestiner führt die sich schon abzeichnende Inflationstendenz auf Preissteigerungen und 
Gewinnmitnahmen seitens der Kaufleute unter den Bedingungen eines sich infolge zunehmender 
Konzentration verschlechternden Wettbewerbs zurück. Eine wachsende Nachfrage nach 
Luxusgütern spielt den Kaufleuten in die Hände. Dem könne man aber steuern, und wenn der Luxus 
erschwert würde, hätte es keineswegs die Folge, daß alle Konsumenten die Luxuswaren sich selbst 
im Ausland holten, wie es der Albertiner mit seinem Beispiel desjenigen behauptet hatte, der sogar 
nach Venedig reisen würde, um sich das Gewünschte zu holen. Lotz spricht hier von 
"handelspolitisch schutzzöllnerischen Vorschlägen, in denen wir luxusfeindlichen Polizeigeist mit 
jener Verwechslung von Geld und Reichtum kombiniert finden, welch letztere irrigerweise früher 
als allen Merkantilisten eigentümlich angesehen wurde"
69. Immerhin hat der Ernestiner gegen den 
Albertiner Recht, daß eine Abwertung die Importe vermindert und den Luxusanspruch zu decken 
erschwert.  
 
Nach diesem Vorgeplänkel wird darauf verwiesen, daß die Argumente an dem in unserer Einleitung 
erwähnten Treffen von 1526 schon ausgetauscht worden seien und die Reichsstände sich dazu 
geäußert hätten, so daß der Ernestiner zweifelt, ob die Kaufleute fähig wären, ein wohlbegründetes 
Gutachten ("gutgrundige vorlegung", S. 35), abzugeben. Obwohl der Ernestiner hier das Vorurteil 
des geschulten Kanzleibeamten über den ungebildeten Kaufmann auszusprechen scheint und sich in 
heftigen, um nicht zu sagen aufhetzenden Worten ausdrückt, hebt er hier das Wichtige hervor: Wirt-
schaftsfragen sollen im sachlichen Gespräch ausgetragen und geregelt werden. Und daran versucht 
er sich nun. 
 
Die Münzherabsetzung brächte den Herren nicht nur Vorteile, denn dem gewachsenen Münzgewinn 
stünden Verluste bei ihren Zinseinkünften gegenüber. Daß die Herabsetzung nicht einseitig zum 
Vorteil der Fürsten erdacht sei, könne man auch daran ersehen, daß sie infolge der verminderten 
Einfuhr geringere Einkünfte aus Wegegeldern zu erwarten hätten. Die Einbußen der Wirte und 
Fuhrleute dürfte in Anbetracht von deren Reichtum in Kauf genommen werden. Es bliebe jedenfalls 
der regionale Handel mit den lebensnotwendigen Gütern. 
 
"Das alles sind die nottüfftigsten wharn / der man ynn keinen wegk entratten mag / auswendig und 
ynwendigen landes" (S. 39). 
 
 
So habe man es selbstverständlich keineswegs auf die Abschaffung allen Handels oder allen 
Gewerbes abgesehen. Der Leser wird nicht umhin können, an Luthers Predigten für eine mäßige 
Lebensführung zu denken, in der Gewinnen und Handeln höchstens einen bescheidenen Platz 
einnehmen dürfen. Sie gelten dann als läßliche Sünden. Der Standpunkt des Verwalters zeichnet 
sich ab, wenn erwähnt wird, man habe die mannigfaltigen Einkünfte aus den Wegegeldern 
überschlagen lassen; er wünscht eine "richtige pollicey" (geordnete Politik, (S. 37), hier wohl: eine 
rigorose Besteuerung und Gesetzgebung wider den Luxus durchgeführt zu sehen.  
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Der Autor nähert sich nun den Thesen, die ihm am wichtigsten scheinen. Er beklagt, wie viel Silber 
gefördert und ausgeführt worden sei und fragt, was das Land dadurch gewonnen habe. Daß es der 
breiten Bevölkerung gut ging, wird man in den ersten Jahren nach dem Bauernkrieg kaum 
behaupten. Wenn man in den Ausführungen des Ernestiners nur die Verwechslung von 
(verlorenem) Geld und (verlorenem) Reichtum sieht, entgeht einem das Verständnis der damals 
drängenden Frage, ob der Reichtum nicht besser hätte verteilt werden können.  
 
Wer etwas ändern will, muß zuerst beweisen, daß die gegenwärtige Lage nicht befriedigen kann. 
Der Ernestiner zeigt mit vielen Beispielen, daß die Preise WURW] der Bezahlung in vollwertiger 
Münze gestiegen seien, und das seit 25 Jahren, nicht etwa seit nur drei oder vier. Wie wir sahen, 
stützt die moderne wirtschaftshistorische Forschung die Sicht, die Inflation sei nicht nur monetär 
verursacht gewesen und habe schon im vorangehenden Jahrhundert eingesetzt. Die gute Münze 
habe keine Vorteile gebracht, lautet die Schlußfolgerung, die in Wirklichkeit natürlich unbewiesen 
bleibt, da die Inflation bei fortgesetzter Münzherabsetzung sicherlich größer gewesen wäre, wie der 
Albertiner in seiner Antwort hervorzuheben nicht versäumen wird.  
 
Das Silber sei überbewertet, denn man habe es eingeschmolzen, weil Silber so billiger zu haben war 
als ungemünztes Silber. Lotz, der nicht an die Möglichkeit einer Überemission von Silbermünzen 
denken mag, vermutet, das Silbermonopol der Herren habe zu einem überhöhten Preis für Rohsilber 
geführt
70. Der Ernestiner dagegen spricht von einem "uberflus solcher uberwirdigen Müntz" (S. 47). 
Zum Verständnis dieses auch bei Copernicus anzutreffenden, sach-lich kaum zu widerlegenden 
Arguments hat man sich vorzustellen, daß die Kaufleute und Händler die guten Münzen 
herausfischten und der Umlauf im Volk mit schlechten, zum Teil mit ausländischen Münzen 
durchgeführt wurde, was den Ernestiner zu einem Vergleich veranlaßt: Die Gäule, die den Hafer 
anbauen, werden am wenigsten damit gefüttert (denn der bleibt den Reitpferden vorbehalten).  
 
"Ynn summa / die frembden und reichen Lande/ als Italia / Franckreich / die Nider Burgundische 
lande / auch Engelland etc. die stellen das furnemen und grund yhrer handlung darauff / das sie die 
wahr / aus yhren landen / yn frembde abfüren / vnd dagegen das reichtumb / das ist gelt / empfahen 
und suchen." (S. 47). 
 
 
Mit erstaunlichem Scharfblick erfaßt der Ernestiner hier die merkantilistische Politik der 
exportorientierten Länder, die über Bergwerke zur Förderung des für den Güterumlauf damals 
unentbehrlichen Edelmetalls nicht verfügen. Die Formulierung, daß man seinen Reichtum (nämlich 
das Geld) für Luxuswaren hingeben müsse, scheint eine naive Verwechslung von Reichtum und 
Geld zu meinen, aber der Autor will, wie der Zusammenhang klar macht, darauf aufmerksam 
machen, daß der Silberexport und Luxuswarenimport nur wenigen im Lande dient: den 
Bergwerksbesitzern und den von ihnen Abhängigen, denen also, die nun reich genug werden, um 
Luxusgüter zu importieren, während sich wenig Beschäftigungsgewinn für Gewerbetreibende und 
Ackerbauern ergibt. Sie leiden an der Überbewertung der Währung. So läuft es darauf hinaus,  
 
"das hundert ungeuerlich sich reichen / dagegen die Fürsten / vnd der gemeyn landman / vorder-ben 
/ der / Gott lob / mehr dann hundert tausend sein / die sich doch ane das viel höher hetten bessern 
sollen" (S. 47). 
 
 
Die Theorie lehrt, daß zwei Länder sich durch die Ausnutzung der komparativen Vorteile im 
internationalen Handel besser stellen, aber diese Vorteile kommen nicht notwendig allen zugute, 
und wenn nur beim einen die Produktivität durch technischen Fortschritt steigt, verschlechtert sich 
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in der langen Frist die relative Stellung des anderen. In der Sicht des Ernestiners werden die 
Handelsbeziehungen überdies durch die zunächst paradox anmutende Verbindung einer 
Überemission von Münzen von zu hohem Silbergehalt gestört. 
 
Unter den weiteren Argumenten findet sich ein interessanter Versuch, unlautere Praktiken der 
Großkaufleute im Wettbewerb aufzu-decken. Sie hielten die gute Ware zurück und verkauften 
schlechte an die kleinen Händler, und wenn diese die schlechte Ware an die Kunden zu bringen 
versuchten, träten Beauftragte der Großhändler auf, welche nun mit der guten Ware die kleinen 
Händler vom Markt verdrängten. Daß dies vorkäme, wird behauptet von "etlichen Monopoliern" (S. 
53); die Praxis führt dazu, daß 
 
"der gemeine kauffmann / bei jhnen schwerlich auffzukomen vermag" (S. 55), 
 
 
und so sind die Anbieter dann in der Lage, die Preise weiter zu steigern. 
 
Die Hauptsache sei, daß die Münzung sich nach dem Silberpreis zu richten habe. Die 
Bergwerksbesitzer sollten allerdings weniger erhalten, als wenn sie ihr Silber auf dem offenen 
Markt verkauften. Da man für das Silber bisher ebenso viel bezahlt habe, sei die Maßnahme nicht 
übertrieben und nicht gefährlich, es sei denn 
 
"es bescher vns dan Gott / viel / und vberflussige Bergwerg" (S. 57). 
 
 
Genau dies trat ein. Den in ihrer Konkurrenzfähigkeit geschwächten europäischen Bergwerken 
traten die amerikanischen gegenüber.  
 
In diesem Absatz, in welchem der Autor versucht, seine Maßnahmen als gemäßigte hinzustellen, 
wird nochmals darauf hingewiesen, daß gegenwärtig die guten mittelgroßen sächsischen Münzen 
eingeschmolzen, im Ausland billiger ausgeprägt und re-importiert würden. Das eben müsse man 
verhindern. Die großen Münzen wiederum zirkulierten zwar noch, jedoch mit einem Agio, das ihr 
Einschmelzen verhindere. Die Berechtigung des Agios bestreitet der Ernestiner nicht; es ist ihm 
aber ein Beweis, daß das Münzwesen neu geordnet werden müsse. Man brauche eine 
 




Auf den gestiegenen Silberpreis sei nun allerdings auch nicht mit einer Überemission zu antworten.  
 
"Es ist aber nicht die meynung / das man sich also vnvorsichtig / vbermüntzen / vnd die silber 
vnwert machen solt" (S. 65). 
 
 
Der Ernestiner möchte somit eine unterwertige Münze prägen lassen und sie im Umlauf knapp 
genug halten. Nach dieser Interpretation verstand er nicht nur, wie Copernicus, daß eine 
Geldschwemme zur Inflation führt, sondern auch, daß eine vorsichtige Emission auch bei 
unterwertigen Münzen mit stabilen Preisen verträglich bleiben kann, wobei er es allerdings für nötig 
hielt, den Preisauftrieb durch unvollkommene Konkurrenz zu bekämpfen. Diese Gedanken-
verbindung geht über die später im 16. Jahrhundert gehörte Vorstellung eines rein 
quantitätstheoretischen Zusammenhangs von Geldmenge und Preisniveau weit hinaus.   45
 
Viel verlegener ist unser Ernestiner (aber nicht um Worte), wenn er erklären soll, wie sich die 
Bergwerke unter den für sie verschlechterten Rentabilitätsbedingungen halten sollen. Er redet von 
den armen Bergleuten, welche die Klüfte erschließen und das Erz schürfen, von den Kaufleuten, die 
dann die Berganteile an sich bringen und von der guten Verwaltung, die der Betrieb erfordere. Er 
hält es für "Meuterey" (S. 69), wenn man da den Fürsten mit noch weitergehenden Forderungen 
komme, wie die aufrührerischen Bauern, die gesagt hätten 
 
"Wir wöllen frey sein vñ kein pflicht auff vns tragen" (S. 69). 
 
 
Die Bergwerksbesitzer sollen also niedrigere Gewinne hinnehmen und gleichwohl gehorsamst 
investieren. - Schließlich kehrt er zum merkantilistischen Leitmotiv zurück. Reich nenne man die 
Länder mit viel Gewerbe und Handel, die Niederlande, Norditalien, England und Frankreich. Wenn 
diese durch Handel reich sind: weshalb will man dann die Ausdehnung des Handels in Sachsen 
begrenzen? Die erste, einfache und für uns befremdliche Antwort lautet: Reichtum ist Geld, und 
über diesen Reichtum verfügt Sachsen bereits. Es ist in Gefahr, ihn durch Handel zu verlieren. Denn 
 
"Die selbigen Königreich / lande / vnd Inseln alle / haben jhr gewerb / handtirung / ordenung / 
Pollicey / vnd narung jnn vielwege / darauff gericht / das sie die wahr aus jhren vnd ander landen / 
zu vns Deudschen / Vngern und Behem fast viel füren / vnd das gelt zu sich hinein bringen / 
dadurch sie sich reichen / vnd erhöhen." (S. 75). 
 
 
Diese Sätze sind ein eindeutiger und klarer Ausdruck der merkantilistischen Lehre, wonach die 
aktive Handelsbilanz den an Edelmetall armen Ländern die Edelmetalleinfuhr erst erlaubt, ohne die 
unter den herrschenden Umständen kein Geldumlauf und kein Marktverkehr möglich ist. Nur wird 
die Lehre von der aktiven Handelsbilanz hier nicht wie bei den berühmten englischen 
Merkantilisten aus der Sicht des die Edelmetalleinfuhr benötigenden Landes dargestellt, sondern 
aus der des Edelmetallexporteurs. Weshalb aber ist diesem der Edelmetallabfluß nicht angenehm, 
solange dafür Waren erworben werden? 
 
Hier verliert sich der Ernestiner in finsteren Andeutungen: Bis auf einzelne begünstigte Händler 
verarme das Land. Es fehlt der Entwurf eines Gegenbilds - jedenfall in ausdrücklicher Form, da es 
sich implizit immerhin erschließen läßt -, wie ohne die Edelmetallexporte eine eigenständige 
Industrialisierung besser erreicht würde. Das war die Lehre von Ortiz
71 in Spanien, beinahe 30 Jahre 
später. Verschiedene Gründe mögen den Ernestiner bewogen haben, selbst einer solchen 
Vorstellung nicht nachzugehen. Vielleicht war er zu konservativ, vielleicht nicht klug genug, das 
Ziel der der Entwicklung einer breiteren wirtschaftlichen Basis begrifflich klar zu formulieren. 
Wahrscheinlich gab die zeitgenössische Lage den Ausschlag: die Reformatoren predigten das 
einfache, bescheidene Leben. Der Ernestiner will für die Masse der Bevölkerung nicht mehr und 
nicht we-niger als ein ordentliches Auskommen nach alter Sitte, ohne Störung durch neue 
Bedürfnisse und neue Güter, höhere Preise und sinkende Kaufkraft der Einkommen und ohne daß 
durch das Aufsteigen neuer Schichten Neidgefühle geweckt werden. Wenige hundert Menschen 
seien in den Ländern der Fürsten zu Sachsen reichlich versorgt, aber: Trotz der "milden Gabe 
Gottes / der Bergwerg / vnd der ... fruchtbarkeit / der lande" (S. 75) haben wir "vnbedacht / vnbe-
tracht / vnbesonnen / das gründlich vorderben / jnn gemein landen vnd leuten" (S. 75). Dagegen 
wäre es recht und billig, daß viele tausend durch die Gottesgabe "nach erbarer land handelung reich 
sein" (S. 75).  
 
                                                           
71  Schefold, B.: a.a.O.[FN 64], S. 5-38.   46
Es erübrigt sich, die weiteren Angriffe gegen den Großhandel zusammenzufassen. Der Autor 
spricht schließlich, nachdem er schon des öfteren die Bauern gelobt hat, seine Sympathie auch für 
das Kleingewerbe aus. Seinen Gegner hofft er nicht zu belehren, aber urteilsfähige Dritte: "Antwort 
dem narren ... vmb der andern willen" (S. 79). Als Protestant verbindet er das Zitat aus den 
Sprüchen Salomos mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß auch er in der Heiligen Schrift gelesen habe. 
Keiner darf schließen, ohne sich in seinem Glauben bekannt zu haben. 
 
Die dritte Flugschrift, die Antwort des Albertiners, müßte in der ersten Auflage schon 1531 
erschienen sein. Da diese als verschollen gilt, erfolgt der Nachdruck nach der Auflage von 1548. 
Die Existenz mehrerer Drucke zeugt von einer lebendigen Diskussion. Der Albertiner trittt den 
gegen ihn erhobenen Vorwürfen kräftig entgegen, den Gegner wie einen Bekannten ansprechend. 
Den Vorwurf des Mißbrauchs des Gottesworts kann er nicht auf sich sitzen lassen. Er gibt zurück, 
es sei üblich geworden, unter dem Schein des göttlichen Worts anderen das Ihre zu nehmen oder zu 
behaupten, der oder jener Stand sei "wider Gott" (S. 85). Der andere möge seinen Glauben mit 
besserer Frucht beweisen - aus katholischer Sicht bewährt sich der Glaube ja in den Werken. 
 
Wichtige neue Argumente kommen nicht ins Spiel, obwohl einzelne kleine von historischem 
Interesse sind. So entgegnet der Albertiner der Behauptung des Ernestiners, die Fürsten hätten an 
einer Herabsetzung des Silbergehalts kein überwiegendes eigenes Interesse mit dem Verweis, bei 
den Verhandlungen in Zeitz sei der Nutzen für die Fürsten nicht verschwiegen worden. Die 
entscheidende Frage, ob die Vor- oder die Nachteile für die Fürsten überwögen, bleibt freilich 
unbeantwortet. Auch die Bauern seien für die Beibehaltung der guten Münze eingetreten, hebt er 
hervor. Die Nachteile einer Senkung der Rentabilität der Bergwerke werde auf viele Leute fallen, 
auch auf Arbeiter, Bauern und Handwerker. Damit deutet sich an, daß der Albertiner hofft, der 
Silberexport werde schließlich doch zu einer Verbreiterung der wirtschaftlichen Basis führen. Die 
zwischen ihm und seinem Widerpart zahlreichen Mißverständnisse über die Inflation löst er 
teilweise auf, indem er die Argumente des Ernestiners in seiner methodischen Weise einzeln 
vornimmt. Er warnt vor einer Abwertungsspirale, in der sich die Herabsetzung des Silbergehalts des 
Geldes und das Steigen des in Geld ausgedrückten Silberpreises immer wieder gegenseitig 
bedingen. 
 
"Vnd würde also das Silber dodurch also offte / vnd also hoch gesteigert / das zu letzt / die müntze 
eitel kupffer würde." (S. 105). 
 
Wenn der Ernestiner sich gegen den Luxus wende, solle er eben Luxusgesetze erlassen und nicht 
deswegen abwerten - auch der Albertiner pflichtet bei in der Ablehnung der "fürwitzigen kleidunge 
... vnd der gleiche uberflüssigen prachts" (S. 107), während der Leser bei der üppigen Aufzählung 
der Modeartikel an solchen Luxus in großer Schönheit zur Geltung bringende Holbeinportraits 
denken mag. Allerdings fällt die albertinische Luxuskritik bedeutend gemäßigter aus - die 
Menschen seien eben nicht zu ändern. 
 
Auch daß unter der Politik der guten Münze Warenpreise gestiegen seien, wird etwas zögend 
zugegeben: 
 
"die wörtze eins theils / mag etlicher masse gestigen haben" (S. 109). 
 
Nun aber trägt er seine nicht-monetären Erklärungen der Inflation vor. Die Gewürze hätten sich 
wegen der Verlagerung der Handelswege nach Portugal verteuert und die Menge der nachgefragten 
Gewürze zugenommen - Argumente, die nicht ohne weiteres überzeugen, da ja die neuen 
Handelswege aus Wettbewerbsgründen gesucht wurden und die vergrößerte Menge dank 
Skalenerträgen im Transport zu niederen Preisen beitragen sollte. Verschwendung wird denunziert:   47
 
"wenn der hausman einen rock / Kappe / Pannedt /Hut / Hosen / Wammes / Schuch / ein malh oder 
vier angeblasen hat / so werffen wirs wegk" (S. 111).  
 
Die Inflation entsteht also in der Wegwerfgesellschaft des 16. Jahrhunderts! Da wird der moderne 
Leser, beeinflußt von moderner Theorie, vielleicht doch eher auf jene "Übermünzung" schließen, 
vor der der Ernestiner warnt, auf die der Albertiner jedoch nicht eintritt. Sein bestes Argument ist zu 
betonen: wenn das Geld sich schon bei guter Prägung so entwertet, wie muß es erst bei schlechter 
werden! Bei der schlechten sei zu erwägen, daß Silber zwar in der Tat eher im Lande bleiben 
werde, aber es bliebe bei den Fürsten, nicht beim Volke. Sachsen besitze eben wenig, um es zu 
exportieren, vom Silber abgesehen. Hier bemerkt der Albertiner nicht, daß für den Ernestiner eben 
dies gerade das Problem ist, an das er sich, in der drängenden Frage der Industrialisierung allerdings 
begrifflich durchaus unklar bleibend, herantastet. Die zweite Schrift des Albertiners endet, wie 
seine erste begonnen hat: mit dem Verweis auf die gute Ordnung und auf die Obrigkeit, die für sie 
Verantwortung trägt.  
 
Wagen wir, der Gefahren bewußt, die sich ergeben, wenn man von den Schultern der späteren 
Ökonomen herunter urteilt, zuletzt eine Zusammenfassung in modernen Worten.  
 
Der kühle Albertiner geht von Axiom aus, daß sich die Kaufkraft der Silbermünzen nach ihrem 
Metallwert richtet. Seine Andeutungen zur Bestimmung von Preisen verweisen summarisch auf 
Produktionskosten. Dies ist die klassische Position, die später von Smith ausgearbeitet werden wird. 
Sie bedeutet, daß die Menge des umlaufenden Geldes endogen bestimmt wird. Wer die Preise, die 
Umlaufsgeschwindigkeit und das Transaktionsvolumen gegeben denkt, muß auf eine Anpassung 
der Geldmenge schließen. Überreichlich geprägte Münzen werden eingeschmolzen; viel des Silbers 
fließt ins Ausland ab. Dem Albertiner scheint das unbedenklich. Er erweist sich als 
wirtschaftspolitisch liberal, indem er den Silberabfluß als Warenexport geschehen lassen will, da 
ihm Importe gegenüberstehen und er von beidem, der Silberproduktion und der Einfuhr, eine 
dynamische Beschäftigungsentwicklung erhofft. Als Anhänger geordneter wirtschaftlicher 
Rahmenbedingungen tritt er dafür ein, diesen sonst selbstgeregelten Ablauf durch eine stabile 
Münzordnung zu sichern.  
 
Der überschwängliche Ernestiner redet altväterlich und als Neuerer zugleich. Die Inflation sieht er 
einerseits als Folge von Marktmacht, andererseits begründet er sie quantitätstheoretisch. Zwar sagt 
er nicht, wie später Keynes vom Goldstandard, das Silbergeld sei ein "barbarous relic", aber er will 
seine Ausgabe verknappen, um einen Zwangskurs zu erreichen, der deutlich über dem Metallwert 
liegt. Damit verfolgt er mehrere Ziele: ein fiskalisches zugunsten seines Fürsten, ein 
beschäftigungspolitisches (denn er rechnet mit einer Abwertung gegen außen) und ein moralisches 
(Luxusimporte werden erschwert). Die Störung der Rechtsverhältnisse zwischen Schuldnern und 
Gläubigern nimmt er in Kauf, die Beeinträchtigung der Exporte der merkantilistischen Engländer, 
Franzosen, Niederländer, Italiener, Portugiesen bereitet ihm eine Genugtuung. Der Schlag gegen die 
Importkaufleute erscheint ihm als Verteidigung protestantischer Werte. Nicht der Aufbau einer 
eigenen Exportwirtschaft, sondern das langsame, organische Wachsen einer autarken, autochthonen 
Binnenwirtschaft von Bauern und Handwerkern im beamtengestützten Fürstenstaat strebt er an. 
Beunruhigt bemerkt der Leser ebensowohl Ansätze zu Staatseingriffen, die, vernünftig gehandhabt, 
selbstverständlich geworden sind, wie Andeutungen einer Geisteshaltung, welche später die 
deutsche Entwicklung hemmen oder sogar fehlleiten sollte.  
 
Wer die Münzschriften auch nur mit einiger Aufmerksamkeit im Original liest, wird sich trotz 
solcher Bedenken des Eindrucks einer ernsten, mit hoher persönlicher Anteilnahme, 
Verantwortungsbewußtsein, religiösem und patriotischem Eifer geführten Auseinandersetzung nicht   48
entziehen können. Die Lektüre der Übersetzung kann der Deutung helfen, schwächt diesen 
Eindruck aber erheblich ab, der sich wesentlich aus dem Ringen um eine neue Sprache zum Ver-
ständnis des wirtschaftlichen Geschehens ergibt. Zumal in Verbindung mit den Schriften Peutingers 
und Fronspergers erkennen wir ein neues Bild von den Anfängen der ökonomischen Theorie in 
Deutschland, das in den deutschen Lehrbüchern der Dogmengeschichte erst einen sehr schwachen, 
in den internationalen fast gar keinen Niederschlag gefunden hat. Zugleich vertieft sich das Ver-
ständnis für eines der wichtigsten Kapitel der Europäischen Geschichte: das Zeitalter der 








Compte tenu de l’importance que Say accorde à la théorie de la production, ce domaine de 
l’économie politique mérite que l’on s’y arrête de manière à comprendre l’approche d’un 
économiste dont les ouvrages se diffusent à l’échelle de l’Europe et des Etats-Unis au cours de la 
première moitié du XIX
e siècle
1. Par ailleurs, comme ce domaine est étroitement lié aux problèmes 
posés par la théorie de la valeur et des prix, il faut prendre en compte les modifications que Say 
introduit dans les différentes éditions de son 7UDLWp, dans le &DWpFKLVPHG¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXH et le 
&RXUVFRPSOHWG¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXH SUDWLTXH, soit qu’il réponde aux objections de David Ricardo, 
soit qu’il critique les thèses avancées par ce dernier. 
On prendra pour point de départ la troisième édition du 7UDLWp, datée de 1817, c’est-à-dire la 
dernière édition que Say publie avant d’être confronté à l’interprétation de Smith proposée par 
Ricardo dans ses 3ULQFLSOHV RI 3ROLWLFDO (FRQRP\ DQG 7D[DWLRQ, publiés cette même année. Il 
s’agira de mettre au clair la conception que Say présente de la production des richesses, c’est-à-dire 
de la production d’utilité (§1). Ensuite, on proposera une interprétation des lignes de force selon 
lesquelles Say présente la défense de sa théorie de la production et des prix, tout en insistant sur les 






Dans ce qui constitue la première partie de son 7UDLWpG¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXH, Say développe 
une approche significative des différences existant entre lui et les économistes britanniques, comme 
le montre la structure de son argumentation. En effet, Say commence par une série de définition 
concernant la richesse et la valeur de manière à expliquer «&H TX¶LO IDXW HQWHQGUH SDU
352'8&7,21». Le lecteur moderne - et sans doute est-ce aussi le cas d’un contemporain comme 
Ricardo - est quelque peu surpris de constater qu’aucune discussion approfondie des concepts de 
valeur et de prix n’apparaît avant les trois premiers chapitres de la partie consacrée à la répartition 
des richesses
2. Il faut prendre en compte cet aspect de l’ouvrage de Say pour comprendre son 
économie politique et, ainsi, comprendre ce qu’il fait avant de juger de ce qu’il aurait dû faire selon 
le "canon" de la théorie moderne ou de la théorie ricardienne. 
Dans le premier chapitre du 7UDLWp, Say rassemble sous le terme de richesse les biens qui ont 
une valeur, c’est-à-dire qui sont utiles ; la valeur est mesurée par le taux auquel s’échangent les 
biens
3. Toutefois, une courte note placée dès la deuxième page de l’ouvrage indique que 
l’approfondissement de la notion de valeur est renvoyée à plus tard. S’il n’est pas véritablement 













question de la richesse et de la valeur, de quoi est-il donc question dans ce chapitre? D’une 
définition de la production. Say prend d’abord ses distances vis-à-vis d’une acception erronée de la 
production qui rattache celle-ci à la production de matière ou à une matérialité particulière. Le 
passage suivant est clair sur ce point, même s’il laisse implicite les auteurs qui sont visés, François 




VDXUDLW DXJPHQWHU QL GLPLQXHU 7RXW FH TXH QRXV SRXYRQV IDLUH F¶HVW GH UHSURGXLUH FHV
PDWLqUHVVRXVXQHDXWUHIRUPHTXLOHVUHQGHSURSUHVjXQXVDJHTXHOFRQTXHTX¶HOOHVQ¶DYDLHQW
SDVRXVHXOHPHQWTXLDXJPHQWHO¶XWLOLWpTX¶HOOHVSRXYDLHQWDYRLU,O\DDORUVFUpDWLRQQRQ
SDV GH PDWLqUH PDLV G¶XWLOLWp LO \ D production &¶HVW DLQVL TX¶LO IDXW HQWHQGUH OH PRW
productionHQpFRQRPLHSROLWLTXHHWGDQVWRXWOHFRXUVGHFHWRXYUDJH/DSURGXFWLRQQ¶HVW
SRLQWXQHFUpDWLRQGHPDWLqUHPDLVXQHFUpDWLRQG¶XWLOLWp » (Say 1817, I, p. 3). 
 
Say termine ce bref chapitre liminaire par un rappel de l’objet de tout le premier livre du 
7UDLWp: «  ,O Q¶\ D GRQF YpULWDEOHPHQW SURGXFWLRQ GH ULFKHVVH TXH Oj R LO \ D FUpDWLRQ RX
DXJPHQWDWLRQG¶XWLOLWpSachons comment cette utilité est produite» (LELG, p. 7; je souligne). Puis, il 
termine son chapitre 3 par un énoncé fort quant au but visé dans O¶HQVHPEOHGHO¶RXYUDJH: 
 
« &RQFOXRQV GRQF TXH OHV ULFKHVVHV TXL FRQVLVWHQW GDQV OD YDOHXU TXH O¶LQGXVWULH




OHV YUDLV PR\HQV GH OHV REWHQLU /H GpYHORSSHPHQW GH FHV PR\HQV HVW OH but de cet 
ouvrage » (LELG, pp. 21-22, je souligne). 
 
En d’autres termes, Say nous avertit que son ouvrage, et non pas seulement sa première partie, 
est tout entier consacré à expliciter les moyens grâce auxquels les hommes peuvent produire, en 
quantité croissante, les biens dont ils ont besoin. Ce sont donc ces moyens vers lesquels il faut se 





Il existe, remarque Say, des biens libres dont « VHXOHODQDWXUHIDLWOHVIUDLV » (LELG, p. 8); ils 
sont utiles et disponibles au-delà de l’usage que l’on en a. L’économie politique est chargée 
d’étudier les richesses dont on ne bénéficierait pas «VL O¶LQGXVWULH KXPDLQH QH SURYRTXDLW
VHFRQGDLWDFKHYDLWOHVRSpUDWLRQVGHODQDWXUH » (LELG). Ainsi, dans sa définition de l’industrie, Say 
met l’accent sur la relation existant entre celle-ci et la nature, avant d’en analyser les différentes 
facettes selon trois directions. Premièrement, la production signifie un usage que les êtres humains 
font de la nature qui est comme à leur disposition. La production est conçue en termes de 










(LELG, p. 10) 
 
L’usage dont il est question peut être direct ou indirect. Say ajoute ainsi un terme 
intermédiaire entre l’industrie et la nature avec le capital qui représente le stock de produits déjà 
existant dont l’industrie dispose avant de mettre à contribution la nature
5. On a donc dès à présent le 
triptyque définissant les conditions de la production moderne avec l’industrie (ou travail humain), le 
capital et la nature; ou encore le service productif du travail, du capital et des agents naturels.  
Deuxièmement, les avantages que les sociétés peuvent attendre de la nature les conduisent à 
se l’approprier ; hors le cas où la nature est un bien libre (le vent, la mer, les lois de la nature - LELG, 
p. 34), elle est appropriable grâce à une législation positive qui assure à son possesseur l’usage 
exclusif, comme c’est le cas du sol. Cette dimension de la relation de la production à la nature est 
donc de l’ordre de l’organisation sociale : la mise en place de la propriété est indispensable aux 
yeux de Say pour que les hommes se lancent dans l’activité productrice, mais la forme sociale de la 
propriété peut être plus ou moins bien organisée. Il y a donc un effort spécifique à accomplir en ce 
domaine et l’auteur du 7UDLWp ne manque pas d’y insister puisque l’examen du droit de propriété, 
des règlements administratifs en matière de production, etc. sont introduits à partir du chapitre XIV 
en tant que causes accidentelles de la production, c’est-à-dire en tant que causes sociales selon 
lesquelles la production est améliorée ou entravée
6. 
Troisièmement, selon Say la nature n’est pas seulement une matière inerte que les êtres 
humains auraient à travailler ou à s’approprier. Elle est un « outil puissant »
7 dans la mesure où elle 
constitue la ressource même grâce à laquelle les matériaux offerts peuvent être mis en œuvre. En 
effet, la production d’utilité fait intervenir la connaissance des lois de la nature, lois qui sont autant 
de moyens de mettre la nature au service de la société. Cette dimension de la relation à la nature est 
mise en relief lorsque Say définit le service productif des agents naturels : 
 




FKDOHXUTXLVHGpJDJHSDUODFRPEXVWLRQHWF » (LELG, p. 29) 
 
La connaissance vient s’ajouter aux fonds qui constituent l’industrie humain et elle permet 
une meilleure utilisation des matériaux au profit des êtres humains. La connaissance joue le rôle 
d’une DSSURSULDWLRQFROOHFWLYH de la nature qui est comme le pendant de la propriété privée du sol
8. 




















Say attache une très grande importance à cette dimension de l’industrie humaine et il est amené à 
poser la thèse générale suivante : 
 




(LELG, p. 35). 
 
La relation des êtres humains à la nature peut donc être de trois ordres, avec l’XVDJH des 
matériaux présents sur ou dans le globe terrestre, l’DSSURSULDWLRQ de certains d’entre eux et la 
FRQQDLVVDQFH GHV ORLV qui président aux phénomènes naturels. Ces dimensions de la relation 
production-nature ont pour support les classes intervenant dans la production. Le savant réalise 
l’appropriation collective de la nature en fournissant les connaissances qui permettent de maîtriser 
« l’outil puissant » qu’est la nature; l’ouvrier exécute le travail immédiat destiné à transformer la 
nature ; finalement, l’entrepreneur d’industrie joue un rôle d’intermédiaire essentiel en louant les 
services productifs des deux précédentes catégories auxquelles viennent s’ajouter les services des 
capitaux loués aux capitalistes, ceux de la terre loués aux propriétaires fonciers. Ce travail de 
coordination économique comporte d’ailleurs une dimension sociale, car l’œuvre de l’entrepreneur 
fait partie de l’administration dont il a été question lorsque Say expliquait que l’ignorance et la 
mauvaise administration sont deux causes susceptibles de diminuer la quantité de richesses 
produite. 
Pour terminer sur cette définition des conditions de la production, on notera que Say 
généralise son approche lorsqu’il souligne la similitude entre l’industrie humaine, le capital et 
l’œuvre de la nature : tous trois sont redevables de la notion de WUDYDLO
9. Le chapitre VII du 7UDLWp 
explique que l’industrie humaine - celle du savant, de l’entrepreneur ou de l’ouvrier - est un travail 
entendu comme une « DFWLRQVXLYLHjODTXHOOHRQVHOLYUHSRXUH[pFXWHUXQHGHVRSpUDWLRQVGH
O¶LQGXVWULH » (LELG, p. 52). Say homogénéise les différentes formes d’industries qui concourent à la 
production, mais, plus surprenant, il étend cette notion de travail aux deux autres services 









O¶pWDEOLU SXLVTX¶HOOH HVW XQ PR\HQ G¶REWHQLU OH VHUYLFH GH SOXVLHXUV DJHQV QDWXUHOV GRQW
O¶HPSORL JUDWXLW SHXW H[FpGHU EHDXFRXS HQ YDOHXU O¶LQWpUrW GX FDSLWDO TXH UHSUpVHQWH OD
PDFKLQH » (LELG, p. 53)
10. 
 
L’homogénéisation des différents services producteurs sous le registre du travail ne conduit 
pas Say vers une théorie de la valeur-travail ou une théorie de la mesure de la valeur par le travail - 
au contraire, il reproche à Smith de s’être fourvoyé sur ce point (LELG; FI aussi Say LQ H. Hashimoto 
1980, p. 67). Say procède d’une autre manière pour envisager les services producteurs des capitaux 





et de la terre comme des machines mise en œuvre par le travail humain de manière à obtenir le 












SOXVGHSURGXLWVSRXUOHPrPHWUDYDLOKXPDLQ&¶HVWOHFRPEOHGHO¶LQGXVWULH » (LELG, p. 53-
54). 
 
De ce fait, dès le début de la Restauration, Say a réuni les éléments permettant de définir une 
forme originale de société, inconnue jusqu’alors. C’est ce que Henri Saint-Simon et son secrétaire 
Auguste Comte théoriseront plus tard sous le nom de société industrielle, société dans laquelle la 
relation de pouvoir de l’homme sur l’homme s’efface devant la maîtrise de la nature par l’homme 
(Saint-Simon 1819, pp. 77-87). Cette perspective amène Say à se démarquer vigoureusement de la 
position défendue par son Smith, lorsqu’il s’agit de caractériser la société moderne et d’isoler les 





Une comparaison attentive du « Discours préliminaire » des deux premières éditions du 7UDLWp 
montre qu’à partir de 1814, Say critique vigoureusement la :HDOWKRI1DWLRQV (Steiner 1998b). La 
théorie de la production exposée par Smith n’échappe pas à ce sort puisque la division du travail qui 
en constitue un élément central, est soumise à la critique. 
Certes, Say reprend à son tour la célèbre description de la fabrique d’épingles, mais il 
s’emploie à en déplacer le point d’application et, surtout, à en limiter l’importance au regard d’un 
phénomène que Smith ne connaissait pas ou a ignoré. Premièrement, Say met l’accent sur 
l’importance de la division des travaux au sein du monde savant, c’est-à-dire parmi ceux qui 
étudient la nature pour que la société puissent s’approprier collectivement les ressources offertes par 
les agents naturels. Bref, la division du travail intellectuel est un élément important que Say 
introduit avec le service productif du savant parmi les éléments constitutifs de l’industrie
11. 
Deuxièmement, Say reproche à Smith de n’avoir pas perçu la suprématie de la machine sur la 













SULQFLSH PpFRQQX O¶HPSrFKH G¶pWDEOLU OD YUDLH WKpRULH GHV PDFKLQHV SDU UDSSRUW j OD
SURGXFWLRQGHVULFKHVVHV » (LELG, pp. xlix-l). 
 
Plus que la division du travail, ce sont les machines qui permettent de comprendre comment 
les sociétés ont pu accroître si considérablement les quantités de richesses produites; cela emporte 
d’ailleurs sa conviction au point que lorsque les deux phénomènes sont intimement liés, il accorde 
encore la suprématie à la machine
12. Par machine, nous l’avons vu, Say comprend tous les moyens 
que l’industrie peut employer pour faire usage des forces non appropriées de la nature grâce à la 
maîtrise des lois de la nature par la science. L’inflexion est donc considérable par rapport à Smith: 
on peut s’en assurer en indiquant deux conséquences importantes que Say tire de ce changement de 
perspective. 
Lorsqu’il introduit la monnaie, Say suit Smith en expliquant que des individus spécialisés 
dans une tâche ne peuvent produire tout ce dont ils ont besoin et qu’en conséquence les échanges se 
multiplient. Toutefois, Say ne retient pas l’appellation de FRPPHUFLDOVRFLHW\ proposée par Smith 
pour caractériser ce genre de société. La raison en est simple, mais profonde: ce ne sont pas les 
échanges qui sont au cœur de la société, mais c’est la production, ou encore les échanges entre les 
hommes et la nature, médiatisés par l’usage des machines, par l’usage plus éclairé des différentes 
machines, la terre et les animaux domestiques inclus :  
 
« 'HSXLV XQH FHQWDLQH G¶DQQpHV OHV SURJUqV GH O¶LQGXVWULH GXV DX[ SURJUqV GH
O¶LQWHOOLJHQFHKXPDLQHHWVXUWRXWjXQHFRQQDLVVDQFHSOXVH[DFWHGHODQDWXUHRQWSURFXUp
DX[KRPPHVG¶LPPHQVHVpFRQRPLHVGDQVO¶DUWGHSURGXLUHPDLVHQPrPHWHPSVOHVKRPPHV
RQW pWp WURS UHWDUGpV GDQV OHV VFLHQFHV PRUDOHV HW SROLWLTXHV HW VXUWRXW GDQV O¶DUW GH
O¶RUJDQLVDWLRQGHVVRFLpWpVSRXUWLUHUSDUWLjOHXUSURILWGHFHVGpFRXYHUWHV » (LELG, II, p. 
35n1). 
 
De ce point de vue, il ne faut pas se méprendre quant à la signification d’une formule que Say 
emploie à de nombreuses reprises dans le 7UDLWp, lorsqu’il considère la production comme un 
échange
13. Il ne s’agit pas de voir là une "anticipation" de la démarche walrasienne exposée dans les 
(OpPHQWVG¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXHSXUH avec la séquence qui part de l’échange (2, puis P marchandises 
entre elles), pour étendre le modèle de base à la production, puis à la capitalisation. Au contraire, 
avec Say, la production est au cœur de l’économie politique et l’échange dont il est question, c’est 
celui que les hommes font avec la nature pour obtenir d’elle la plus grande utilité, au moyen des 
ressources qu’elles met à leur disposition du moment qu’ils font l’effort de la maîtriser 
intellectuellement par le développement de la science
14. La définition synthétique du concept de 




















PRLQVDYDQWDJHX[ » (LELG, II, 452-453). 
 
En termes de théorie économique, les conséquences sont importantes. Au lieu de la question 
smithienne selon laquelle il s’agit de mettre au jour les règles que les hommes suivent naturellement 
dans l’échange (Smith 1776, I, p. 44), la question sayenne concerne les règles que les hommes 
suivent socialement dans l’échange avec la nature pour produire de l’utilité. Ces règles dépendent 
de l’état social puisque elles dépendent de la maîtrise que les hommes ont des lois de la nature, mais 
elles dépendent aussi des règles selon lesquelles les hommes s’organisent socialement. En effet, Say 
n’oublie jamais de mentionner les «  fléaux humains  » ou le manque de développement des 
« sciences morales et politiques » parmi les phénomènes qui entravent la production
16. D’ailleurs, 
comme on le sait, l’entrepreneur est au centre de son approche précisément parce qu’il est le 
médiateur essentiel grâce auquel cette relation Société-Nature prend place. 
Ces réflexions sur la nature de la production chez Say conduisent à voir dans son 7UDLWp deux 
formes possibles de la croissance économique. Dans les deux cas, cette dernière est déterminée par 
la quantité de capital à la disposition des entrepreneurs ou, plus généralement, de la société ; cette 
thèse, Say l’adopte à la suite de Smith et, croit-il, en opposition aux Physiocrates, ou du moins de 
tous ceux qui affirmeraient que la croissance repose sur le secteur agricole. Dans une première 
forme, le capital sert à étendre le principe de la division du travail, en ce sens qu’une masse plus 
importante de capital permet d’approfondir la séparation des tâches dans les manufactures (à 
technique constante, c’est-à-dire à niveau de maîtrise cognitive de la nature constant). Cette forme 
de croissance peut être qualifiée de FURLVVDQFH H[WHQVLYH, puisqu’elle ne fait qu’étendre les procédés 
déjà connus, grâce à la disposition d’une quantité accrue de capital. Toutefois, Say met l’accent sur 
une deuxième forme de croissance économique, basée sur l’emploi de machines plus 
perfectionnées
17. Cette FURLVVDQFHLQWHQVLYH met alors au cœur de l’activité productrice d’une part 
les connaissances scientifiques nouvelles et, d’autres part, l’entrepreneur ayant su utiliser ces 
connaissances nouvelles pour améliorer les termes de l’échange entre la société et la nature. En 
d’autres termes, la croissance intensive est celle où la masse de capital productif n’est plus qu’un 
indicateur de la capacité des hommes à faire concourir la nature à la production: 
 




EHDXFRXS GH SHLQH SRXU H[SOLTXHU O¶DERQGDQFH GHV SURGXLWV GRQW MRXLVVHQW OHV SHXSOHV






IRQWWUDYDLOOHUjQRWUHSURILW » (LELG, I, pp. 30-31). 
 










La croissance intensive repose donc sur ce que Say appelle le « comble de l’industrie » ; la 
société moderne n’est pas la FRPPHUFLDOVRFLHW\ de Smith, mais c’est la VRFLpWpLQGXVWULHOOH que lui-
même, Henri Saint-Simon et les rédacteurs du &HQVHXU(XURSpHQ - Charles Dunoyer et Charles 
Comte
18 -, Charles Dupin
19, ou le second successeur de Say à la chaire d’économie politique du 
Collège de France, Michel Chevalier
20, développent dans la première moitié du XIX
e siècle. Lorsque 
Say instille dans ses ouvrages d’économie politique des remarques pointant vers une utopie, c’est 
l’utopie d’une « société parfaitement industrielle » qui est mise en avant. Il s’agit d’une utopie 
moins relevée que celle du poète rapportée par Aristote (/DSROLWLTXH, 1253b35) où les instruments 
se meuvent d’eux-mêmes pour se rendre à l’assemblée des Dieux puisqu’il s’agit d’une société dans 
laquelle: 
 
« OHV KRPPHV VDQV rWUH PRLQV QRPEUHX[ VHUDLHQW WRXV HPSOR\pV j GHV DFWHV TXL
UpFODPHQW LPSpULHXVHPHQW XQH FHUWDLQHGRVH G¶LQWHOOLJHQFH HW R WRXW FH TXL HVW DFWLRQ
SXUHPHQWPDFKLQDOHVHUDLWH[pFXWpSDUGHVDQLPDX[RXSDUGHVPDFKLQHV8QHSDUHLOOHQDWLRQ
DXUDLWWRXVOHVSURGXLWVMRXLUDLWGHWRXWHVOHVXWLOLWpVTX¶LOHVWSRVVLEOHGHVHSURFXUHU » (1828-





Dans le chapitre 4 du &DWpFKLVPH G¶pFRQRPLH SROLWLTXH, l’entrepreneur est celui qui 
entreprend la fabrication d’un produit (Say 1821, p. 15), ceci suppose trois choses qui seront ensuite 
reprises et développées dans le &RXUVFRPSOHW: l’entrepreneur doit acquérir les connaissances à la 
base de l’art qu’il veut exercer
21, il doit rassembler les moyens d’exécution et diriger cette dernière, 
il doit décider si cette production vaut la peine d’être menée à bien
22.  
Premièrement, Say distingue la science et son application. Le savant suit la logique propre à la 
science, à savoir l’investigation de la nature alors que l’entrepreneur suit une logique économique et 
il n’introduit les découvertes du savant que dans la mesure où celles-ci permettent d’obtenir un 
produit nouveau ou de mettre en œuvre une technique nouvelle qui soient profitables. Dans le &RXUV 
FRPSOHW Say illustre cette idée en faisant un parallèle entre l’expérience de Volta, apparemment 
sans aucune destination industrielle, et l’application qui en est faite en France pour la conservation 
des plaques de cuivre doublant les coques des navires (1828-29, I, p. 93). La fonction de 





EHVRLQV SK\VLTXHV GH O¶KRPPH PDLV VD FRQVWLWXWLRQ PRUDOH F¶HVWjGLUH VHV P°XUV VHV
KDELWXGHVVHVJRWVOHGHJUpGHFLYLOLVDWLRQGRQWLOMRXLWODUHOLJLRQTX¶LOSURIHVVHFDUWRXWHV















FHV FKRVHV LQIOXHQW VXU VHV EHVRLQV HW SDU FRQVpTXHQW VXU OHV  VDFULILFHV DX[TXHOV LO VH
UpVRXGUDSRXUOHVVDWLVIDLUH2UFHWDUWGHO¶DSSOLFDWLRQTXLIRUPHXQHSDUWLHVLHVVHQWLHOOHGH
OD SURGXFWLRQ HVW O¶RFFXSDWLRQ G¶XQH FODVVH G¶KRPPHV TXH QRXV DSSHORQV HQWUHSUHQHXUV
G¶LQGXVWULH » (LELG, p. 94). 
 
Pour employer le vocabulaire de Joseph Schumpeter (1911), il y a une dissociation entre 
l’invention (scientifique) et l’innovation (économique) alors même que Say insiste sur les 
connaissances scientifiques que doit posséder l’entrepreneur
23. Aux yeux de Say, cette dissociation 
est factuellement justifiée par le fait que si les découvertes scientifiques circulent facilement entre 
les individus et entre les nations (1817, I, p. 45) - ce qui explique d’ailleurs la modicité des revenus 
monétaires que les savants en retirent (LELG, II, p. 80) - il n’en va pas de même de la capacité à 
appliquer les découvertes à la production de choses utiles. C’est ainsi que Say explique la 
supériorité anglaise: 
 






DSSOLFDWLRQVXWLOHV » (LELG, I, p. 45-46, je souligne ; voir aussi 1828-29, I, p. 98). 
 
Le phénomène est renforcé par le fait que les connaissances dont doit disposer l’entrepreneur 
ne sont pas seulement des connaissances théoriques, mais aussi des connaissances pratiques, ce que 
Say appelle « ODVFLHQFHGH>VRQ@pWDW » (LELG, p. 47) qui peuvent découler de ses expérimentations 
personnelles
24. Cet aspect met donc en relief la nature de capital des connaissances privées de 
l’entrepreneur ou de la firme ainsi que la réputation dont ils jouissent: « /HQRXYHOHQWUHSUHQHXUD
VRQpGXFDWLRQjIDLUHVXUFKDFXQGHFHVSRLQWVHWQXOOHpGXFDWLRQQ¶HVWJUDWXLWH8QHFOLHQWqOHWRXWH
IRUPpHXQHH[SpULHQFHDFTXLVHVRQWGHVDYDQWDJHVVLSUpFLHX[HQPDQXIDFWXUHTX¶LOVpTXLYDOHQWj
XQFDSLWDOFRQVLGpUDEOH » (1828-29, I, p. 297). 
Deuxièmement, Say prolonge cette réflexion sur le rôle de l’entrepreneur en examinant sa 
fonction de prise de décision dans un cadre industriel. Cette dimension a déjà fait l’objet d’un 
examen approfondi dans les travaux qui se sont intéressés à la filiation entre Say et Frank Knight 
(Steiner 1997, 1998a; Fontaine 1999). Dans le cadre de sa théorie de la répartition, Say caractérise 
l’entrepreneur par l’incertitude marchande puisque lui seul a un revenu incertain car lié aux résultats 
futurs sur les marchés où s’écoulent les produits qu’il vend. Dans la théorie de la production, le 
pendant de cette situation réside dans l’impératif de maîtrise intellectuelle des incertitudes liées à ce 
futur; l’entrepreneur doit calculer en fonction des prix des services certains et du prix (incertain) des 
biens produits : 
 
«  /HV HQWUHSUHQHXUV G¶LQGXVWULH QH VRQW SRXU DLQVL GLUHTXHOHVLQWHUPpGLDLUHVTXL
UpFODPHQWOHVVHUYLFHVSURGXFWLIVQpFHVVDLUHVSRXUWHOSURGXLWHQSURSRUWLRQGHODGHPDQGH
TX¶RQ IDLW GH FH SURGXLW /H FXOWLYDWHXU OH PDQXIDFWXULHU RX OH QpJRFLDQW FRPSDUHQW
SHUSpWXHOOHPHQWOHSUL[TXHOHFRQVRPPDWHXUYHXWHWSHXWPHWWUHjWHOOHRXWHOOHPDUFKDQGLVH











XQHEDVHGHODYDOHXUGHFHVVHUYLFHV » (1817, II, pp. 53-54).  
 
Cette tâche est loin d’être simple. En effet, l’entrepreneur doit maîtriser un large ensemble de 
données dont les grandeurs ne peuvent pas être déterminées d’une manière assurée, ou bien même 
de grandeurs qui ne peuvent être qu’estimées subjectivement au sens de l’incertitude radicale de 
Knight; pour ce faire, Say attend visiblement beaucoup d’une capacité spécifique qu’il dénomme le 
MXJHPHQW
25. C’est le cas lorsqu’il s’agir de prévoir les besoins, c’est-à-dire, finalement, la demande 
qui sera faite d’un produit
26. C’est aussi le cas lorsque l’incertitude réside dans des décisions 
publiques modifiant l’environnement de l’entrepreneur, par exemple lorsque le gouvernement se 
lance dans la production d’un bien ou bien lorsqu’il modifie la valeur de la monnaie (LELG, pp. 267, 
339). 
Troisièmement, Say souligne le rôle de l’entrepreneur en termes de contrôle du processus de 
production. Le passage suivant, aussi succinct qu’il paraisse contient néanmoins une vision précise 
du travail de supervision continuel que l’entrepreneur doit accomplir pour obtenir de ses 





DILQ TXH O¶DSSUREDWLRQ DUULYH j TXL  HOOH DSSDUWLHQW  OHV LQWpUHVVHU j XQH VXUYHLOODQFH
PXWXHOOHVDQVHQFRXUDJHUO¶HVSLRQQDJHTXLIDLWPpSULVHUFHX[TXLO¶HPSORLHQW » (1828-29, I, 
p. 300). 
 
Selon Say, le travail de supervision passe essentiellement par deux canaux : la connaissance 
du métier, la supervision comptable. Selon Say, l’entrepreneur doit connaître les techniques 
d’exécution, car « FHOXLTXLQHFRQQDvWSDVWRXWHVOHVGLIILFXOWpVG¶H[pFXWLRQFRPPDQGHPDOHWPDOj
SURSRV » (LELG). Sans doute faut-il voir là un écho des conditions industrielles de l’époque dans 
laquelle la distance entre les dirigeants et les exécutants est encore faible
27, ne serait-ce que parce 
l’essentiel de la production se fait toujours dans de petits ateliers et non dans de grandes 
manufactures (LELG, p. 268). La supervision comptable est introduite dans le cadre des leçons 
données au Conservatoire, puis dans le &RXUV FRPSOHW (VIIIème partie, chapitre 18); à cette 
occasion, Say explique qu’un entrepreneur peut surplomber le fonctionnement de son entreprise 
grâce à des livres de compte pour peu que l’on ait fait l’effort d’apprendre la comptabilité et d’être 
capable d’en tirer les fruits
28. 
 




















Il s’agit maintenant de tirer parti de cet examen de la théorie sayenne de la production pour 
éclairer certaines prises de position en matière de théorie de la valeur et des prix, notamment 
lorsque Say est confronté aux critiques que lui adresse Ricardo. Les relations personnelles entre les 
deux hommes s’échelonnent sur la période 1814-1822, soit peu de temps avant la mort prématurée 
de l’économiste anglais en septembre 1823. D’un point de vue intellectuel, les relations portent sur 
une période plus vaste. Il est possible, voire probable, que Say ait pu pris connaissance des écrits de 
Ricardo sur le prix du lingot, traduits dans le 0RQLWHXU XQLYHUVHO (an X, vol.2) au moment où Say 
explique à plusieurs correspondants qu’il est en train de refondre son 7UDLWp, en attendant des jours 
meilleurs pour publier la seconde édition
29. Il est certain qu’une partie des modifications introduites 
dans la cinquième édition du 7UDLWp ainsi que nombre de développements du &RXUVFRPSOHW sont 






Une première différence apparaît lorsqu’il s’agit de définir l’objet principal de l’économie 
politique. Dans l’introduction à ses 3ULQFLSOHV, Ricardo indique que son attention porte sur la 






GLVWULEXWLRQLVWKHSULQFLSDOSUREOHPLQSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\ » (Ricardo 1817, p. 5) 
 
La production intervient chez Ricardo au travers d’une théorie de la valeur basée sur la 
difficulté de production ; le problème smithien quant aux règles suivies dans l’échange est rapporté 
aux conditions définissant l’offre des biens (Kurz & Salvadori 1994, p. 16) et il est premier dans la 
mesure où il sert à clarifier la théorie de la répartition. Or, on l’a vu, Say ne procède pas de cette 
manière là : il a placé la production au premier rang et a repoussé à plus tard la réflexion sur la 
valeur; de même, il ne recherche pas une grande précision en matière de théorie de la répartition 
parce que celle-ci dépend de rapports de force économique (i.e. les rapports entre l’offre et la 
demande pour tel ou tel service producteur dans un système de marchés qui, selon Say, n’est pas 
caractérisé par une parfaite mobilité des facteurs), dont la nature est d’être extrêmement variable 
(Steiner 1998a, tables 5.1 et 5.2). Au point qu’il considère comme hors de son propos la question de 
la détermination précise des contributions des différents facteurs à la production. D’ailleurs, il ne 
creuse pas le problème théorique lié à la théorie de l’imputation, alors qu’il en expose à plusieurs 
reprise le principe fondamental, renvoyant l’affaire à ce que John Stuart Mill appellera plus tard le 
« KLJJOLQJRIWKH PDUNHW »
31. 
                                                           
￿￿&·HVWFHTX·LOGpFODUHHQIpYULHUj-HDQ&KDUOHV/pRQDUG6LVPRQGLRXHQFRUHMDQYLHUj%HQMDPLQ)URVVDUGXQ
SUrWUHGHVHVDPLV6WHLQHUE










Un peu plus tard, alors qu’il est question des /HWWUHVj 0DOWKXV de Say, Ricardo donne son 









UHJXODWHVYDOXHDQGVXSSO\LVLWVHOIFRQWUROOHGE\FRPSDUDWLYHFRVWRISURGuction » (Ricardo 
à Malthus, 9 octobre 1820, LQ Ricardo 1952, VIII, pp. 278-279). 
 
Cette lettre écrite à Malthus après une lecture dont on sait qu’elle fut très attentive des 
3ULQFLSOHV RI 3ROLWLFDO (FRQRP\ (Ricardo 1820), aurait pu être adressée aussi bien à Say, 
notamment lorsqu’il est question de la théorie de la valeur. En effet, il faut être attentif au fait que 
lorsqu’il est question de la détermination des prix par l’offre et de la demande, Ricardo renvoie à un 
passage du début de sa lettre, passage dans lequel il critique l’approche de Say fondée sur l’utilité: 
 







UHJXODWHGE\WKHFRVWRISURGXFWLRQ » (LELG, pp. 276-277). 
 
Ainsi, malgré les différences existant entre Say et Malthus sur la question du fonctionnement 
du système de marchés, malgré l’accord entre Say et Ricardo sur la question des crises, il existe une  
opposition profonde entre Ricardo et Say-Malthus lorsqu’il s’agit de l’objet de l’économie politique 
d’une part, du rôle respectif des forces de marché et des contraintes de la production d’autre part. 
Pour les deux derniers, les lois de la production de la richesse sont décisives, bien plus que celles 
concernant la répartition de la richesse produite. Bien sûr, il serait faux de croire que Ricardo ne dit 
rien sur la production car la ‘dynamique grandiose’ qui se dégage de ses écrits concerne bien la 
production : aussi est-il plus exact de dire que dans le bouclage répartition-production, c’est la 
répartition qui a la primauté chez Ricardo. L’inverse est caractéristique de la position de Say que 
nous suggérons d’interpréter ici comme privilégiant la théorie de la production et ne considérant la 
répartition que comme un ensemble de phénomènes dont il s’agit qu’elle ne se trouve pas contredire 
les potentialités de la production. On peut ainsi s’expliquer que Say se satisfasse de propositions 
superficielles en matière de ce qui s’appellera plus tard la théorie de l’imputation, ainsi qu’on l’a vu 
plus haut. 
Le deuxième point de différence profonde entre Say et Ricardo-Malthus concerne le rôle 
central que Say attribue à l’entrepreneur dans la théorie de la production et, plus généralement, dans 
la compréhension du fonctionnement d’un système de marchés. Il est intéressant de revenir sur un 
passage de la lettre déjà mentionnée de Ricardo à Malthus. En effet, continuant à critiquer la 
manière dont Say défend ce que nous appelons maintenant la "loi de Say", Ricardo explique sa 
façon de voir les choses: 









FDQQRWIDLOWREHVRPHHPSOR\PHQWVZKLFKZRXOG\LHOGJRRGSURILWVand if a superior genius 
had the arrangement of the capital of the country under his control, he might, in a very little 
time, make trade as active as ever. Men err in their productions, there is no deficiency of 
demand » (LELG, p. 277; je souligne). 
 
Say ne pourrait bien sûr pas souscrire à une telle interprétation de sa loi des débouchés, 
précisément parce qu’elle passe sous silence celui qui lui paraît être le personnage central de la 
pièce, à savoir l’entrepreneur confronté à l’incertitude marchande, confronté au problème pratique 
d’anticiper la demande dans une situation où, justement, il n’existe pas de «  superior genius  » 
capable de planifier la production parce qu’il aurait été capable de connaître à l’avance les 
demandes qui se feront dans les différents marchés des biens et services consommables. Aussi, faut-
il prendre au sérieux, théoriquement parlant, la réponse que Say fournit en 1825 lorsqu’il réécrit sa 
correspondance à Ricardo. En réponse aux critiques que Ricardo lui après lecture de la première 
édition du &DWpFKLVPHG¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXH, Say ne faisait pas intervenir l’entrepreneur en 1815, ce 




P¶HPSrFKHU GH IDLUH HQWUHU SRXU EHDXFRXS GDQV O¶DSSUpFLDWLRQ GHV SURILWV OH WDOHQW OD
FDSDFLWpLQGXVWULHOOHGHFHOXLTXLIDLWYDORLUXQWHUUDLQRXXQFDSLWDOHWMHUHJDUGHFRPPH
FRPSDUDWLYHPHQWSHXLPSRUWDQWOHSURILWSURSUHOHSURILWLQKpUHQWjFHVGHX[LQVWUXPHQWV » 
(Say, LQ Ricardo 1952, VI, p. 274)
32. 
 
En remettant l’entrepreneur au centre de son approche, Say marque d’une manière correcte 
une différence importante entre Ricardo et lui. Contrairement à l’énoncé de Ricardo pour qui la 
demande ne fait pas problème et pour qui seules les erreurs des producteurs persistant dans des 
productions inadaptées sont à l’origine des désajustements sur les marchés, ou des crises partielles, 
Say considère que le problème est celui du mutuel ajustement de l’offre et de la demande en tant 
que processus distincts au plan temporel, processus que, précisément, l’entrepreneur a en charge de 
coordonner. C’est parce que les évolutions de la demande sont incertaines que les entrepreneurs 
peuvent errer, c’est aussi parce que le monde économique est « visqueux » que ces entrepreneurs 
peuvent, pour un temps, espérer que le maintien de l’activité dans une phase de dépression est 
rationnelle. Pour reprendre une formulation de Philippe Fontaine (1999), l’approche de Say met 
l’accent sur l’incertitude qui caractérise le producteur en face des biens à produire, en termes de 
qualité comme en termes de volume; Say adopte une position qui est plus proche de la théorie de la 
firme conçue comme une organisation, c’est-à-dire comme un lieu caractérisé par une rationalité 
procédurale plutôt que par une rationalité substantive, par une approche de phénomènes marchands 
où la fluidité n’est pas parfaite, même lorsqu’on se situe au niveau des ajustements financiers (Say 
1818, p. 466). 
 
 
                                                           







Probablement esquissé dès leur première rencontre en décembre 1814, le débat entre Ricardo 
et Say sur la théorie de la valeur commence dès le mois d’août 1815. Á Say qui vient de lui envoyer 
une copie de la première édition du &DWpFKLVPH G¶pFRQRPLH SROLWLTXH, Ricardo répond 
immédiatement en soulevant deux objections: 
 
« <RXKDYH,SHUFHLYHDOLWWOHPRGLILHGWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHZRUGYDOXHDVIDUDVLWLV
GHSHQGHQW RQ XWLOLW\ EXW ZLWK JUHDW GLIILGHQFH , REVHUYH WKDW , GR QRW WKLQN \RX KDYH
PDVWHUHG WKH GLIILFXOWLHV ZKLFK DWWDFK WR WKH H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKDW GLIILFXOW ZRUG 8WLOLW\ LV
FHUWDLQO\WKHIRXQGDWLRQRIYDOXHEXWWKHGHJUHHRIXWLOLW\FDQQHYHUEHWKHPHDVXUHE\ZKLFK
WRHVWLPDWHYDOXH$FRPPRGLW\GLIILFXOWRISURGXFWLRQZLOODOZD\VEHPRUHYDOXDEOHWKDQRQH
LV HDVLO\ SURGXFHG DOWKRXJK DOO PHQ VKRXOG DJUHH WKDW WKH ODWWHU LV PRUH XVHIXO WKDQWKH
IRUPHU$FRPPRGLW\PXVWEHXVHIXOWRKDYHYDOXHEXWWKHGLIILFXOW\RILWVSURGXFWLRQLVWKH
WUXHPHDVXUHRILWVYDOXH » (Ricardo 1952, VI, pp. 247-248; lettre du 18 août 1815). 
 
Say répond en affirmant sa conviction en faveur d’une approche, qualifiée par la suite de 





SURGXFWLRQZKDW\RXFDOOWKHdifficulty of its productionHWF¶HVWFHTXLIDLWTXHVRQSUL[QH
SHXWSDVWRPEHUHQGHVVRXVGHFHWDX[ » (LELG, p. 271)
33. 
 
Avec des variantes, Say campera désormais sur cette définition ‘symétrique’ de la valeur. 
Remarquons pour l’instant qu’il ne semble pas avoir immédiatement pris la mesure de la différence 
entre lui et Ricardo: en effet, à l’exception de la formulation condensée donnée dans l’(SLW{PH 
(1817, II, p. 485), la troisième édition du 7UDLWp ne fait pas apparaître de manière claire cette 
approche symétrique de la valeur, si ce n’est au travers d’une partition de la relation marchande 
avec, d’abord, le débat contradictoire entre le vendeur et l’acheteur pour fixer le prix courant, puis 
la concurrence entre les producteurs pour abaisser les prix au niveau des frais de production (LELG, 
pp. 7-8)
34. Sans que cela signifie un accord entre les deux auteurs, ou un ralliement de Say à 
Ricardo, Say conclut alors par une formulation proche de la formulation ricardienne: « En d’autres 
termes, plus rigoureux, les produits tendent toujours à prendre une valeur proportionnée aux frais de 
production qui sont nécessaires pour les établir » (LELG, pp. 8-9).  
La parution des notes sur les 3ULQFLSOHV, puis de la quatrième édition du 7UDLWp montre que si 
Say emploie des formulations ambigues, notamment lorsqu’il s’exprime de la manière suivante: 
« /RUVTXH M¶pFKDQJH  NLORJUDPPHV GH IURPHQW FRQWUH XQ NLORJUDPPH GH FDIp M¶pFKDQJH OHV
VHUYLFHVSURGXFWLIVTXLRQWIRUPpNLOGHIURPHQWFRQWUHFHX[TXLRQWIRUPpXQNLOGHFDIp » 
(1819, II, p. 7)
35. Ces formulations peuvent expliquer que, momentanément, Ricardo déclare qu’il 












« DOPRVWIXOO\DJUHH>ZLWK@\RXUGRFWULQHRISURGXFWLYHVHUYLFHV » (Ricardo à Say, LQ Ricardo 1952, 
VIII, p. 379; lettre du 8 mai 1821); ce que laisse aussi entendre un passage des 3ULQFLSOHV, la théorie 
de la rente étant mise de côté (Ricardo 1817, pp. 283-284). Néanmoins, contrairement à 
l’interprétation suggérée par Samuel Hollander (1985), il ne semble pas possible de souscrire à une 
quelconque similitude entre les deux auteurs sur le fond. A partir de 1823, puis dans les années 
1825-1829, sous l’influence de Ricardo, même après la mort de ce dernier, Say radicalise sa 
réflexion en accentuant le côté demande de son analyse et en s’efforçant d’expliciter aussi 
clairement que possible les relations entre besoins, utilité, demande, revenus et prix. La lecture de la 
cinquième édition du 7UDLWp et du &RXUVFRPSOHW le montre très clairement: en effet, la notion de 
classement des biens en fonction d’une hiérarchie des besoins et la référence à la richesse, deux 
éléments introduits ou réintroduits en 1819, font l’objet d’une réflexion plus serrée de la part de 
Say.  
Say déclare que les agents classent leurs besoins et cette hiérarchie, qu’elle qu’en soit 
l’origine, est « XQHFKRVHGHIDLWHWG¶REVHUYDWLRQ » (1826, III, p. 161); ensuite, il rattache cette 
hiérarchie aux choix effectués entre les différents biens sous contrainte de revenu
36. Quel que soit le 
motif de la préférence, l’agent choisit en fonction de ses préférences d’une part et du prix relatif 
d’autre part; Say a donc atteint un niveau relativement élevé de clarté dans cette voie nouvelle de sa 
réflexion: 
 




FDSDEOHVGHSURFXUHUXQHVDWLVIDFWLRQSOXVJUDQGHSRXUOHPrPHSUL[ » (LELG, p. 162). 
 
Par ailleurs, Say associe désormais à sa réflexion sur le prix, une idée exprimée dès la 
première édition du 7UDLWp à propos de la répartition de la richesse dans la société, répartition qui 
prend, selon lui, la forme d’une pyramide. La demande est ainsi liée à la richesse, tant au niveau 







V¶pOHYDQW » (LELG, p. 162-163). 
 
Le &RXUVFRPSOHW accentue cette approche avec un graphique illustrant comment, sur la base 
du classement hiérarchique des besoins, la richesse et les frais de production entrent contact par 
l’intermédiaire de la demande (1828-29, I, pp. 357-359). Au final, Say a précisé sa théorie du prix 
fondée sur la valeur utilité et le rôle de la demande et maintient son interprétation « symétrique » de 
la valeur, notamment lorsqu’il réitère sa proposition sur l’effet des variations de la demande sur le 











TXRLTX¶LO Q¶H[FqGH SDV OHV IUDLV GH SURGXFWLRQ 3RXU TXH OD FRQFOXVLRQ GH 5LFDUGR IW
VRXWHQDEOHLOIDXGUDLWTXHWRXVOHVVHUYLFHVSURGXFWLIVIXVVHQWpJDOHPHQWSURSUHVjWRXVOHV
SURGXLWV » (LELG, pp. 361-362)
37. 
 
Il est exact que la réflexion de Say apparaît incomplète par rapport à ce que développera 
Alfred Marshall parce que Say ne fait jamais intervenir une distinction en termes de périodes, le 
court terme pour les force de marché, le long terme pour les coûts de production. Néanmoins, la 
remarque de Say concernant les effets d’une hausse de la demande des biens sur les marchés des 
services producteurs est pertinente. 
Toutefois, ceci ne concerne qu’une partie de la polémique avec Ricardo. Dès le départ de la 
polémique, ce dernier a élevé une critique concernant le lien entre valeur et richesse qui met plus 








IRXQGDWLRQRIJUHDWYDOXH » (Ricardo à Say, LQ Ricardo 1952, VI, pp. 247-248; lettre du 18 août 
1815). 
 
De la part de Ricardo, il y a une distinction importante, mais somme toute élémentaire, à faire 
entre richesse et valeur. La richesse renvoie à l’utilité, à la jouissance alors que la valeur renvoie à 
la difficulté de production et à la quantité de travail nécessaire à la surmonter; cette distinction fait 
l’objet d’un chapitre des 3ULQFLSOHV, chapitre dans lequel Say est pris à partie (Ricardo 1817, pp. 
279-288). Il est vrai que le débat est affecté par le manque d’une terminologie adéquate, puisque 
l’utilité renvoie à la fois à l’utilité socialement déterminée, celle qui permet de classer les biens en 
utiles ou nuisibles, et à l’utilité subjective qui fait qu’un bien nuisible peut satisfaire un besoin (ce 
que Vilfredo Pareto désignera plus tard par le terme d’ophélimité). La difficulté est d’autant plus 
grande que Say n’a pas une position intangible quant à la nature de l’utilité considérée, puisque il 
est progressivement amené à clarifier le fait qu’il considère l’utilité subjective et non pas l’utilité 
objective, socialement déterminée. En outres, comme le montrent les manuscrits de cette période, 
Say cherche longuement une solution au problème posé en termes d’une différence entre richesse 
individuelle et richesse de la nation; c’est-à-dire qu’il admet alors GH IDFWR la pertinence de la 
critique de Ricardo
38. Ces points qui, indubitablement, affaiblissent la position de Say ne doivent 
pas masquer la réponse fournie; cela d’autant plus que la théorie de la production est directement 
mobilisée à cet effet. 
Reprenons le fil de la controverse. Dans une première réponse, Say ne saisit sans doute pas la 
portée de la critique de Ricardo, critique d’ailleurs formulée d’une manière embrouillée en faisant 
intervenir la restriction des besoins, ce qui est hors propos. Aussi dans sa réponse de septembre 
1815, Say se contente-t-il de réitérer l’idée, à laquelle Ricardo souscrit, que le «  comble de la 
richesse » serait atteint si tous les biens étaient des biens libres ou peu s’en faut (Say LQ Ricardo 









1952,  VI, p. 271). Dans ses notes sur les 3ULQFLSOHV, Say (1818, pp. 478-479) s’appuie sur la 
distinction entre richesse naturelle et richesse sociale, distinction commune chez lui. La discussion 
reprend ensuite en juillet 1821 dans une correspondance dans laquelle Say fait usage de la réponse 
introduite dans la note 18 de la deuxième édition du &DWpFKLVPH (1821, pp. 216-220) qui paraît à la 
fin de cette année
39. L’argument de Say est alors directement basé sur sa théorie de la production, 
c’est-à-dire sur la nature de la relation Société-Nature par l’intermédiaire de la machine. Le fait que 
l’on échange une livre d’or contre 2.000 livres de fer signifie-t-il, demande Ricardo, que l’or est 









 GHJUpV G¶XWLOLWp FUppV SDU O¶LQGXVWULH IDLVDQW SDUWLH GHV ULFKHVVHV VRFLDOHV HW SDU
FRQVpTXHQWHQWUDQWGDQVODVSKqUHGHO¶pFRQRPLHSROLWLTXH » (1821, p. 219). 
 
La réponse de Say vaut la peine d’être considérée avec quelque attention. En premier lieu, elle 
actualise l’idée développée dans le cadre de la théorie de la production, lorsque Say fait valoir les 
mérites de la croissance intensive, dans laquelle la machine permet aux producteurs d’obtenir plus 
de produits grâce à une meilleure maîtrise des forces gratuites offertes par le savant. En effet, si au 
lieu de comparer l’or et le fer on compare deux états successifs de la production d’un même bien, 
on comprend que, selon lui, l’utilité du bien ne change pas, alors que le prix diminue en raison de 
l’emploi de la machine, du remplacement de services producteurs par des forces naturelles gratuites; 
c’est d’ailleurs ainsi qu’il présente les choses dans le chapitre du 7UDLWp consacré aux variations 






XQHPDFKLQHRXODUHQGSOXVSURGXFWLYH » (Say 1819, II, p. 35; 1826, II, p. 178)
40. 
 
L’approche de Say sert à expliquer comment un bien dont la quantité disponible s’accroît peut 
procurer une plus grande jouissance aux individus vivant en société, donc fournir une plus grande 
utilité alors qu’en même temps, chaque unité du bien coûte moins cher à produire, a une valeur 
marchande moindre. En effet, grâce à l’usage des forces naturelles gratuites mises en œuvre par une 
machine mieux pensée, l’utilité naturelle est en proportion plus grande que l’utilité sociale résultant 
de l’industrie. L’utilité sociale diminue alors que l’utilité totale (naturelle et sociale) demeure la 
même pour celui qui possède le bien. Le prix diminue puisque l’utilité sociale a diminué ; l’individu 
est pourtant plus riche en termes d’utilité naturelle, même s’il l’est moins en termes des d’autres 
marchandises qu’il peut se procurer en échange. On est donc en face d’un développement similaire 
à celui fondée sur la différence entre utilité totale et utilité marginale ; l’approche de Say est donc 








ici similaire à celle de Jules Dupuit lorsque ce dernier distingue l’utilité totale et l’utilité relative et 
qu’il mesure cette dernière par la différence entre l’utilité totale et le prix d’achat ou coût
41. Selon 
Say, la richesse plus grande dont on bénéficie lorsque les frais de production unitaires diminuent 
désigne le surplus du consommateur, c’est-à-dire la différence entre ce que l’on aurait été près à 
payer pour jouir du bien (somme des utilités naturelle et sociale) et ce que l’on paye réellement 
(l’utilité sociale). À ce jour, il semble que Seul George J. Stigler ait relevé la réponse fournie par 
Say, même s’il l’écarte parce qu’elle lui paraît métaphysique au regard de la théorie de l’utilité 
marginale que Say ne pouvait connaître (Stigler 1950, p. 77). Couplée à la répartition des richesses - 
la pyramide du &RXUVFRPSOHW - la production de biens utiles en quantité croissante et à un prix plus 
faible (grâce à l’emploi des forces gratuites de la nature qui diminuent la part de l’utilité sociale 
dans l’utilité totale) permet d’améliorer la situation de la population
42, un objectif toujours essentiel 





Say appartient au groupe des ‘industrialistes’ pour lesquels la production est, plus que tout 
autre segment de la réalité économique, le phénomène central au point de qualifier la société qui se 
met en place au XIX
e siècle. On comprend ainsi l’intérêt que Say accorde à la machine en tant que 
moyen de tirer de la nature des procédés de production d’autant plus économiques qu’il sauront 
mettre en œuvre les forces gratuites de la nature. Par ailleurs, cet accent mis sur la production 
permet d’expliquer sa position vis-à-vis de Ricardo. Ce dernier est à l’origine de l’effort analytique 
que Say fournit entre 1819 et 1829 pour élucider les relations entre besoins, demande et prix. A cet 
égard, et bien que Say n’ait pas formulé une loi de demande ou une loi du débit, il faut lui accorder 
le mérite d’une réflexion originale et solide, même si elle passe par des formulations changeantes, 
inachevées au regarde de ce qui sera développé ultérieurement, ne répondant pas aux problèmes 
soulevés par Ricardo. Pour le meilleur comme pour le moins bon, la théorie de la production est le 
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1. During the Sixties a dramatic change occurred in the field of monetary theory: the approach 
which held that the price level is determined by aggregate demand and aggregate supply whereas 
the supply of liquid resources, together with the schedule of  liquidity preference, determine the 
interest rate was successfully challenged. The opposite and traditional view prevailed once again: 
the Quantity Theory of money regained the consensus of the profession, the media and the political 
word. 
It thus appears that the alternative approach to the Quantity Theory had a very short spell in the 
history of economic thought; although there was a stream of opponents to the Quantity Theory 
running from the early mercantilists throughout the XIX century, it was only with the General 
Theory that a true alternative to the Quantity Theory reasoning was set out.  
 The Neoclassical synthesis incorporated the income-expenditure adjustment mechanism and the 
liquidity preference approach within its framework, but it was a weak defense against the assault of 
monetarism and the New Classical macroeconomics.  
  In the standard macro textbook of so-called Neo-Keynesian orientation, an increase in the 
quantity of money, through its effect on spending and output, causes an increase in output and in 
prices. However, this is only a short-run effect; any increase in output beyond the natural or NAIRU 
level, brought about by expansionary policies which entails an increase in the nominal stock of 
money, keeps pushing wages and prices up until the "real" quantity of money is back to its initial 
level. In the words of Dornbusch-Fisher : 
"In the long run, once wages and prices have had time to adjust fully, the model has the same 
predictions as the classical case [...] The difference is only in the adjustment process. In the classical 
case a monetary expansion leads immediately to an equiproportionate rise in prices with no real 
expansion. Here, both output and prices rise in the short and medium term, and only in the long run 
do we reach the classical case. [...] In the short run the prediction of [the] model more closely 
resemble the Keynesian case [...], and the more slowly that wages adjust to changes in employment, 
the greater the resemblance". (Dornbusch-Fisher 1990: 495) 
In the end, rather than an alternative approach to the Quantity Theory, the Keynesian approach to 
monetary theory appears as a complement to it, valid to explain short-term fluctuations in output 
and prices. 
Of course this is not what Keynes must have meant when he wrote in the Preface to the French 
edition of the General Theory, dated February 1939: 
"The following analysis registers my final escape from the confusions of the Quantity Theory, 
which once entangled me. I regard the price level as a whole as being determined in precisely the 
same way as individual prices; that is to say, under the influence of supply and demand....The 
quantity of money determines the supply of liquid resources, and hence the rate of interest..." 
(Keynes 1973 : xxxiv-xxxv). 
In fact, the demise of the Quantity Theory of money took Keynes a long  way from his previous 
views. In what follows an attempt is made to trace the development of this transition to an 
alternative theory.  
 
                                                           
1 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Via. A. Cesalpino, 12 –00161 Roma, e-mail: cristina.marcuzzo@uniroma1.it. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Conference on the History of Economics, Lisbon, 1996 
and at the Annual Conference of AISPE, Pisa, 1996.   70
2.  According to Kahn "Keynes’ long struggle over a period of six years to produce a version of 
the Treatise worthy of publication was directed partly to an escape from the stranglehold of the 
Quantity Theory of Money in its crude form. In the end Keynes was able to write that ’The forms of 
the Quantity Theory [...] on which we have all been brought up [...] are but ill adapted for this 
purpose’ of exhibiting ’the causal process by which the price level is determined, and the method of 
transition from one position to another’ "... (Keynes 1971:120). 
"Nevertheless" -Kahn continues- "Keynes seems to have been so much under the spell of the 
Quantity Theory that he could write about his Fundamental Equations as though they were 
’versions’ of the Quantity Theory." (Kahn 1984: 56). 
In the Treatise the logic of the Quantity Theory is questioned on two grounds: 1) the slowness of 
the adjustment required to bring about the final equilibrium position renders it almost irrelevant as 
an explanation of actual processes; 2) since "a change in the total quantity of money [...] is 
algebraically consistent for a time with more than one set of consequences" (Keynes 1971: 243) the 
Quantity Theory of money cannot be interpreted as exhibiting a causal process.  
The Treatise offers only the destruens pars of the criticism of the Quantity Theory, and Keynes 
was able to provide the alternative approach only when he "succeeded in getting his theory of 
money, his theory of wages and Kahn’s multiplier into a coherent system" (Robinson 1966: viii). 
Moggridge dates Keynes’s first formulation of an alternative explanation of determination of the 
level of output in the early 1933
2, but Kahn claims that at the time Keynes had not yet have a clear 
picture of the alternative approach
3.  
In fact, an argument similar to that presented in the Treatise is adopted by Keynes in a letter to 
Dennis Robertson of May 3, 1933, to reject the Quantity Theory: 
"In my present state of mind [...] I doubt that either version of the Cambridge equation is of any 
serious utility, and I can’t remember that I have ever come across a case of anyone ever using either 
of them for practical purposes of interpretation [...] One can of course write down quite a number of 
equations of this type, stating the de facto relationship of some one thing to some other. But are they 
of any use for causal interpretation? All the versions of the Quantity Theory, which make no 
distinction between swops and intermediate transactions and genuine production-consumption 
transactions, seem to me to tell one nothing". (Keynes 1979: 18). 
We have then evidence that Keynes associated the theory of liquidity preference with his earlier 
discussion in the Treatise
4, that the output adjustment mechanism was discovered at beginning of 
1933 and that by  Summer 1934 the main lines of the General Theory had become clear (Marcuzzo 
2002). In the steps which led to an alternative to the Quantity Theory, I will argue, Richard Kahn 
and Joan Robinson had an important role. 
 
3
5. Keynes attributed the crucial element in the transition from the Treatise to the General Theory 
- adoption of the theory of aggregate demand and aggregate supply to determine the short period 
level of prices-  
to the approach taken by Kahn in his "multiplier article": 
"[...] It was Mr. Kahn who first attacked the relation of the general level of prices to wages in the 
same way as that in which that of particular prices has always been handled, namely as a problem of 
                                                           
2 "... by early 1933 at the latest  the basic output-adjustment framework of the General Theory was in place, as were the 
theory of liquidity preference and the notion of the marginal efficiency of capital" (Moggridge 1992: 564-5).   
3 "By March 1934 clarity had been far from reached over the fundamental definitions" (Kahn 1984: 114). 
4 Some commentators stressed the continuity between the Treatise and the General Theory as far as the theory of the 
liquidity preference is concerned.  Patinkin points to the instances in the General Theory where mention is explicitly 
made of the link with the bull-bear discussion in the Treatise of the relationship between the three motives in the 
demand for money (transactive, precautionary, speculative) in the General Theory and the income-deposits, business 
deposits and savings deposits of the Treatise  (Patinkin 1993: 650). Trevithick maintains that "many of the characteristic 
features of the theory of liquidity preference had been formulated in A Treatise on Money." (Trevithick 1994: 82). 
5 This section is mainly drawn from Marcuzzo (1996a).   71
demand and supply in the short period rather than as a result to be derived from monetary factors." 
(Keynes 1973, Appendix: 400n)
6 
In his "multiplier" article, Kahn maintained that the determination of the level of price and output 
of consumption goods cannot but be derived from the theory of demand and supply. The aggregate 
supply curve of consumption goods, just like the supply curve of a single commodity, indicates the 
price necessary for each level of demand for consumption goods for that quantity to be produced, 
the demand for consumption goods being a function of total employment. Thus, the aggregate 
supply curve of the consumption goods sector represents "all the situations in which the price level 
is such as to confirm production and employment plans made by the firms in this sector." (Dardi 
1990: 8).  
Following a change in employment (brought about  by  the building of roads financed by the 
Government) we can study its effects on the prices and output of consumption goods, in other 
words the increase in production beyond the increase in investment, by observing the shape of the 
supply curve of consumption goods.  
 Kahn’s construction of the aggregate supply curve is meant to solve two problems: a) what the 
price must be in order that a given quantity of consumption goods be produced; b) how much 
employment is generated by the increase in the quantity of consumption goods which it is profitable 
to produce.  
 The answer to (a) depends on the assumed pattern of costs, the value and pattern of the elasticity 
of demand, and the behavior pattern assumed to be followed by firms (profit maximization), while 
the answer to (b) depends on hypotheses about labour productivity and money wages. 
Once hypotheses are made on a) and b), we can calculate the increase in price, output and 
employment, for any given increase in the primary employment, which is of course the multiplier. 
The multiplier article can be seen then as the first step towards a theory based on aggregate supply 
and demand curves, although its application is limited here to the consumption goods sector. 
Extension of this analysis to output as a whole is accomplished in the discussion of the aggregate 
supply function as we find it in the lectures given by Kahn in Michaelmas Term 1932, as recorded 
in the notes taken by Lorie Tarshis (Tarshis (1979). 
7  
  The starting point for the construction of the aggregate supply curve is the same as in the 
multiplier article. The difference is that on the vertical axis we now have the expected proceeds 
necessary to induce entrepreneurs to produce a given output, while in the horizontal axis we have 
the level of output so that the question - what the price must be - is substituted by what the proceeds 
must be, in order that a given quantity be produced.  
To derive the aggregate supply curve, we start from determination of the supply curve of each 
level of output for a single firm. The supply price answers the question: given marginal and average 
costs, associated with a given level of output, Oi , what the price must be in order that the firm that 
maximizes its profits be willing to produce precisely that level of output? 
The level of output, Oi, will be produced only if profits are at a maximum; that is to say, only if in 
Oi marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
8 Thus, on the basis of the well known relationship 
between price and marginal revenue, for a given elasticity of demand measured at Oi , the supply 
price, pi , is:  
 
       pi = ( k
k-1
) MCi 
                                                           
6 The claim is substantiated by Kahn himself. In a letter to Patinkin of March 1974 he described one of the main 
important results of the 1931 article as "Finally disposing of the idea that the price level is determined by the quantity of 
money" (Patinkin-Leith 1977 :147). 
7 An outline of Kahn’ lecture notes can be found in Kahn’s papers, King’s College Cambridge (henceforth RFK, 
followed by the catalogue number), RFK 4/15/4-14.  
8 In addition the price must be at least as high as the variable unit cost, otherwise the entrepreneur would earn more (or, 
in this instance, lose less) by suspending production.    72
where k = elasticity of demand and MCi = marginal costs at Oi . 
 The supply curve is then given by: 
 




      It is worth noting that the above is a general formulation, which does not require special 
assumptions about market form or the shape of the marginal cost curve. Specific assumptions are 
reflected in the shape of the supply curve and in the value of its elasticity.  
The aggregation problem is "solved" by assuming that, for any given level of output, the 
distribution among firms of their individual share is known. The aggregate level of output, O , is 
then: 
 








m= number of firms; Ok = output produced by the  kth firm. 
The total output of the economy is measured by a production index; to avoid double counting, 
intermediate products are of course subtracted from the total production, so that a measure in terms 
of value added is obtained. 
The importance of the aggregate supply curve, drawn in the expected proceeds-aggregate output 
space, is that derivation from it of the "level of prices" is straightforward: for each level of output, it 
is given by the ratio of expected proceeds to output.  This means that the level of price can be 
determined by the same forces as the level of output and not by the Quantity of Money.  
 What Kahn had achieved turned out to be an important step in the development of Keynesian 
ideas, as Joan Robinson reminded us years later: "A short period supply curve relating the level of 
money prices to the level of activity (at given money-wages rates) led straight from Marshall to the 
General Theory." (Robinson 1969: 582). 
The point can not have been fully understood even by the closest among Keynes’ associates, if in 
October 1934, Kahn felt the need to explain it to Harrod: 
"To my mind it is the most complete nonsense to suppose that the ideal behaviour of banks can be 
framed in terms of any propositions involving level of prices. How prices behave depends on how 
wage behave, and that in turn depends on how Trade Unions behave [...] In short, I do not think in 
terms of money and prices. In the view of Keynes and his followers the Theory of Money has 
ceased to exist. Though of course that is an exaggeration (it is the quantity of money which 
determines the rate of interest), but the exaggeration is a pardonable one."
9  
 
4. The question also arises of the role Joan Robinson played in facilitating Keynes’s progress 
towards the new formulation, bearing in mind course her close friendship and collaboration with 
Richard Kahn. (Marcuzzo 2001) 
Kahn left for America in December 1932. The correspondence with Keynes is particularly 
interesting where Kahn gives his opinion on the dominant influence of the quantity theory of money 
in the United States. For instance he wrote to Keynes: “I am thinking that the only way to save 
humanity is to lead a campaign against the Quantity Theory” (JMK L/K: 36)
10. And in a paper he 
read to the Political Economy Club when he came back after four months, he added: “the scourge 
which goes by the name of the Quantity Theory of money has swept the country” (RFK/3/18/3:15); 
“my visit to the United States inclines me to ascribe most of the ills of the world to the Quantity 
Theory of Money” (RFK/3/18/3:16). 
                                                           
9 Letter of Oct 22, 1934,  quoted in Besomi 1999:46. 
10  JMK stands for J.M. Keynes papers, King’s College, Cambridge.   73
The issues addressed in correspondence with Joan Robinson in the following were mainly raised 
by their joint proof reading of the Economics of Imperfect Competition (Marcuzzo (1996a), but the 
questions debated in the previous year in the "Circus" also were discussed. Early in January 1933, 
Joan Robinson read Kahn’s draft of his book on the Economics of the Short Period and naturally she 
was looking into Kahn’s and Keynes’ works, with those questions in mind. She wrote to Kahn on 
January 31st, 1933: 
"I am beginning to have doubt about Maynard’s long period equilibrium with underemployment. 
Wouldn’t it lead to a fall in money wages? i.e. it isn’t really equilibrium. For it can’t be said to be in 
equilibrium with the price level tending towards O." (RFK 13/90/1/85). 
On March 2, 1933, he replied to her:  
"Naturally, you cannot raise the point, but if Maynard hints that he would like you to look at his 
stuff, I do wish you would. I must confess that I am a bit appalled at the prospect of having the sole 
responsibility thrust on to me after my return" (RFK 13/90/1/163)
11.  
Joan Robinson’s contribution to  the transition from the argument of the Treatise to that of the 
General Theory is contained in an article -The Theory of Money and the Analysis of Output 
published in the first issue of the "Review of Economic Studies" in 1933- where she gives an 
outline of Keynes’ theory "as far as it had got in 1933" (Robinson 1951: viii). She later described it 
as a "kind of interim report, which clears the ground for the new theory but does not supply it" 
(Robinson 1966: viii). 
The paper must have been written when Kahn was in America as we gather from his reaction in a 
letter to her of 20 March 1933: 
"Gifford also showed me your thing on the Theory of Money. I do think it ought to be published, 
but I suppose it can’t be. It would be awfully illuminating to all those who live in darkness, and it is 
well done". (RFK 13/90/1/200)
12 
The point of the article is to show that the aggregate supply and aggregate demand apparatus can 
be employed to determine the equilibrium level of output. Only if the supply of goods is perfectly 
inelastic will an increase in the quantity of money result in an increase in prices. But if over a 
certain range the supply of goods is perfectly elastic " a rise or fall in demand for goods [...] will be 
met by an increase or decrease in output without any changes in prices" (Robinson 1951: 56). 
Joan Robinson goes as far as arguing that in fact the theory set out in the Treatise is concerned 
with determination of the level of output rather than the level of prices, and that Keynes failed in 
that book "to realize the nature of the revolution that he was carrying through" (Robinson 1951: 55). 
The article contains an attack on the Quantity Theory of money described as a tautology, "devoid 
of causal significance" (Robinson 1951: 55). The point is illustrated by what Joan Robinson refers 
to as Kahn’s "Quantity Equation for hairpins."
13 It is worth quoting the relevant passage in full: 




the daily loss of hairpins by each women with long hair, and 0 the daily output of hairpins. Then 
                                                           
11 A year and half later, when the  building blocks of the General Theory were firmly laid out, Joan Robinson was so 
confident in her role that she could write to Kahn: "[...] of course I am absolutely full of views about the Treatise. 
Would Maynard like me to write him a Preface for the new work showing in what respects his ideas have altered?" 
(letter of Sept. 5, 1934; RFK 13/90/2/95). In fact, it was during that Summer that a change occured in the personal 
relationship between Keynes and Joan Robinson. She wrote to Kahn on August 15, 1934: [...]  "I see Maynard signed 
’yours faithfully’ in type and crossed it out in ink so I can’t really complain." (RFK 13/90/2/40). 
12 Charles Gifford was the student who used the marginal revenue curve in one of his essay for Austin Robinson, thus 
arousing the interest of Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn who then started their joint work on imperfect competition. 
See Marcuzzo 1994 and 2001. 
13 Among Kahn’s papers a handwritten document, containing the notes of the lecture which Kahn gave to Graduate Club 
in Chicago in January 1933, has been found where the Quantity Equation for hairpins is set out. See RFK papers, File 
4/17. Also Dardi (1994: 91) agrees that the "Quantity theory for hairpins" testifies "to Kahn’s resolution in waving the 
anti-quantity theory flag at the time when Keynes and the ’Circus’ were still groping for a way out of monetary 
orthodoxy".   74
M  = PT
V
  and 09 = 37. Now suppose that the Pope, regarding bobbed hair as contrary to goods 
morals, wishes to increase the proportion of long-haired women in the population, and asks a 
student of economics what he has best do. The student sets out Mr. Kahn’s equation, and explains it 
to the Pope.’ All you need do’, he says, ’is to increase 0, the daily output of hairpins (for instance, 
you might give a subsidy to the factories) and the number of long-haired women is bound to 
increase’. The Pope is not quite convinced. ’Or, of course’, the student adds, ’if you could persuade 
the long-haired women to be less careless, V would increase, and the effect would be the same as 
though the output of hairpins had increased’".  
The parable reiterates the criticism of the Quantity Theory of money according to the argument set 
out in the Treatise, but hints at an alternative explanation where the direction of cause and effect 
between money and prices is reversed
14. What of course the article does not provide is the 
framework in which the different elements of the new theory - the liquidity preference, the output-
adjustment mechanism and the wage theory - fit logically together. For this we have to turn to the 
*HQHUDO7KHRU\. 
 
5. In chapter 21 of the General Theory Keynes presents his theory of the determinants of the price 
level and shows how it stands in relation to the Quantity Theory.  
  The price level for output as a whole is determined, as in the case of a single industry, by 
marginal cost and the scale of output. However, in the case of aggregate output, a new element must 
be taken into account, namely the effect of changes in aggregate demand both on costs and on 
volume (Keynes 1973: 294). 
In the aggregate if the rates of remuneration of the different factors of production, which enter into 
the marginal costs, change in the same proportion as the wage-unit, then the level of price depends 
partly on the wage unit and partly on the volume of employment.  
Keynes then proceeds to discuss the conditions under which the result of the strict Quantity 
Theory - a proportional increase in prices as consequence of an increase in the quantity of money - 
actually hold.  
First, we have to consider the effect of a change in the quantity of money on effective demand,  
and then how the change in effective demand spends itself in increasing output and prices. In other 
words the elasticity of changes in prices with respect to  a change in the quantity of money (e) is 
given by the elasticity of changes in effective demand with respect to changes in the quantity of 
money (ed) times the elasticity of changes in prices with respect to changes in effective demand 
(ep). 
Formally, we have that:  
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It is immediately evident that if effective demand increases in the same proportion as the quantity 
of money, that is to say if we assume a constant ratio between effective demand and the quantity of 





= ) =1, prices will increase in the same proportion as the increase in 





= ) = 1, where D is effective demand and P is the level of 
prices. 
 
                                                           
14 Kahn gave a clear statement of the reversed causality between money and prices as early as 1932  in a paper “Public 
Works and Inflation” he presented to the American Statistical Association of Cincinnati, where he wrote "the quantity 
of money is an effect, not a cause".  (Kahn 1972 : 30).   75
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H2 = is the elasticity of output in response to changes in 





H: = is the elasticity of money-wages in response to changes in 
effective demand, the condition of equiproportional increase in price following an increase in 
effective demand, is satisfied if eo = 0 or ew = 1. 
 





HH =  is the 
elasticity of change in employment in response to a change in effective demand, we can write: 
 





 = ed [ 1 – eeeo(1-eW)] 
              = ed (1 -  eeeo +  eeeoew) 
 
The above expression, according to Keynes, "can be regarded as a generalized statement of the 
Quantity Theory of money" (Keynes 1973: 305). 
 Thus the quantitative result is made dependent upon the values of four critical elasticities: 
ed = liquidity factors, which determine the demand for money in each situation; 
ew = labour factors, which determine the extent to which money-wages are raised as employment 
increases; 
ee, eo = physical factors, which determine the rate of decreasing returns as more employment is 
applied to the existing equipment. 
Thus, if the public hold a constant proportion of their income in money, ed =1; if money wages 
are fixed, ew =0; if constant returns prevail, eeeo =1; if there is full employment either of labour or 
equipment, eeeo = 0. (Keynes 1973: 306). 





 is equal to 1; for instance, as we have 
seen, if ed = 1 and ew =1, but also: 
 
either  
if  ed = 1, ew = 0 and eeeo = 0; 
or 
if  ed = 1 and eo =0 
 
and of course a variety of other combinations.  
However, "on plausible assumptions relating to the real world", according to Keynes, it is very 
unlikely that the elasticity of the price level with respect to a change in the quantity of money will 
turn out to be equal to one, and therefore it is "safe to make the generalization [that] as a rule [is] 
less than unity". [Keynes 1973: 306]. 
The really important result achieved by Keynes is not, of course, to have claimed what any 
defender of the Quantity Theory of money would readily concede, but to have provided us with 
description of a transmission mechanism in which behavioural relationship are ordered according to 
a clear chain of causes and effects. As Kahn later put it, the novelty of the approach is the view of 
"the monetary and credit mechanism as a matter of straightforward cause and effect, expressed in 
terms of physical realities" (Kahn 1972:145). 
 
                                                           
15 The derivation of the result is given in Keynes 1973: 285n.   76
6. Keynes’ generalization of the Quantity Theory of money follows a line of reasoning similar to 
that employed in the theory of income determination: the Quantity Theory of money results apply 
under very special conditions: far from being a general proposition it can be applied in very special 
circumstances, which rarely occur in the real world. 
It could be argued that the attempted reconciliation with the tradition, as in many other instances 
of Keynes’s tactics against the orthodox view
16, ended up as serving its rehabilitation. Rather than 
stressing that the Quantity Theory of money results apply under very special conditions, the 
Neoclassical synthesis first, and the so-called Neo-Keynesian models later, swept those very special 
assumptions under the carpet so that the very point Keynes was making against the Quantity Theory 
of money was completely missed.  
The generalized statement of the Quantity Theory of money presents a transmission mechanism 
from monetary to real factors that can be broken down into a series of steps, which may lead to very 
different outcomes. 
For instance,  an increase in the quantity of money may not generate a proportional increase in 
effective demand; the increase in effective demand may not give rise to a predictable rise  in wages,  
and the rise in output and employment and prices may occur in various combinations so that there is 
not only one possible outcome. 
Moreover, changes in the supply of money bring about changes in the interest rate only if the 
schedule of the liquidity preference is represented as a well-defined curve or a stable relationship. 
Kahn, in his Liquidity Preference article, stressed "the unsuitability of thinking of a schedule of 
liquidity preference as though it could be represented by a well-defied curve or by a functional 
relationship expressed in mathematical terms or subject to econometric processes" and held Keynes 
responsible for giving way "to the temptation to picture the state of liquidity preference as a fairly 
stable relationship". (Kahn 1972: 90)
17. 
To sum up, costs conditions and the degree of competition set the increase in prices necessary for 
an increase in production to take place, if constant returns do not prevail, so that firms maximize 
their profit, but it is the level of expected demand which sets the level of production, and an 
increase in the level of expected demand is not synonymous with increase in the quantity of money. 
The chain of causes and effects is misrepresented in the so called AD/AS model which became 
popular in the 1990s. An increase in the quantity of money always, shifts the AD curve up and to 
the right, except in liquidity trap, since a higher money supply in real terms makes the interest rate  
fall and investment and income increase.  Then, in order to see what happens to the price level the 
aggregate supply curve is brought in. The AS curve is presented, in the long run, as perfectly 
inelastic  at the "natural rate of unemployment" or at the NAIRU level, whereas in the short run it is 
presented as upward sloping, because of fixed nominal wages and/or misperceptions of price 
changes by workers  and firms. It follows that how  the increase in the quantity of money spend 
itself on prices and  output is made dependent on the elasticity of the aggregate supply curve.  
However, the shape of the AS curve reflects conditions in the labour market rather than the 
structure of costs in the economy. Any increase in prices, associated with changes in income and 
employment is mainly accounted for by an increase in money wages,  more or less proportionally, 
according to the assumptions made on the behaviour of labour productivity and mark up. It is thus 
apparent that the AS curve is nothing more than a travesty of the empirical regularity known as the 
Phillips curve. (Marcuzzo 1996b).  
On the contrary, we saw that the aggregate supply function (ASF) devised by Kahn -and adopted 
by Keynes in relation to employment levels
18- is a relationship between different levels of output 
                                                           
16 Harcourt-Sardoni (1994) rightly argue that part of Keynes’s strategy to gain acceptance for his new ideas was to 
accept as many assumptions of the classical theory as possible,  then deriving conclusions at variance with it. 
17 Dardi rightly argue that "hints may be found, especially in Kahn’s later writings, which point to long-standing 
differences between him and Keynes on the very foundations of monetary theory and on the most appropriate ways of 
dealing with the influence of monetary theory on the rate of interest." (Dardi 1994: 91). 
18 If average labour costs are constant and marginal labour costs are a constant fraction of marginal costs, then the 
supply fuctions against output and employment have the same characteristics. See Tarshis (1979: 377).   77
and those expectations of proceeds that would induce entrepreneurs to make them available. Its 
position and shape is determined by the marginal costs of the various firms that make up the 
economy and the elasticities of the demands for the products of these various firms, whereas 
Keynes’s aggregate demand function (ADF) shows the level of proceeds the firms expect to realize 
from the sale of their outputs. Their intersection gives the equilibrium level of output at which 
profits are maximized.  Once the equilibrium level of output is determined by the level of effective 
demand, then we can find out the price level corresponding to it on the basis of the assumptions 
made in relation to the costs functions and the degree of competition. 
19  
The demise of the Quantity Theory approach implies the acknowledgment that it is the level of 
effective demand which sets the level of production while cost conditions  and the degree of 
competition determine the prices at which that output can be sold. Thus prices are seen as the 
outcome of the profitability conditions prevailing in the economy and not of the level of the 
quantity of money.  
 
                                                           
19 In the case of the supply curve in relation to aggregate output (AFS-O), we have seen that it is given by the slope of 
the straight line joining the corresponding point on the ASF-O to the origin. In the case of the supply curve in relation to 
aggregate employment, (ASF-N) the slope of the line from any point on the function to the origin represents the ratio of 
value added to the level of employment. (Tarshis 1979: 380). 
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Sir John Hicks has spoken of the re-switching of economic ideas. Theories which illuminate ’the 
right things at one time may illuminate the wrong things at another’ after which, when 
circumstances change, they sometimes once again focus on what is of central importance. 
([1975]1981, pp.230-2) Knut Wicksell’s theory of money, interest and prices is an example.  
   In his seminal Geldzins und Güterpreise of 1898, which R.F. Kahn translated into English as 
Interest and Prices in 1936, Wicksell was especially concerned to produce a theory which could 
explain the falling price trend in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. More than 100 years 
later, his theory has the potential to illuminate several developments which are otherwise puzzling. 
 
1. In all the leading developed economies central banks are being asked to control inflation within 
an extremely narrow range, and they are achieving this with apparent effectiveness entirely through 
their control over short-term interest rates. Wicksell believed that the interest rate at which 
companies obtained short-term finance was sufficiently powerful to achieve the objective of price 
stability, but in much of the twentieth century few regarded this as a sufficient tool to achieve that 
purpose. 
2.  The commercial banks of many countries now hold what would have been regarded, in much of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as astonishingly low ratios of liquid assets, and whether their 
rate of deposit creation rises or falls is not a consequence of previous movements in their liquid 
reserves. They lend what they find it profitable to lend and they can easily acquire whatever liquid 
assets they believe they need at the same time as they expand their advances. In Wicksell's credit 
expansion model, the rate of growth or decline of bank deposits was virtually independent of the 
level of liquid reserves. 
3.  Many find the contrast between the apparent robustness of growth in the US economy and the 
decade-long stagnation of the Japanese economy puzzling. According to Wicksell's theory, if the 
real rate of return on capital is 7 per cent in the US and 1 per cent in Japan, expansionary forces will 
predominate at any US real interest rate of up to 3 or 4 per cent, while the Japanese economy will 
suffer a falling trend in prices at any positive real rate of interest whatsoever. If Japanese profits are 
actually as weak as this it is hardly surprising that even nominal interest rates of less than 0.5 per 
cent have failed to produce any significant expansion of economic activity. 
4. The world's central banks are finding it increasingly helpful to cooperate through extensive 
exchanges of information and occasional co-ordination of their interest rate decisions to produce a 
sustainable structure of world interest and exchange rates. Wicksell regarded central bank 
cooperation as an essential element in the achievement of world-wide price stability. That, in his 
view, was the limit to the favourable contribution which monetary policy could make, since: 
 
Those who expect monetary measures to perform miracles might well remind themselves of 
the well-known fact that coins do not give birth to offspring, and that even if they did, 
precious metal would constitute neither sustenance nor clothing. ([1898]1936, p.196) 
 
Hence, even when money is ideally managed, the most it can offer to the world is price stability in 
every leading economy. 
   In this paper Wicksell's theory of money, interest and prices will be outlined. After that some of 
its implications for economic theory will be discussed. Milton Friedman acknowledged a direct debt   81
to Wicksell in his definition of the ’natural rate of unemployment’ in 1968, in what Sir Alan Budd 
has described as ’the most important contribution to the employment debate in the post-war period. 
Almost everything about unemployment or inflation that has been published since then can be seen 
as an attempt to develop the ideas that were developed in that paper.’ (1996, p.128) There are 
remarkable parallels between the process of accelerating inflation in Friedman when unemployment 
falls below the ’natural’ rate, and in Wicksell when the market rate of interest falls below his 
’natural’ rate. Finally some of the implications of Wicksell’s argument for the robustness of the US 








During the nineteenth century there were extensive developments in banking throughout the world. 
By 1898, when Wicksell published Geldzins und Güterpreise, most business purchases in countries 
such as Sweden, were paid for with cheques drawn on bank accounts, and these could be cleared 
between a country's banks through what Wicksell described as a Giro system. This created 
extensive economies in a country's need for cash. 
    To bring out the fundamental implications of these developments, Wicksell set out two limiting 
cases, one where all financial transactions were made in cash, and another in which he set out his 
entirely original conception of a cashless economy: 
 
We intend therefore, as a basis for the following discussion, to imagine a state of affairs in 
which money does not circulate at all, neither in the form of coin (except perhaps as small 
change) nor in the form of notes, but where all domestic payments are effected by means of 
the Giro system and bookkeeping transfers. A thorough analysis of this purely imaginary 
case seems to me to be worth while, for it provides a precise antithesis to the equally 
imaginary case of a pure cash system, in which credit plays no part whatever. The monetary 
systems actually employed in various countries can then be regarded as combinations of 
these two extreme types. (p. 70)    
 
In this 'credit economy': 
 
the whole monetary system of a country is in the hands of a single credit institution provided 
with an adequate number of branches, at which each independent economic individual keeps 
an account on which he can draw cheques. (p.71) 
 
Provided that all payments are made by cheque, and that the proceeds from all cheques received are 
banked, virtually no cash need change hands, and there is no "circulation of money". 'The cheques 
regularly return after a day or two to the Bank (or rather to one of the banks, and so to the bankers' 
clearing house).' (p.87) The Bank (or system of banks) needs to maintain gold reserves to cover the 
balance of foreign transactions, but 'When the foreign balance of trade or balance of payments is 
such that the bank has to give up part of its cash to foreign countries, it finds itself with an equal 
excess of domestic claims.' (p.71) The cashless economy functions through a continual extension of 
credit from producers to the purchasers of commodities: 
 
The actual exchange of commodities proceeds very simply. The buyer draws a cheque on 
his balance (or on his credit) for the appropriate sum, and the seller cashes the cheque, the 
sum being thus credited to him by the bank. But within a short space of time goods must be 
paid for by goods. It follows that the sum of the amounts debited must be equal to the sum   82
of the amounts credited... 
    A certain interval will, however, elapse between the sale of one lot of goods and the 
purchase of another equivalent lot. During this time, the sellers are in reality extending 
credit to the buyers to the amount of the sum in question (or a part of it), although on the 
surface the payment has the appearance of being immediate. This is brought about as a result 
of the facilities and guarantees provided by the Bank. (p.72) 
 
The Bank (or system of banks) will offer facilities to businesses to the extent that production 
appears to be potentially profitable, and this will depend on the relationship between the rate of 
return that businesses are able to earn from production and the cost of finance. Wicksell defines the 
rate of return earned from production as the ’natural’ rate of interest, while finance is extended at a 
market rate of interest which may differ from the natural rate over extended periods, with 
consequences of fundamental significance, which he went on to set out in an entirely original 
manner. His definition of the natural rate of interest derives from the theory of capital which Böhm-
Bawerk had done much to clarify: 
 
There is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, 
and tends neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessarily the same as the rate of 
interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money 
and all lending were effected in the form of real capital goods. It comes to much the same 
thing to describe it as the current value of the natural rate of interest on capital (p.102) 
 
In his 1936 Introduction to Kahn's translation, Bertil Ohlin succinctly expresses Wicksell's 
definition of the natural rate as, 'governed by the marginal productivity of capital, i.e. of the 
roundabout methods of production which would exist if money were not used' (p.viii). The natural 
rate of interest will include the competitively determined return to entrepreneurship and thus take 
into account the reward for risk which entrepreneurs require. Wicksell believed that this would 
generally be quite small, since 'unavoidable risks cancel out in the course of a long succession of 
economic periods, and the entrepreneur's own profit is confined to the amount which corresponds to 
the actual mental effort of the entrepreneur' and special considerations such as 'business secrets'. 
(p.104) He also states that: 
 
The entrepreneurs' profit as such, constantly tends towards zero under the influence of 
competition among entrepreneurs; or at least it tends towards a certain small amount which 
is not very different from zero. (p.135) 
 
The financial rate of interest at which producers borrow is determined within the banking system 
and it can differ markedly over prolonged periods from the productivity-of-capital-determined 
natural rate. To demonstrate the effect of a market rate below the natural rate, after a previous 
period in which the two rates were equal, Wicksell first constructed a highly artificial example. The 
period of production of all producers is one calender year, and they borrow in advance of 
production. During the twelve month production period they incur wage, material and rental costs. 
Previously, when the two interest rates were equal, they sold their year's production in advance for 
an amount which was just sufficient to repay their loans, and to provide them with the competitively 
determined return for entrepreneurship which included whatever allowance was appropriate for risk. 
Prices are originally stable, the level of output is stable, there is neither net saving nor investment, 
and the rate of interest at which entrepreneurs borrow corresponds to the natural rate that their 
year's production yields.
1  
                                                           
1  Wicksell presented a general account of his theory in Chapters 7 and 8, and a rigorous account with these initial 
assumptions entitled, ’Systematic Exposition of the Theory’ in Chapter 9. His most pertinent descriptive passages 
sometimes appear in one account and sometimes in the other, and they are to a degree conflated. David Laidler (1991)   83
   Wicksell then supposed that the market rate of interest fell by one percentage point, so that it 
became 1 per cent lower than the productivity-determined natural rate. Because the discount 
entrepreneurs receive for selling their products a year in advance will then become 1 percentage 
point less, entrepreneurs will receive a price for the advanced sale of their products which is up to 1 
per cent higher. They will then be able to pay more for labour and raw materials, and because the 
economy is initially at full employment equilibrium, competition will tend to raise the prices they 
obtain. ’The producer has to pay more for, wages, raw materials, rents, etc., but he receives 
correspondingly better prices for his own products.’(p.95)  
 
The economic equilibrium of the system is ipso facto disturbed. If prices remain unchanged, 
entrepreneurs will in the first instance obtain a surplus profit (at the cost of the capitalists 
[rentiers and business intermediaries]) over and above their real entrepreneur profit or wage. 
This will continue to accrue so long as the rate of interest remains in the same relative 
position. They will inevitably be induced to extend their businesses in order to exploit to the 
maximum extent the favourable turn of events. And the number of people becoming 
entrepreneurs will be abnormally increased. As a consequence, the demand for services, raw 




There are two elements in Wicksell’s argument that a rate of interest which falls below the natural 
rate will raise prices: first the lower rate at which entrepreneurs borrow immediately enables them 
to obtain higher prices for the forward sale of their products, and therefore to pay higher wages and 
higher prices for raw materials. When the assumption of a uniform one year period of production is 
relaxed, it emerges that this effect will be more powerful the longer the life of capital, and Wicksell 
even suggests that, in the case of houses with indefinitely long lives, a fall in the rate of interest 
from 4 to 3 per cent will allow builders to obtain prices which are up to 33 per cent higher. In 
general, the impact of a lower rate of interest will be larger the greater the roundaboutness of 
production.  
   In all the years in which the advantage of a rate of interest below the natural rate persists, and it is 
his belief that ’a fairly constant difference between the two rates of interest could be maintained for 
a long time’ (p.104), entrepreneurs will seek to expand their level of activity. Wicksell attaches 
great significance to long-term continuing effects. He admits that, in the initial year of a rate of 
interest below the natural rate, this could even lead to lower instead of to higher prices. This would 
arise in what he regards as the unusual case of pricing through cost-plus contracts where ’goods are 
produced to order’ and lower interest rates reduce the cost of capital inputs. (p.98) But this effect 
will be greatly outweighed in subsequent years by the tendency for lower interest rates to increase 
the level of entrepreneurial activity. Even if there were an initial fall in prices: 
 
it would, so far as I can see occur only once for all, and it would thus be put completely in 
the shade by the cumulative effect on prices that is to be ascribed to a difference between the 
two rates of interest. If entrepreneurs continue, year after year perhaps, to realise some 
surplus profit ... the result can only be to set up a tendency for an expansion of their 
activities.’ (pp. 142-3) 
 
If the economy is initially at full employment, a desire by entrepreneurs to expand cannot actually 
lead to a higher level of production: 
 
It is impossible to endorse the widespread view that under suitable conditions a country’s 
output can be expanded almost indefinitely, by "arousing the spirit of enterprise" and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
sets out a lucid exposition of Wicksell’s theory on pp.120-46.   84
like. This fallacious view is derived by concentrating attention on one single branch of 
production, provided perhaps with an excess of fixed capital (buildings, machines, etc.) In 
such a single branch of production it would be possible to increase output immediately, but 
only at the expense of the other branches of production from which labour and liquid capital 
have to be drawn. The impossibility under normal conditions of a general expansion of 
production is, I think, demonstrated by the figures of unemployment at different periods, 
recently collected in various countries. The average number of unoccupied workers is 
relatively small, about 1 per cent. A general expansion of production would thus be possible 
only as a result of longer hours - which are neither desirable nor feasible over any length of 
time - or as a result of further technical progress. (p. 143) 
 
But, despite the full employment of resources in the aggregate, it is feasible for entrepreneurs in 
cooperation with the banks to achieve expansion which takes the form of a lengthening of the 
period of production, an increase in ’roundaboutness’, which will be encouraged by a lower rate of 
interest. In ’almost every enterprise’, this would ’increase the efficiency of the factors of production’. 
(p.133) The money lent in this way ’immediately flows back to the banks’ or else ’the sums 
withdrawn by means of cheques returns in the form of deposits’. (p.155) If new investment took this 
form, net saving would be required, because the increasing roundaboutness of production would 
reduce present consumption and raise future consumption. Here Wicksell makes a statement which 
is remarkably ahead of his time: 
 
The real saving which is necessary for the period of investment to be increased is in fact 
enforced - at exactly the right moment - on consumers as a whole; for a smaller quantity 
than usual of consumption goods is available (p.156) 
 
In due course, consumers will benefit from the longer period of production, and ’receive some 
reward for their abstinence’. 
   The economic consequences which follow a reduction in the market rate of interest below the 
natural rate, whether these take the form of increases in entrepreneurial activity, or a lengthening of 
the period of production with the possible consequence of forced saving, will combine to create an 
inflationary process. Entrepreneurs will find that they can raise prices, afford the higher 
accompanying level of costs, and emerge with surplus profits. As the process develops: 
 
The upward movement of prices will in some measure "create its own draught". When 
prices have been rising steadily for some time, entrepreneurs will begin to reckon on the 
basis not merely of the prices already attained, but of a further rise in prices. (p. 96) 
 
Wicksell envisages a continuing process where each rise in costs and prices provides the foundation 
for the next, until the anticipation of these developments produces their acceleration: 
 
price movements take place very much more rapidly than we have been assuming. For once 
a higher level of prices has been established, it may, after only a few months, weeks, or even 
days, become the basis for new contracts, wage agreements, and rent agreements. (p.146)  
 
Conversely, where the market rate of interest rises above the productivity-determined natural rate, 
entrepreneurs will find that their sales revenues are insufficient for the recovery of their wage, 
material and rental costs, so their demand for factors of production will fall, the supply of 
entrepreneurs will decline, prices will begin to decline, at a rate which will accelerate as it comes to 
be anticipated. Where the rate of interest exceeds the natural rate, some of the impact of lower real 
demand will fall upon the level of employment:  
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when the lending rate of interest remains permanently above the natural rate. Not only will 
the entrepreneurs now fail to obtain any surplus profit, but they will suffer losses, which 
they will cover in the first place out of their [own] wages or out of the income derived from 
their own fortunes. To prevent this, they will desire to confine their activities to the more 
profitable channels, and there will be a corresponding contraction in their demand for labour 
and land. But workers and landlords will respond by scaling down their demands for wages 
and rents, and on the whole activity will be maintained at the former level. (It is not, 
however, to be denied that there may be a more or less permanent, though not progressive, 
loss of employment by some of the workers - the industrial reserve.) (p.149)  
 
There is thus an asymmetry between the unemployment which may arise when the market rate of 
interest exceeds the natural rate, and the failure of output and employment to rise significantly in 
the inflationary conditions which arise when the natural rate of interest exceeds the actual rate. In 
the deflationary conditions, where the actual rate of interest exceeds the natural rate, there will be 
both falling prices and a long-term loss of employment.  
   Where the natural rate of interest exceeds the actual rate over a significant period, so that a rising 
and indeed an accelerating trend in prices develops, the banking system will be under particular 
pressure. The general and probably accelerating price increases will need to be financed by the 
banking system, quite largely through Wicksell’s credit-creation model, where the banks lend 
unlimited sums and find that whatever they lend comes back to banks somewhere in the system. It 
will be evident that in much of the exposition of his theory of inflation, his credit-creation model 
appears to come close to being his standard case: 
 
The banks need not worry whether the dates on which their deposits become due correspond 
with the periods over which their loans have been granted. From our assumption that every 
withdrawal of a deposit must directly entail the deposit of an equal sum elsewhere or the 
repayment of an equal loan, it follows that the banks, or rather the aggregate of banks taken 
as a whole, can within limits ... lend any desired amount of money for any desired period of 
time at any desired rate of interest, no matter how low, without affecting their solvency, 
even though their deposits may be falling due all the time. It follows that if the rest of our 
theory is correct the banks can raise the general level of prices to any desired height. (pp. 
110-11) 
 
Wicksell indeed insisted in 1898 that money is ’elastic in amount. Its quantity can to some extent be 
accommodated - and in a completely developed credit system the accommodation is complete - to 
any position that the demand may assume.’ (p. 135) 
   But he made it entirely clear that this process of unlimited credit expansion is only feasible at a 
global level. A single bank acting alone which lent at interest rates below those of others would 
rapidly bring about ’its own insolvency’, whilst if the banks of a single country sought to meet an 
unlimited domestic demand for credit, then inevitably that country’s ’precious metal flows away’, 
but ’If, on the other hand, taking an international point of view, we suppose that the same movement 
is undertaken, consciously or unconsciously, by every bank in the world, or at any rate in the gold-
standard countries, the matter assumes an entirely different appearance.’ (pp.111-13) 
   The extent of global bank lending is not limited by the adequacy of liquid reserves because, 
Wicksell insisted, the lower prudent limit to these ’has never actually been reached’ while at the 
same time ’the banks’ reserves are unnecessarily large and could be diminished without endangering 
their solvency.’(pp.114-15) 
   It was therefore the general upward and downward movements in world prices which Wicksell 
claimed to explain, with world prices trending upwards when international interest rates were below 
the natural rate, and trending downwards when world interest rates mainly exceeded the natural rate 
as in the quarter century before he published Geldzins und Güterpreise.   86
   In its logically rigorous form, Wicksell’s theory with these far-reaching implications rests on a 
series of highly abstract assumptions, but he insisted that he had made these  ’purely for the sake of 
simplicity and clarity’ and that ’not a single one of them is essential to the validity of the general 
conclusion’ that the sustained trends in world-wide inflation or deflation depended on the 
relationship between the actual and the natural rates of interest. (p.136)  
   For expositional reasons he presented his theory with the assumption of initial price stability, but 
he maintained that his theory would be applicable whatever the starting point: 
 
If for any reason whatever, the average rate of interest is set and maintained below this 
normal [i.e. natural] level, no matter how small the gap, prices will rise and will go on 
rising; or if they were already in process of falling, they will fall more slowly and eventually 
begin to rise. (p. 120) 
 
Hence the theory will operate in real world situations, whatever the initial rate of inflation. But there 
will be influences upon inflation other than the relationship between the actual and the natural rates 
of interest. Wicksell claimed none the less that: 
 
though the facts are essentially in complete agreement with theory, they often present a 
somewhat different appearance. The reason is that a movement of prices, which is here 
being treated as an isolated phenomenon, is in practice superimposed on some other and 
independent movement of wages, etc., dissimilar and possibly opposite in nature. (p. 150) 
 
Hence the consequences for inflation of a discrepancy between the actual rate of interest and the 
natural rate are superimposed upon the other potential influences which operate. But Wicksell 
insisted that the impact of a discrepancy between the two interest rates would be ’sufficiently great 
to provide a perfectly natural explanation of all such variations in prices as occur in actual practice.’ 
(p. 146) 
   David Laidler (1991) demonstrates that so long as Wicksell holds to the assumptions of a uniform 
one-year period of production and an initial stationary state with price stability, his argument is 
actually immune from the difficulties involved in the aggregation of capital and the identification of 
its marginal product with a ’natural’ rate of interest. (p.130) Wicksell in his various subtle and 
sophisticated contributions to capital theory came close to uncovering some of the difficulties which 
lay at the heart of the capital theory debates of the 1970s. It is probably no accident that he set out 
the rigorous version of his argument on pp.122-56 with assumptions which might almost have 
satisfied Joan Robinson in 1953-54 and in 1956 when, as ’the messenger who brought the bad 
news’, she launched this debate. 
   But, at the same time, Wicksell insisted that his discovery of the extent of the economic influence 
which a discrepancy between the actual and the natural rates of interest could be expected to exert 
meant that his theory could explain ’all such variations in prices as occur in actual practice.’ 
   Directly after his claim for the comprehensive relevance of his theory to real world conditions, 
where none of his precise assumptions would actually prevail, Wicksell returned to the logical 
precision of ’our hypothetical world’. He thus insisted, both that he had presented his theory with 
complete rigour, and at the same time, that it explained all the significant facts of real world price 
fluctuations. 
   Wicksell followed his book of 1898 with two volumes of Lectures of which the second was 
concerned with Money. These were published in German in 1906 and in English translation as 
Lectures on Political Economy in 1935. In 1906 he presented an article length version of his theory 
to the Economic Section of the British Association. This was published in the Economic Journal in 
June 1907. These later versions differ relatively little from his brilliant initial presentation in his 
book of 1898. The main departure is his admission during the opening decade of the twentieth 
century that, in a gold standard world, changes in the supply of gold (this had increased   87
significantly since 1898, while world prices were beginning to rise) would influence price 
movements additionally to the inflation or deflation produced by discrepancies between his two 
interest rates. Hence, in his Economic Journal article of 1907, his bold assertion of the over-riding 
influence of the relationship between the actual and the natural rates of interest merely became: 
 
the influence of credit or the rate of interest is only one of the factors acting on prices; the 
other is the volume of metallic money itself, especially, in our times, the supply of gold, and 
so long as the gold itself remains the standard of value, this factor evidently will take the 
lead in the long run. (p. 218) 
 
In 1971 gold was disassociated from the dollar, which was the last of the world’s leading currencies 
which still maintained a gold-link. This finally removed the qualification to his theory which he had 
been obliged to make in 1906-7.  
   Wicksell’s radically new theory of 1898 proved to be more readily accommodatable within the 
macroeconomic innovations of Milton Friedman, with which there is an intimate interrelationship, 
than it has with those of Keynes. In the period in which Keynesian interpretations of inflation and 
deflation predominated, Wicksell disappeared from the principal macroeconomic textbooks outside 
Sweden and Austria through failures of interpretation which Axel Leijonhufvud explored and 
documented in 1981. These occurred despite the detailed knowledge of Wicksell by Kahn, Keynes’s 
principal collaborator, and at the same time, the translator of Geldzins und Güterpreise.  
   The final sections of this paper will outline some of the theoretical interrelationships between 
Wicksell's argument, and that of Keynes and Friedman, and set out a few of the implications of his 
theory for the world economy of the twenty-first century. An explanation of the 'reswitching of 






Keynes wrote warmly of Wicksell's theory in A Treatise on Money. He described Geldzins und 
Güterpreise as 'an outstanding attempt at a systematic treatment' of the influence of interest rates 
upon prices, and declared that the book 'deserves more fame and much more attention than it has 
received from English-speaking economists'. (p.i.167) He suggested that saving and investment 
should be brought into Wicksell's definition of the natural rate of interest: 
 
if we define Wicksell's natural rate of interest as the rate at which saving and the value of 
investment are in equilibrium [measured and defined as in the Treatise], then it is true that, 
so long as the money rate of interest is held at such a level that the value of investment 
exceeds saving, there will be a rise in the price level of output as a whole above its cost of 
production, which in turn will stimulate entrepreneurs to bid up earnings above their 
previous level, and this upward tendency will continue indefinitely so long as the supply of 
money continues to be such as to enable the money rate to be held below the natural rate as 
thus defined. (p.i.177) 
 
Keynes added that, although Wicksell does not bring this out, this process will involve 'a continual 
rise in money earnings, but one which is never quite sufficient to wipe out profits'. (p.i.176) In the 
Treatise, Keynes defined investment as 'the incomes earned from the production of investment 
goods' while saving, as in the General Theory, is that part of incomes which is not consumed. With 
these definitions, investment exceeds saving when inventories are being run down, and the 
equilibrium between saving and investment, which Keynes suggests as the further condition which 
should be inserted into Wicksell's definition of the natural rate of interest, is equivalent to the   88
Swedish assumption that ex-ante investment equals the level of ex-ante saving at full employment 
equilibrium.   
   With this suggestion of Keynes’s, when the market rate of interest falls below the natural rate, 
planned investment will exceed full employment saving, with the inevitable consequences of over-
full employment and rising prices and wages, precisely as in Wicksell’s own accounts of the 
influence of a rate of interest which falls below the natural rate. Wicksell’s forced saving can easily 
arise in this condition of sustained over-full employment.  
   Later  commentators  have  followed  Keynes  of  the  Treatise by inserting the condition that 
investment equals the full employment equilibrium level of savings into Wicksell’s definition of the 
natural rate of interest. But none of this analysis found its way into The General Theory where the 
sole reference to Wicksell is the footnoted statement that his definition of the natural rate of interest 
differs both from Böhm-Bawerk's definition, and 'contemporary economists'' definitions of a 
'neutral' rate. (p. 183) 
   In  The  General  Theory there is a continual tendency towards equality between the marginal 
efficiency of capital (virtually equivalent to Wicksell's natural rate of interest) and the rate of 
interest, and nothing is made of any prolongued adjustment process where they differ. As 
Leijonhufvud has emphasised, any discrepancy between the two rates of interest disappears entirely 
in IS/LM and the various formulations of the neoclassical synthesis, where there is invariably a 
single rate of interest which is compatible with equilibrium in both the monetary and the real 
economy. Hence Wicksell's insight that there are two rates of interest; one entailed by equilibrium 
in the real economy, and the other by the banking system, and that there is a potential for powerful 
disequilibrium processes where they differ, was thrown away. 
   In 1968 Friedman opened his celebrated article by condemning Keynes for the belief that interest 
rate policy would be ineffective 'in times of heavy unemployment' because the liquidity trap would 
set a limit to the extent to which they could be lowered, while Keynes's disciples had come to 
believe that interest rates would have little impact on investment and consumption, even when they 
could be lowered, with the consequence that monetary policy was 'twice damned'. Friedman added 
that: 
 
The wide acceptance of these views in the economics profession meant that for some two 
decades monetary policy was believed by all but a few reactionary souls to have been 
rendered obsolete by new economic knowledge. Money did not matter. Its only role was the 
minor one of keeping interest rates low, in order to hold down interest payments in the 
government budget, contribute to the "euthanasia of the rentier," and maybe stimulate 
investment a bit to assist government spending in maintaining a high level of aggregate 
demand. (p. 2) 
 
As a consequence of this new economic orthodoxy in the English speaking world, nominal interest 
rates had been kept down in both the UK and the US from 1945 to 1968, inflation had been far 
higher than in previous historical periods, and real interest rates in the so-called golden age were 
mainly negative. The actual rate of interest will have been far below the natural rate in both the US 
and the UK during most of the golden age. 
   Friedman observed that a country with low interest rates which he singled out, Switzerland, also 
had low inflation and slow growth in its money supply. It was achieving this low inflation rate 
because 'its monetary policy has been tight  - in the sense that the quantity of money has grown 
slowly'. In contrast Brazil and Chile and 'the United States in recent years' had high and rising 
interest rates, high inflation and rapid monetary growth. These indicated that in these countries, in 
the past, 'monetary policy has been easy - in the sense that the quantity of money has grown 
rapidly'. (p. 7 [Friedman's emphases]) In Switzerland, in the language of Wicksell, interest rates had 
previously been held above the natural rate which had produced slow monetary growth and falling 
inflation. In the United States, and far more so in  Brazil and Chile, interest rates had been held   89
below the natural rate which had led to escalating monetary growth that had sent inflation upwards.     
   Friedman then actually set out a specifically Wicksellian explanation of these phenomena. He 
paid Wicksell the supreme accolade of placing him at the heart of his argument without feeling any 
need to include him in his bibliographic references:  
 
Thanks to Wicksell, we are all acquainted with the concept of a "natural" rate of interest and 
the possibility of a discrepancy between the "natural" and the "market" rate. The preceding 
analysis of interest rates can be translated fairly directly into Wicksellian terms. The 
monetary authority can make the market rate less than the natural rate only by inflation. It 
can make the market rate higher than the natural rate only by deflation. We have added only 
one wrinkle to Wicksell - the Irving Fisher distinction between the nominal and the real rate 
of interest. Let the monetary authority keep the nominal market rate for a time below the 
natural rate by inflation. That in turn will raise the nominal natural rate itself, once 
anticpations of inflation become widespread, thus requiring still more inflation to hold down 
the market rate. Similarly, because of the Fisher effect, it will require not merely deflation 




Wicksell’s natural rate of interest is of course already defined as a real rate, because it is the rate of 
interest which would be determined by supply and demand ’if no use were made of money’ and 
lending took the form of ’real capital goods’. ([1898] 1936, p.102) So the sole ’wrinkle’ to Wicksell 
which Friedman introduces is that the market rate of interest with which the natural rate is 
compared should also be regarded as a real rate. Wicksell had seen price stability as the central rate 
around which inflation fluctuated. In a gold standard world, price movements over the centuries will 
be considerably influenced by whether the cost of gold mining has a falling trend in comparison 
with production in general, in which case world prices will have an upward tendency, or whether 
the relative cost of gold rises to produce a falling secular trend in prices measured in gold. Either is 
possible, and price stability which was also Wicksell’s preferred policy choice is the obvious 
reference point between these alternatives. In the late twentieth century, with national currencies 
largely divorced from gold, there has been no such reference point, which is one reason why 
Friedman may have been drawn to regard a steady rate of inflation rather than a zero rate as the 
starting point for his argument.
2  
    Friedman immediately went on to suggest that Wicksell’s discovery of the significance of the 
’natural’ rate of interest had a precise counterpart in the labour market, a ’natural’ rate of 
unemployment at which the labour market was in microeconomic equilibrium, and around which 
any departure would produce a rising or a falling trend in money wages, with a tendency, as in 
Wicksell, towards acceleration: 
 
The analysis has its close counterpart in the employment market. At any moment of time, 
there is some level of unemployment which has the property that it is consistent with 
equilibrium in the structure of real wage rates. At that level of unemployment, real wages 
are tending on the average to rise at a "normal" secular rate, i.e. at a rate that can be 
indefinitely maintained so long as capital formation, technological improvements, etc., 
remain on their long-run trends. A lower level of unemployment is an indication that there is 
an excess demand for labour that will produce upward pressure on real wage rates. A higher 
                                                           
2  A few years later, Friedman made a similar observation when he stated that modern monetary theory had achieved 
only two significant advances over David Hume: knowledge that an economy could be in long-term monetary 
equilibrium with prices rising (or falling) at a constant rate, when for Hume, equilibrium always meant price stability; 
and awareness that the time required for a change in the money supply to have a proportional impact on prices is two 
years. (1975, p.177) A steady state with a constant rate of inflation is indeed one of his central concepts.    90
level of unemployment is an indication that there is an excess supply of labour that will 
produce downward pressure on real wage rates. The "natural rate of unemployment," in 
other words, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general 
equilibrium equations, provided there is embedded in them the actual structural 
characteristics of the labour and commodity markets, including market imperfections, 
stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job 
vacancies and labour availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on. (p. 8) 
 
A market rate of interest below the natural rate will produce a Wicksellian monetary expansion, and 
this will at the same time entail that there is excess demand for labour so that unemployment will 
fall below its natural rate (which, in Wicksell takes the form of rising overtime). Hence a 
Wicksellian monetary expansion will, at the same time, produce a Friedmanite fall in 
unemployment below its natural rate and accelerating wage inflation. If the starting point of an 
accelerating-inflationary process is a Friedmanite fall in unemployment below its natural rate, and it 
was faster entrepreneurial expansion which induced the accelerating growth in output (originally 
due perhaps to a new and favourable development in technology), this would be described by 
Wicksell as a consequence of a rise in the natural rate of interest. An unchanging market rate of 
interest would now be below the new and higher natural rate to produce a monetary expansion 
alongside Friedman’s falling unemployment and accelerating wage inflation. If Friedman’s 
reduction in unemployment below the natural rate was due to a fiscal boost without any 
accompanying change in technical conditions of production, interest rates would have to be lowered 
at the same time to permit accelerating monetary expansion which paralleled the fiscal expansion. If 
monetary policy failed to accommodate the fiscal expansion, this would stall and the interconnected 
expansionary process which Wicksell and Friedman both describe would fail to gather momentum, 
until, in due course, unemployment reverted to the natural rate. 
   If Wicksell’s actual rate of interest or Friedman’s actual rate of unemployment fall below their 
natural rates, wages and prices soon come to rise at accelerating rates, but there are differences in 
the manner in which the two movements are described. Wicksell’s lower interest rates may only 
begin to induce wage inflation after a lag of a year or more, while Friedman would expect wages to 
react directly to the labour shortages associated with an unemployment rate below the natural rate. 
The process which Friedman describes specifically entails an accelerating rise in real wages (in 
relation to their trend), while in Wicksell’s inflationary process price increases may well precede 
wage increases, which will especially be the case if monetary expansion is initiated by higher 
investment which is eventually financed by forced saving. One reason why prices may rise ahead of 
wages, to produce Wicksell’s short-term diminution in real wages rather than Friedman’s increase, is 
that wage rates which are based on negotiation are generally adjusted at discrete intervals, and, in a 
situation where there is microeconomic disequilibrium in the labour market, they may never quite 
catch up. Friedman’s excess demand for labour when unemployment falls below the natural rate 
may therefore mainly produce growing areas of labour scarcity rather than the faster increases in 
real wages which he predicts. 
   When microeconomic markets depart from equilibrium and an inflationary process becomes one 
of the consequences all kinds of lags arise, and these may have the consequence that wages will rise 
ahead of prices, as in Friedman’s presentation of the argument, or prices ahead of wages, as will 
often arise in Wicksell’s version. But the processes which Wicksell and Friedman set out with such 
precision will rapidly become indistinguishable, and a common process with characteristics of both 
will develop.  
   In 1930, Keynes appreciated that Wicksell’s argument was close to what he was saying at that 
time, and like Friedman, he noticed how a fall in interest rates below Wicksell’s natural rate would 
produce rising money wages; but in 1936 in The General Theory he largely abandoned process 
analysis for comparative statics. This left no room for detailed accounts of what occurred during 
departures from equilibrium, and it is these which are analysed so powerfully by Wicksell and   91
Friedman. 
   What is interesting is how, in 1898, Wicksell produced a theory which overlaps considerably with 
the one which Friedman rediscovered and developed in 1968 (with full acknowledgement to his 
predecessor) and which went on to have the remarkable influence on policy makers which Budd has 
remarked upon.
3 So why did Wicksell’s theory fall away from the centre of attention in at least the 
UK and the US for many decades and return in Friedman’s powerful modified form?  
   It will be argued in the final section of this paper that several developments in banking in the late 
twentieth century have brought Wicksell’s limiting case of a credit-based economy closer to the 
underlying realities on which economic theory should be based. Wicksell quite significantly 
anticipated the manner in which world banking would develop, with the consequence that his 
theoretical insights have become more relevant in the twenty-first century than they appeared to be 






Throughout Wicksell’s account of the determinants of monetary expansion an individual country’s 
banks were constrained by international considerations. In the gold standard world of 1898, if one 
economy over-expanded its bank deposits in relation to other leading economies gold flowed away 
from it, and even if its domestic monetary arrangements were largely based on credit, this will have 
drained away the reserves of its banking system. Wicksell’s proposition was therefore that the 
world’s leading banks could only expand the global money supply at the rate they desired when they 
acted similarly. 
   But the idea that the world’s banks would act similarly was not far-fetched in the late nineteenth 
century. With the gold-standard’s fixed exchange rates, short-term interest rates were close to each 
other in the world’s larger economies. Since London was by far the largest monetary centre, the 
Bank of England often set the lead, and world interest rates frequently moved closely with those 
established in London. The Bank of England set a rate which might be above or below the British 
natural rate of interest, and with extremely competitive world capital markets with few barriers to 
international investment, there will have been strong tendencies towards convergence between the 
natural rates of interest in Britain and in other leading economies. The degree of correspondence 
between the world’s natural rates of interest will have been far weaker than that between short-term 
market rates where there will have been near-equality.  
   There may have been prolonged periods where there was a world-wide tendency for natural rates 
of interest to exceed actual rates, and others where actual rates exceeded natural rates. Wicksell 
believed that, where natural interest rates were greater, banks throughout the world would 
collectively expand their lending with the consequence that world money supplies trended upwards, 
and rising prices predominated. Conversely, where market rates of interest were higher than natural 
rates the world’s banks will have expanded their lending at quite modest rates, or even contracted 
the world money supply, and prices will have trended downwards. In Wicksell’s historical accounts 
of which of these were relevant in each historical period (in, for instance [1898]1936, pp.168-77) 
conditions in Great Britain are prominent, perhaps because it was his perception that London 
mainly set the lead in the determination of world interest rates. His proposition that the direction of 
long-term price movements depended on the relationship between the actual rate of interest and the 
natural rate was highly original, and it may provide a broad-brush explanation of the nineteenth 
                                                           
3 Milton Friedman’s recollection (in a letter to the author in September 2001) was that, ’I believe that the only role 
Wicksell really played in my 1968 article was to provide a name for the concept. It is very hard to be sure about such 
things at such long intervals of time, but yet I am reasonably sure that it was only after I had developed the ideas that I 
recognized that they had a great similarity to Wicksell’s and that his terminology was the appropriate terminology for 
me to use as well.’   92
century’s principal price trends which still deserves serious attention.  
   But, since the principal developments to credit including the establishment of giro systems for the 
settlement of inter-bank debts occurred late in the century, his explanation of what had actually 
occurred to prices cannot have relied significantly on his pure credit model in its extreme form.  
   The First World War and the Great Depression devastated the world economy, and they had a 
crucial impact on several of Wicksell’s assumptions. Most leading economies left the gold standard 
during the First World War, and only rejoined it briefly in the inter-war years. This in some respects 
strengthened the potential relevance of Wicksell’s theory. In 1906-7 he had had to concede that 
credit was ’only one of the influences’ which acted upon prices, and that ’the volume of metallic 
money’ could sometimes be of comparable significance. Outside the gold standard metallic money 
became irrelevant, and with few economies actually on the gold standard, this lost its relevance. The 
removal of the gold standard link meant that each country’s interest rates acquired a degree of 
freedom. In the nineteenth century his theory required that the world’s banks respond similarly to a 
world-wide discrepancy between the actual and the natural rates of interest to produce world-wide 
rises or falls in prices. After 1918 most of the leading economies became free to establish their own 
interest rates, with the consequence that whether their prices had rising or falling trends came to 
depend upon the relationship between the actual and the natural rates of interest within their own 
borders. Wicksell’s theory thus ceased to be a world economy theory and it became potentially 
applicable to each individual economy. 
   It does not appear implausible that the United Kingdom had an actual rate of interest above its 
natural rate during most of the 1920s when deflationary conditions predominated, and an actual rate 
below the natural rate after 1932 when bank rate was established at 2 per cent soon after the 
departure from the gold standard. The British natural rate of interest will plausibly have been far 
higher than that after 1932, which will have been one influence behind Britain’s extraordinary 
growth from 1932 to 1937, when unemployment fell by more than 1¼ million, and employment 
rose by 2¾ million. 
   The banking failures which followed the stock market crash were a further fundamental departure 
from the nineteenth century conditions which strongly influenced Wicksell's assumptions. Banks 
collapsed in the United States, Germany and Austria, on a scale which rendered grotesque his 
assumption that they generally had more than sufficient reserves to finance whatever rate of credit 
creation they desired. Banks did not collapse in Britain where the Bank of England successfully 
acted as lender of last resort. In contrast, in the United States where the Federal Reserve declined to 
play any such role, 6,000 banks were allowed to fail. 
   It may be that banks never enjoyed the freedom which Wicksell assumed, but the world-wide 
banking collapses of the 1930s certainly required significant modification to his theory of credit 
creation. To rescue this element in his theory, we need the additional assumption that a country's 
central bank will always act as lender of last resort, in the manner that the Bank of England 
demonstrated in most of the nineteenth century, and even more crucially, in the banking crises of 
the inter-war years. If a country's central bank has the power, the means and the intent to act as 
lender of last resort, Wicksell's hypothesis that a country's banks can themselves determine the 
overall rate of credit creation comes into its own. If the central bank is ready to convert a fraction of 
banks' illiquid assets into liquid reserve assets whenever the banks request, a shortage of reserve 
assets will never constrain the rate of growth of bank lending.  
      By the 1980s and the 1990s, the catastrophic losses of liquidity which followed the banking 
collapses of the 1930s actually persuaded the world's governments and its leading central banks to 
come to the aid of virtually all banks which risked failure. They came to the assistance of banks in 
difficulty, not merely when they lacked short-term liquidity, but in addition, when they faced 
bankruptcy in consequence of significant misjudgements and a plethora of unperforming loans. In 
the 1980s the US government took over the under-performing assets of the Thrift and Loans to the 
extent of around 9 per cent of GDP. In 2001 Japanese banks have loans judged to be at risk totalling   93
up to 40 per cent of GDP,
4 and no one believes that any but the weakest will be allowed to fail. The 
universal willingness to rescue banks which have made horrendous errors, despite the consequential 
moral hazard, underlines how readily the banks of any country can now obtain the liquid assets they 
require.  
   Charles Goodhart (2001) shows how, in the 1990s, reserve ratios nowhere influenced the rate of 
monetary expansion, which was actually determined in all leading economies by the rate of interest, 
precisely as in Wicksell’s theory. At the start of the twenty-first century the world’s central banks 
use only one policy tool, their power to determine short-term interest rates, and everywhere this is 
regarded as sufficient to retard or accelerate the rate of growth of monetary expansion. As Goodhart 
emphasises, this over-riding influence of the rate of interest upon the rate of growth of bank lending 
is underpinned by knowledge on the part of banks that they can rely upon their central bank as a 
lender of last resort.  
   Goodhart quotes Victoria Chick, who wrote in 1992 that reserves have virtually disappeared ’as a 
constraint on bank behaviour’. She observed that British banks could meet any reasonable rise in the 
demand for loans and make good any shortfall of reserves through the Bank of England, with the 
consequence that this could even be referred to as the ’lender of first resort’. (1992, p.197) 
   Goodhart’s account of the relationship between the rate of interest and the rate of growth of bank 
lending is, first that the central bank determines the short-term rate of interest, second, that the 
private sector then decides how much it wishes to borrow at that rate of interest, third, that the 
commercial banks adjust their asset structure so that they can lend this amount, turning if necessary 
to their central bank for any additional reserve assets they may require. Hence the interest rate 
which the central bank establishes is decisive in the determination of the quantity of bank lending 
and the rate of growth of the broadly defined money supply. 
   At the same time, the reserve ratios which banks are required to maintain are ceasing to be ratios 
of liquid assets to deposits, which can readily be attained through the assistance of central banks in 
the manner which Chick and Goodhart describe. The former required ratios of liquid assets to 
deposits are being superseded by minimum ratios of shareholders’ capital to deposits, the so called 
Basel Rules. It can be assumed that successful and profitable lending expands shareholders’ capital 
in the manner that the Basel Rules require. These have not yet acted to constrain the growth in 
deposits in a manner which central banks (even Japan’s) cannot overcome if they choose to. 
   With these new approaches to central banking which have become universal in the twenty-first 
century, the conditions which underpinned Wicksell’s theory are again in place. The growth of the 
money supply again depends entirely upon how much the private sector wishes to borrow at 
whatever rate of interest the banking system establishes.  
   Wicksell believed that in the conditions he assumed, which appear to have returned, the control of 
inflation would be simple and straightforward. Banks, and the governments which could readily 
control them if they wished, could stabilise the general price level through a simple iterative 
process, because a persistent tendency for the price level to rise implied that a country’s interest 
rates (or the world’s) were below the natural rate, while a falling price trend implied that interest 
rates were above the natural rate. He declared that it would be ’impracticable’ and also ’quite 
unnecessary’ for banks actually to ’ascertain the natural rate before fixing their own rates’. Instead 
they could follow a procedure which would ensure price stability. He stated this entirely in italics to 
emphasise the significance he attached to this passage: 
 
 
So long as prices remain unaltered the banks’ rate of interest is to remain unaltered. If prices 
rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate of interest is to be lowered; 
and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at its new level until a further 
                                                           
4  A Goldman Sachs report released in July 2001 found that ’the level of loans to companies that have a high risk of 
bankruptcy’ totals 40 per cent of GDP. The Japanese Financial Services Agency regards the total of ’potentially risky 
loans’ as around 30 per cent of GDP. (Financial Times, 20 July 2001).   94
movement of prices calls for a further change in one direction or the other. ([1898] 1936, 
p.189) 
 
That is precisely how monetary policy is conducted by the Bank of England and the European 
Central Bank in the twenty-first century, except that their inflation targets are not quite the zero 
which Wicksell regarded as ideal, and they attempt to anticipate future inflation instead of merely 
reacting to it after the event in the manner that he advised in 1898. Whenever the Bank of England 
or the European Central Bank judge that inflation will exceed the target range which they have been 
asked to sustain they raise interest rates, and they reduce them where inflation is expected to fall 
below the target range. The United States Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan act similarly 
except that their target inflation rates are less clearly defined. 
   One reason why governments expect the world’s leading central banks to control inflation entirely 
through the variation of short-term interest rates is the extraordinary influence of Friedman’s 1968 
article and the research that followed it, which indicated that the rate of inflation had no long-term 
influence upon the rate of unemployment. Most governments therefore now believe that there will 
be no long-term sacrifice of employment if they give their central banks the over-riding objective of 
using the rate of interest to control inflation. That it was this article of Friedman’s which 
underpinned the establishment of a Wicksellian analysis of inflation control again underlines the 
extraordinary complementary between his theoretical innovations of 1968 and Wicksell’s theory of 
1898. 
   Perhaps the most original element in Wicksell’s analysis of money and banking was his concept of 
a wholly credit-based economy where banks could expand their lending and consequently a nation’s 
aggregate bank deposits at whatever rate they regarded as profitable. While this pure-credit 
economy was merely a limiting case in 1898, some of the developments he described are beginning 
to appear increasingly familiar in the management of financial transactions in the twenty-first 
century. This may be another reason why his theory, which was so widely overlooked in the US and 
the UK in much of the twentieth century, illuminates real world developments in the twenty-first.   
   One striking implication of the new Wicksellian world is the contrast between the natural rates of 
interest in the world’s two largest economies. Figure 1 indicates that in the US the real rate of return 
on capital has exceeded 7 per cent since the mid-1990s. This may explain that economy’s 
extraordinary strength. Wicksell’s natural rate of interest is the prospective marginal rate of return 
on capital, while what Figure 1 estimates is the average rate of return. There may moreover be a 
cyclical element in the 7 per cent real rate of return in the second half of the 1990s (although 
inflation scarcely accelerated). The US’s 7 per cent average real rate of return on capital will 
therefore exceed Wicksell’s natural rate of interest, but perhaps not by a great margin. These data 
suggest that US nominal interest rates could rise far higher than the Federal Reserve will 
conceivably contemplate, and still leave extensive opportunities for further additions to the number 
of businesses in the US, which Wicksell always emphasised, and to the capital stock of existing 
businesses, financed if need be through credit expansion. In these circumstances US recessions will 
be brief, and if they arise because of over-investment in certain kinds of Information Technology 
equipment, this will be worked off within two years, because the service life of most IT hardware 
and software is no more than twenty-four months.  
   The US has been able to achieve this very high real rate of return on capital because it led the IT 
revolution. More than 40 per cent of its business investment has been in information technology and 
its many applications, and the real quality-adjusted cost of IT hardware and software has been 
falling at a compound rate of 20 per cent per annum. To be able to exploit a 20 per cent per annum 
rate of capital-augmenting technical progress in up to two-fifths of all business investment will have 
greatly reduced the average cost of capital equipment, and massively boosted the natural rate of 
interest in the manner that Figure 1 illustrates.
5 
                                                           
5  The evidence on the extent of IT investment in the United States and the rate of capital-augmenting technical progress 
which is being achieved, and its influence, is summarised in Eltis (2000), pp.131-47.   95
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   Conditions have been very different in Japan, the world’s second largest economy. Data 
for the real rate of return on capital in Japan are unavailable but a good deal can be inferred 
from the information in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 indicates that in the second half of the 
1990s Japanese profits were at around three-seventh of the US level expressed as a 
percentage of sales. Figures 3 and 4 suggest that in the second half of the 1990s the US rate 
of growth of real GDP was about 2½ times that of Japan, while US private-sector 
investment, expressed as a ratio of GDP, was about four-fifths as great. Japan has therefore 
invested more than three times as much for each percentage point of growth. With profits 
about three-sevenths as great as a ratio of GDP, and capital requirements for each per cent of 
growth more than three times as great, Japan's real rate of return on capital will have been 
about one-seventh that of the US.
6 This Japanese handicap may include a cyclical element 
(although few now envisage a return to the sustained Japanese growth of previous decades); 
but the discrepancy between the apparent 7 per cent real rate of return in the US and the 1 
per cent real rate in Japan is so great that a huge underlying gap is likely to remain.  
   Fundamentally, in addition to its great advantage in the creation of new IT technologies, the US 
has benefited from a degree of competition between companies and within companies (where 
perceived underperformance is rarely tolerated), while Japan has a culture of cross-subsidisation of 
the inefficient by the efficient, both between companies and within companies. No one is allowed to 
fail and excessive costs are carried in a variety of ways. Company overheads rose by 17 per cent of 
GDP during the 1990s, and the various escalations of cost have combined to produce the miniscule 
overall profitability which the data implies.  
    If Wicksell's natural real rate of interest has actually been as high as 5 to 7 per cent in the United 
States and as low as 1 to 3 per cent in Japan, this would explain why Japan has had a falling general 
price level during 1999 and 2000, despite its short-term interest rates of less than 0.5 per cent. 
Allowing for risk, Japanese companies had to borrow at more than 0.5 per cent, and they will have 
required a rate of return from new investment of at least 2.5 per cent. With an average real rate of 
return on capital of as little as 1 per cent, there has been little desire to expand borrowing, and the 
creation of new businesses will have been unattractive. Hence bank lending and the growth of bank 
advances was bound to be sluggish in the manner that Wicksell's theory predicted, while Japanese 
banks have the extraordinary ratio of underperforming loans made to near-insolvent companies 
which has been remarked upon. 
   It is remarkable that a theory more than a century old which attracted little attention during most 
intervening decades, now has such power to illuminate. The re-switching in its favour occurred 
because of: 
 
1. The prescience of Wicksell's theory of credit creation, which reads far more convincingly 
in the twenty-first century than in most of the twentieth.  
2. The universal willingness of central banks to act as lenders of last resort has lent 
credibility to Wicksell's assumption (falsified by events during much of the twentieth 
century) that reserves are largely irrelevant to prudent banking.  
3. The departure of the world's economies from the gold standard has made his theory 
applicable to each country individually rather than to the world economy considered as a 
whole.  
 
                                                           
6  The rate of profit on capital, P/K, is identically equal to the share of profits in output, P/Y, divided by the capital-to-
output ratio, K/Y. The capital to output ratio will tend towards the investment ratio, I, divided by the rate of growth, g. 
Hence, P/K tends towards P/Y ÷ (I/g). If, in the second half of the 1990s, the US had a P/Y which was 7/3 times 
Japan's, an I that was 4/5 as great, and a g which was 2½ times as great, its P/K will have been tending towards (7/3 ÷ 
8/25) = 7.3 times Japan's. Ideally comparable US and Japanese data would be available, defined as in the above growth 
and income distribution formulae. The US government produces this data, while the Japanese government publishes far 
less. The Bank Credit Analyst's estimates in Figures 2, 3, and 4, whatever their imperfections, indicate a vast 
discrepancy between real rates of return on capital in the US and Japan.   97
 
 
A consequence has been that the world’s monetary policies have come to be managed in the manner 
which he advocated.  
   His prescience includes an international dimension which has not yet come to the forefront of 
attention. He wondered whether ’a policy of co-operation between the banks of the whole world’ lay 
within ’the realm of possibility’. ([1899] 1936, p.190) He believed that: 
 
the difficulties which arise through a highly one-sided balance of payments or through a 
large difference in the price-levels of two or more countries can be overcome by measures 
undertaken, not only by the "unfavourably" situated country, but also by the "favourably" 
situated country or countries. (p. 191) 
 
He believed that co-operation between the central banks of the world’s leading economies created 
the possibility that the world’s monetary and exchange rate system could enjoy ’two degrees of 
freedom’ instead of one. In particular, ’relative rates of interest’ could be adjusted to influence ’rates 
of exchange’. (p.192) In the gold standard world of 1898 rates of exchange had only very slight 
flexibility; the scope for interest rate differentials to influence exchange rates is infinitely greater in 
the twenty-first century. 
   Up to now the world’s leading central banks have rarely had an agreed agenda for the adjustment 
of relative exchange rates through agreed changes in relative interest rates: the Plaza accord of 1985 
has been a rare exception. Usually at least one leading central bank prefers market forces to any 
combined attempt to achieve a sustainable non-inflationary structure of world exchange rates. The 
cataclysm of the 1930s created universal support for the lender of last resort function of central 
banks, which underpins the resurrection of Wicksell’s credit-creation model. It may require a future 
shock to the world economy to produce the international co-ordination which he predicted. 
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It is always very pleasant to discuss a paper devoted to an issue one would have liked to investigate 
oneself. For someone interested in modern and not so modern monetary theory and its connection 
with general equilibrium models, Eltis’s inquiry into Wicksell early quantity equation modelling 
and its newly-found relevance for today’s world is both exciting and frustrating.  
 
Exciting in a sense that, even if I am always suspicious about ancestor’s worshipping, it is always 
pleasant for an historian of thought to realise that ‘wrong ideas of dead men’ (Pigou) are not so 
wrong and not so old after all… Frustrating in a sense that Eltis’s paper offers such a sweeping 
review of some of the trickiest monetary arguments debated since 1898 that the reader is bound to 
be disappointed. Walter Eltis is putting us on so many hot trails that one would have wished at 
many places more in-depth discussions and references to the primary and secondary literatures. But 
let us not quibble, Walter Eltis general argument is very exciting; he is clearly not bothered like 
Seurat with the shape of the various little dots on the canvas but is painting with the broad brush of 
someone who, clearly, has been heavily involved in policy making.  
My comments on Walter Eltis’s paper fall into two parts. First, I intend to examine briefly his broad 
argument of the relevance of Wicksell’s monetary theory for the understanding of modern financial 
and monetary systems. Second, I select a small number of issues (both in the history of the subject 
and in the policy part of the paper) I would like to dig into a bit more deeply. I hasten to add that I 
am not a Wicksell scholar and that my understanding of this subtle theorist is only based on a 
reading of his two main books way back in the late 1980’s. 
 
Walter Eltis’s central argument is that Wicksell’s approach to monetary management was way 
ahead of his time; was for different and good reasons set aside during the entire 20
th century and 
that, thanks to a radical change in the working of the banking and financial system, is finding today 
a new lease of life; or, at least, Eltis is encouraging us to go back to Wicksell to understand the 
predicaments the Japanese economy has gone through for the past four-five years (and, I add, to 
understand what the US economy is likely to go through during the next few years). The 
articulation is as follows: 
 
·  Today, Central Banks control inflation through short-term interest rate; Wicksell had a 
very similar opinion. 
·  Contrary to what went on during most of the last century, high-powered money reserves 
play a very small part in modern banks’ decisions to lend or not; Wicksell also thought 
that the rate of growth or of decline of bank deposits was virtually independent of the 
size of liquid reserves. 
·  The gap between the real rate of return on capital (however this tricky concept is 
defined) and nominal interest rate being a good indicator of the growth rate of any 
economy, a proper understanding of Wicksell’s cumulative process could teach us a 
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great deal about the growth rate differentials between Japan and the US during the past 
decade. 
·  Finally, Wicksell was apparently keen on Central Banks’ co-ordination. Since part of the 
success in bringing down inflation during the 1990s was according to Eltis linked to 
such a co-ordination, Wicksell might have yet more to teach us in that respect. 
 
This is a very tall programme indeed to be squeezed into the modest –if not rudimentary 
Wicksellian cumulative process. Eltis’s argument seems somewhat over-enthusiastic. I think that 
modest and careful Wicksell himself would have been slightly taken aback at the credit granted to 
him as a precursor of modern monetary theory.  
In particular, I am a bit mystified by the summary of the core of the argument  (p. 43) ‘if Wicksell’s 
natural real rate has actually been as high as 5 to 7 percent in the US and as low as 1 to 3 percent in 
Japan, this would H[SODLQ why Japan has had a falling price level during 1999 and 2000…’.  
As a matter of fact, and dare I say, my reading of Wicksell’s theory seems to indicate that he was 
working in term of interest rate GLIIHUHQWLDOV and not in absolute level. It is because there is a gap 
(at no particular level) between the real natural rate
2 and the real market rate (i.e. nominal rate 
deflated by inflation rate) that the price level is rising or falling. In other words, if Central Banks 
cannot reduce nominal interest rates below zero they are (at least theoretically) perfectly free to set 
real market rates of interest as low as they please (providing they do not care about the level of 
inflation necessary to bring about the desired real market rate).  If one wants to apply Wicksell’s 
cumulative process argument to contemporary Japan and United States, one would have to examine 
the differential between these two ‘real’ rates: as long as the real market rate (or alternatively the 
real cost of finance) is below the real natural rate, the price level would tend to rise (and vice-versa). 
If OECD data are readily available for both Japanese and American real market rates, what proxy 
should stand for the real natural rate of interest? That is the whole question. Data for real rates of 
return on capital are not readily available. Hence, I will not dispute Eltis’s suggestions on pages 41-
42: a range between 5 to 7 percent in the US and between 1 to 3 percent in Japan over the 1996-
2000 period. When compared to the relevant average short-term real market rates for the same 
period (slightly over 0.1 percent for Japan and 2.8 for the US), in both countries, real natural rates 
are higher than real market rates of interest. In both countries, the Wicksellian differential is in the 
same direction;  thus, it cannot explain DORQH the falling price level  witnessed in Japan during 1999 
and 2000. Since my comparison uses real magnitudes there is no need to reintroduce here nominal 
interest rates. 
Hence, my question is, either my reading of Wicksell is faulty or Eltis’s argument does not explain 
the whole of the growth differential between the US and Japanese economy? Once again, I do not 
understand, why a differential in favour of real natural rate could bring about ‘falling price level in 
Japan in 1999 and 2000’. Apart from a reference to Wicksell’s intuition, other factors would 
probably have to be brought in. In particular, the general tenor of the argument seems to me to be 
couched in pre-*HQHUDO7KHRU\ terms (excluding notably changes in output) or, if you like, in the 
typical one-equation model of Friedman’s demand for money. Moreover, in Wicksell’s model, the 
real natural rate, not the real market rate, calls the tune. 
Let me however, develop this differential issue a bit further. I think it is nothing else but a very old 
story dating back at least to Thornton, solved by Wicksell (p. 84: he was hardly ‘ahead of his time’) 
and resurrected by Keynes under the name of Gibson paradox. 
The broad argument
3 is that equilibrium in a monetary economy with non-monetary assets exists 
only when the market rate of interest in the loan market equals the rate of return on capital in the 
                                                           
2 What Wicksell calls the real internal rate of return on capital, or, in his quasi-Austrian fashion, the ‘marginal 
productivity of waiting’ (Lectures on Political Economy (1906), vol. I, London, Routledge & Kegan, 1935, p. 177). 
3 The next few paragraphs draw freely on the present author’s entry on the ‘Gibson Paradox’ in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Money and Finance (P. Newman, M. Milgate and J. Eatwell, eds), London, Macmillan, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 
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commodity markets. In such a monetary equilibrium (to use Wicksell’s terminology), the equality 
between these two rates also implies that savings equals investment and the constancy of the price 
level.  In particular, if the money rate happens to be lower than the natural rate, agents can take 
advantage of this to increase their demand for investment goods. Assuming full employment, such 
an additional demand  would immediately generate a rise in the price level fuelled by excess 
demand on commodity markets, and, sooner or later, this would react on the loan market and trigger 
a rise in the money rate of interest. 
Clearly, the expansion of bank credit can only become effective through a reduction of the money 
rate (Wicksell favouring like Keynes a rise in the natural rate).  This was hardly a novelty: Thornton 
had already fully realised it in 1802. The theme common to most 19th century writers is that at the 
same time as the monetary increase pushes interest down it also pushes prices up. Following this 
argument, one would expect the bank rate and the price level to move in RSSRVLWH directions. But 
this was only half the story; and monetary theory had to wait until  Wicksell  demonstrated that 
XOWLPDWHO\ the rise in prices has to cause a UHYHUVDO of the former one. It is precisely the second half 
of this process which Keynes "rediscovered" thanks to Gibson’s statistical research. 
As a matter of fact, a similar empirical attempt had already been made by a leading critic of 
Ricardian monetary theory. In his &XUUHQF\ 3ULQFLSOH ([1844] 1959, pp. 123-124), Tooke had 
already argued that, in apparent contradiction with the then dominant doctrine, the market rate and 
the price level are SRVLWLYHO\ correlated. For Tooke, the quantity theory of money was thus proved to 
be wrong. And it is precisely in trying to reconcile Tooke’s early version of the Gibson paradox 
with the quantity theory that Wicksell solved this paradox by means of his cumulative process 
which provides a detailed explanation of its short run PRGXVRSHUDQGL. 
The Gibson paradox in not very difficult to explain when it is realized with Wicksell (and Keynes) 
that changes in productivity, capital accumulation or technology do alter the rate of return on real 
capital independently of monetary forces. The bank rate will therefore trail EHKLQG the real rate. In 
Keynes’s own words : 
 
     If the market rate of interest moves in the same  direction as the natural rate of interest 
but  always lags behind it, then the movements of the price level will tend, even over longish 
periods, to be in the same direction as the movements of the rate of interest...The Gibson 
paradox is explained ($ 7UHDWLVHRQ0RQH\, I, 7KH&ROOHFWHG:ULWLQJVRI-RKQ0D\QDUG
.H\QHVvol. VI, London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 184). 
 
What would be needed to disprove the quantity theory is not a positive correlation between prices 
and the absolute level of the market rate of interest but a positive correlation between prices and 
interest GLIIHUHQWLDOV. 
Keynes eventually used this idea of a difference between these two rates or, alternatively, between 
savings and investment, and its influence on profit, defined as windfall gains, as the basis for his 
attempt to find precisely the dynamical laws of the disequilibrium process. His fundamental 
equations are in a way not a substitute for the quantity theory but an analysis based on the solution 
brought to the Gibson paradox of the dynamics of the price level within a short-run disequilibrium 
process. 
 
Let us turn much more briefly to four other shorter remarks: two linked to the history of thought and 
two on the policy part of the paper. 
 
1.  On page 81, Eltis discusses in detail what he calls Wicksell’s ‘credit economy’? The 
system is framed within a gold standard system; i.e. the system has an anchor; the 
system is not unstable. At other places, he alludes (sometimes explicitly) to Wicksell’s 
‘pure credit economy’: this is quite another system and free bankers have been at it, 
trying to assert its stability, for quite a while. Which version is in fact behind his   102
argument? When Nixon severed the link between the dollar and gold, he did QRW 
introduce a ‘pure credit economy’ à la Wicksell.  
2.  In his section on Wicksell, Keynes and Friedman, Eltis only mentions Keynes up to the 
7UHDWLVH. Of course, we all know the story about the collapse of the quasi-Wicksellian 
fundamental equations. But doesn’t Keynes’s 1936 principle of effective demande 
introduce variations of output as an extra variable that Wicksell cannot obviously handle 
with his full-employment cumulative process; i.e. changes in money influence nominal 
prices only, not the level of output?  
Friedman’s famous quote on p. 90 about ‘natural rate of unemployment…ground out by 
the Walrasian system’ is for me a clear indication that, Wicksell like Friedman work 
their respective natural rate of unemployment or natural rate of interest doctrine against 
the background of an implicitly stable Walrasian general equilibrium model… 
excluding, by definition income or output as a variable. No wonder the similarities 
between their two approaches. 
Similarly, on pp. 90-91, Eltis criticises Keynes for setting up in the *HQHUDO7KHRU\ a 
comparative static model while praising Wicksell and Friedman for their ‘detailed 
accounts of what occurred during departures from equilibrium’. Given the present sorry 
state of general equilibrium analysis, and particularly the impossibility of demonstrating 
its stability (Mantel, Debreu, Sonenschein), if Wicksell can be excused for ignoring it in 
1898, Friedman can certainly not have either ignored it or be credited with a detailed 
account of disequilibrium situations. If I may say so, he is simply, as usual, DVVXPLQJ 
the stability of the system he is explicitly referring to. 
3.  Referring to Goodhart’s paper while discussing the many parallel between Wicksell’s 
vision of how a banking system is supposed to work and the actual working of 21
st-
century banking system, Eltis uses the ‘too big to fail’ argument’ to demonstrate that, in 
fact large banks are today semi-public goods and that modern Central Banks are always 
playing their role of lender of last resort. Hence, commercial banks would have an easier 
task to determine the rate of credit creation (since they would never be constrained by a 
shortage of reserve). I agree onh both point: on the argument and on his interpretation of 
Wicksell. But I think he is going slightly too fast. He retracts somewhat on his argument 
later. Even if banks are largely responsible today to determine on their own the rate of 
credit creation, the classic distinction between liquidity and solvency crises leaves quite 
some room for discretionary intervention by the Central Bank. Central Banks are in the 
business of saving banks not bankers. Banks are after all allowed to fail regularly (vide 
Baring) for solvency reasons. Moreover, Central Banks are still, dare I say, playing their 
crucial role of lenders of last resort (in time of liquidity crisis). 
4.  Switzerland and Friedman’s monomaniac explanation in terms of the money variable 
only (p. 88). 
In fact, the story is quite different and much more sophisticated than a simple quantity 
equation model. 
·  Traditionally, and at least since 1945 and notwithstanding the part played by foreign 
deposits in Swiss banks, Switzerland has been saving massively more than it can 
domestically invest; this characteristic of a highly developed economy with an 
ageing population is, of course, synonymous with an enormous current account 
surplus (around 12% of GNP).  
·  Lower real interest rates and slower growth rates than other European countries are 
the logical consequences.  
·  During the same half century, the Swiss economy has also been characterised by 
extremely low unemployment levels and a religion for balanced budgets – two 
sounds reasons not to reflate by way of a lax monetary policy   103
·  Switzerland did not escape the consequences of the fixed exchange rate crisis of the 
late 1960’s and early 1970s. The tight monetary policy conducted from 1973 
onwards was thus in response to the disastrous consequences brought to the growth 
of the money supply (and hence to the inflation rate) by the undervalued currency of 
a small open economy characterised by a large current account surplus (in a fixed 
exchange rate system).  
·  Accordingly, if applied to Switzerland, Friedman’s sentence “in the language of 
Wicksell, nominal interest rates had previously been held above the natural rate, 
which had produced slow monetary growth and falling inflation” must be very 
seriously qualified. In particular, and with provisos, it could only be applied to a 








I am grateful for Pascal Bridel’s constructive Comment
1. I have one observation with potential 
significance for the History of Economics. In general, economic interrelationships are complex. 
Many influences mutually determine the development of economies, and no single consideration 
can be singled out as a prime determinant without unacceptable oversimplification. 
   There are none the less occasions where a single influence which can be represented by a rather 
simple theory is so powerful that it has the potential to dominate. Keynes’s belief that lack of 
effective demand provided the overwhelming explanation of the unprecedented levels of 
unemployment of the 1930s is an example. Its total influence was questioned at the time and it has 
been questioned since, but his explanation of mass unemployment is undoubtedly seminal. 
   Does a Wicksellian interpretation of the implications of a 1-3 per cent real rate of return on capital 
in Japan have a similar potential to dominate the interpretation of real events? I believe it has, while 
Bridel believes that ’it cannot alone explain the falling price level witnessed in Japan in 1999 and 
2000’. He must be right but it is none the less an extremely powerful influence. 
   With an average real rate of return on capital as low as 1 per cent, real interest rates would need to 
be as low as minus 2 per cent, in view of risk and uncertainty, to provide a justification for 
investment financed through borrowing. Bridel suggests that Central Banks are ’(at least 
theoretically) perfectly free to set real market rates of interest as low as they please (providing they 
do not care about the rate of inflation necessary to bring about the desired market rate)’. But Japan 
has a public debt to GDP ratio which is already 130 per cent and it is rising by between 5 and 10 
percentage points per annum. If the Bank of Japan succeeded in establishing an expected rate of 
inflation which at first produced negative real rates of interest of at least 2 per cent, Japan’s ratio of 
debt interest to GDP would escalate and this would further undermine its public finances. The 
Japanese authorities have hitherto been able to persuade a considerable fraction of the high-saving 
Japanese population to hold Japanese government bonds which offer a nominal return of 1.6 per 
cent or less. With significant expected inflation and a falling yen, many would switch to US and 
European bonds which currently yield 4 or 5 per cent, which would force Japanese interest rates 
upwards to a level which would devastate its public finances, and restore the real rate of interest to 
levels which undermined investment. 
   If inflation offers Japan no way out, Wicksell’s argument stands, that a natural rate of interest as 
low as 1-3 per cent has inescapable deflationary consequence. Paolo Sylos Labini perceptively 
described profits as ’the gasoline of capitalism’ and where these are lacking it cannot function 
effectively. It is largely because the average real rate of return on capital is so low that the Japanese 
banking system is replete with unperforming loans. My paper refers to a Goldman-Sachs study 
which places these potentially at 40 per cent of GDP. With an average real rate of return on capital 
as low as 1-3 per cent, around half the Japanese economy will be losing money. An article 
published in the Financial Times on 29 January 2002 actually indicated that ’According to tax 
statistics, about 70 per cent of Japanese companies lost money last year’. As the Japanese banks 
participate in a culture where they are expected to support the particular industrial and commercial 
companies in their mutually interconnected networks of corporations, they will attempt to continue 
to underwrite the loss-making members of their Keiretsus. But while the Japanese banks will 
underwrite past losses, they will not be similarly obliged to create new ones with the result that the 
trend in capital investment must be downwards, as it is.  
   It is because of these institutional considerations, that Japan’s public debt to GDP ratio is already 
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130 per cent and rising, and because of the incestuous promiscuity between Japan’s banks and its 
leading industrial companies, that the impact of a real rate of return on capital as low as 1-3 per cent 
is so devastating. But given their presence, if one wants a theory which goes to the heart of the 
Japanese crisis, I suggest that Wicksell’s offers unique illumination. 
   As Bridel reiterates, there is nothing fundamentally new in the belief that there is significance in 
the relationship  between the rate of interest and the rate of return on capital: many before Wicksell 
drew attention to it. But his particular assumptions gave it a central importance which was new, and 
he was ready to use it to explain all the inflationary and deflationary trends of the nineteenth 
century in a few pages, so the explanatory power I attributed to his theory might not have surprised 
him. 
   May this be one of the rare cases in the History of Economics where a rather simple theory has 
exceptional power to illuminate?   
 













  It could seem strange at first sight to use game theory to understand structural changes and 
institutional organizations of economies. Beyond the well-known objectives of a retrospective bias 
in reading past economic phenomena through a recent intellectual construction, two major 
criticisms immediately come to mind. First, game theory is supposed to be derived mainly from a 
strictly individualistic methodology based on a narrow definition of rationality. Second, the line of 
reasoning is largely dominated by the backward induction, a mental procedure where individual 
players are assumed to choose their strategy from the beginning to the end of the game. If game 
theory was actually built in the spirit of pure individualistic rationality and developed in a stable 
static perspective, we could legitimately question its relevance for studying structural and 
institutional changes in economy. 
 
  The aim of this paper is to show that these assumptions, which are more generally attached 
to game theory and commonly accepted by scientists, are not correct on the grounds of historical, as 
well as analytical arguments. Consequently, game theory opens up two interesting ways for 
understanding institutional changes which will be briefly explored. On one side, a fresh look at such 
basic notions as "standards of behaviour" and "social orders", which can already be found in 
T.G.E.B. (Theory of Games and Economic Behavior), gives analytical foundations for identifying 
various institutional systems through different solution concepts. On the other side, a dynamic 
approach to interactive systems exists, at least from Volterra’s works on modelling animal 
population struggles. Such a dynamic version of games was reinforced even in 1950 by Nash’s 
suggestions about an alternative dynamic interpretation of his well-known equilibrium-solution 
concept. Following these directions can definitely improve our knowledge of the processes of 
economic and social changes. 
 
  The analytical part of the paper is devoted to the first perspective. 
 
1. Some Historical Fallacies on Game Theory 
 
 
  Nobody can object that the players of a game in its technical sense are individual decision-
makers(1) who choose freely their strategy (or more generally their movements). In addition, they 
are supposed to be selfish maximizers for the sake of simplicity(2). Are such very broad 
assumptions sufficient to conclude that the original framework of game theory is no more than an 
extended and sophisticated (or at variance over simplified, Spohn, 1982) version of the standard 
individualistic paradigms of neo-classical economics? We do not think so. From the very beginning, 
and in spite of some misinterpreted statements, the scope of game theory is not to be found in the 
entities themselves (the decision-makers) with their individual characteristics (preferences, ability 
to maximize selfish utilities …), but rather in the content of their relations during the interactive 
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process, precisely labelled as the "game". Several pieces of historical evidence show that the 
founders of game theory were aware of this novelty. 
 
1.1 Interactive Decision Processes and Individual Decision-making 
 
  Mixed strategies occupy a central place in games of strategy. In his two brief notes 
concerning what he called "games that involve chance and the skill of the players", Borel already 
introduced the idea of mixed strategy for solving the three examples of strategic games which he 
raised (Borel, 1921, 1924). Von Neumann in his 1928 seminal paper suggested a disputable, but 
very interesting interpretation of the use of this notion for such a purpose. Let us quote Von 
Neumann who is reasoning, like Borel, in the restricted format of a two-person, zero-sum game: 
 
  "At the beginning of the game, S1 (the player) is not asked to choose one of the numbers 1, 
2, … S1, he has only to specify S1 probabilities" (Von Neumann [1928], 1959, p.231). 
 
Thus, he specifies the intuition behind the UDLVRQG
rWUH of such an artifice in the following terms: 
 
  "If S really wants to get a particular strategy X, he can specify P(x1)=1, P(x2)=0 (for x1 ¹ 
x2). On the other hand, he is protected against his adversary "finding him out'; for, if e.g. 
P(x1) = P(x2) = ½ nobody (not even himself) can predict whether he is going to choose 1 or 
2!" (ibid, p.23). 
 
And he concludes on this point: 
 
  "In specifying the rules of behaviour for the players it becomes imperative to reconsider the 
element of 'hazard'. The dependence on chance (the 'statistical element') in such an intrinsic 
part of the game itself (if not of the world) that there is no need to introduce it artificially by 
way of the rules of the game itself (if not of the world): Even if the formal rules contain no 
trace of it, it still will assert itself" (ibid, p.26). 
 
  What does Von Neumann's interpretation of choosing mixed strategy really mean? Beyond 
the explicit rules of the game, game theory proposes rules of behaviour for the players. Such rules 
of behaviour are much more complex than simple individual maximization. Von Neumann suggests 
that the purpose of each player could be to avoid being "found out" by the other. According to this 
purpose, "hazard" is transformed into behaviour for the two players. If both accept these rules, the 
problem raised by their interaction in several game situations has a solution. This is the final 
justification for their common acceptance of the prescriptions. Therefore, hazard must be 
understood more as an implicit institution of what Von Neumann called at that time "games of 
strategy". 
 
  Let us note that Von Neumann's strategic interpretation of hazard was not shared by Borel, 
for whom nobody can mimic hazard (Borel, 1939). However, this does not refute our view on the 
real foundations of game theory. Borel does not dispute the necessity of rules of behaviour for the 
players of a strategic game. He only contests that such rules can be derived from hazard. One can 
even say, in retrospect, that he was partially right on this point. Indeed, when we extend the domain 
of the game from zero-sum to non zero-sum, hazard no longer justifies the mixed strategies 
corresponding to its solution. But it does not follow, however, that this set of mixed strategies 
cannot be understood as rules of behaviour derived from a social solution. 
 
  Fifteen years later, the social characterization of interactive decisions are specified and their 
consequences, both on the content and on the foundations of game theory, are developed in   108
T.G.E.B. Such an insistence on underlining the economic specificity of the interactive processes is 
probably due to Morgenstern and must be connected to his original position in the Austrian 
intellectual configuration (Schmidt, 2001). Anyway, from the very beginning of the book, a 
comparison is developed between a "Robinson Crusoe economy" and a "social exchange economy" 
in order to delimit the difference between the individual and the inter-individual approaches to 
economic phenomena (T.G.E.B., p.9-12). 
 
  Three main features emerged from this comparison which are summarized by the following 
table: 
 
   Robinson  Crusoe  Economy    Social Exchange Economy 
 
The problem:  Robinson Crusoe economy faces an 
ordinary 0D[LPXP problem 
No player faces a 0D[LPXP 
problem but a peculiar and 
disconcerting mixture of several 
conflicting problems due to other 
players (T.G.E.B.) 
The system  Robinson Crusoe operates in a 
world whose variables are either 
under his control (tastes, preferences 
…), or completely out of his control 
(the occurrence of independent 
states…) 
Each player co-operates in a world 
where almost all the variables are 
only partially controlled by himself 
(states of the game, and their 
associated outcomes). 
The expectations  Robinson Crusoe makes 
expectations on the difference 
"states" of the world. 
Each player makes expectations on 
the other players' actions (and 
through the reflexivity property, 
other players do the same on his 
action). 
      T a b l e   1  
 
  Several interesting consequences are to be derived from Table 1. The difference in the two 
systems leads to a quite separate treatment of expectations in the two cases. As the players' world is 
only derived from the interactions of all the participants, there is no hypothesis corresponding to the 
rational assumption of an equi-probability of the states of the world in game situations. Therefore, a 
VWDWLVWLFDOPRGXVRSHUDQGL for the decision-maker does not exist in a social exchange economy and 
must be replaced by a VRFLDOPRGXVRSHUDQGL of a totally different type. So, as the players of a game 
make expectations on others, they must make expectations on other expectations … and so on. The 
core of a game situation is to be viewed as an intricate system of embedded mutual expectations, 
and, thus, of interdependent beliefs. Such a social dimension cannot be reduced to individual 
decision-makers, even if the states of the game are the final result of the free will of individuals(3). 
 
  A careful reading of T.G.E.B. reveals that Von Neumann and Morgenstern were perfectly 
aware that the analysis of such interactive economic and social processes is not a simple extension 
of individual decision-making plus additional technical difficulties. Their conclusion does not leave 
any doubt on the matter. 
 
  "The grounds for difficulty lie not on the field of those social relationships we have 
mentioned before, although we do not question their significance. But rather they arise from 
the conceptual differences between the original Crusoe's maximum problem and the more 
complex problem sketched before.   109
  We hope that the reader will be convinced by the above that we face here and now a 
FRQFHSWXDO — and not merely WHFKQLFDO — difficulty. And it is this problem which the 
theory of 'games of strategy' is mainly devised to meet" (T.G.E.B., p.12). 
 
  In spite of its clarity, this warning message has been fully understood only recently. Due to 
the well-known T.G.E.B. appendix devoted to the first axiomatic treatment of utility, the majority 
of game theorists up to the 80s focussed on the connection between game theory and the models of 
the expected utility through the Bayesian rules of revision. Therefore, game theory was mainly 
pictured as an attempt to transform problems of interacting players into a special case of individual 
decision-making under risk (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Harsanyi was even more precise on that point. 
He considered rational behaviour in game theory as a direct generalization of the Bayesian 
rationality under uncertainty. Indeed, in a game situation each player can evaluate his expectations 
about the decision of another player in terms of subjective probabilities and revise his belief in a 
way consistent with the Bayesian rules. Thus, game theory is to be interpreted as an extension of the 
Bayesian rational approach of individual decision-making (Harsanyi, 1977). This standard view was 
largely shared by the economists and the theoreticians of decision-making during more than thirty 
years with a few exceptions, including Binmore (1990, 1993). 
 
  More reflection shows that the relation between the specificity of interactive situations 
covered by game theory and the statistical Bayesian rules of individual beliefs revision is hardly 
obvious. As it was already noted by the authors of T.G.E.B., players' knowledge was not mainly 
concerned by substantive matters but rather by others' knowledge. Aumann, although he himself 
utilized the Bayesian approach as a technical tool for a tractable subjective treatment of probability 
in game theory, became convinced that a system where knowledge and belief refer to more than one 
individual person requires its own logical foundations which cannot simply be derived from those 
of individual decisions (Aumann, 1999). This recognition of such a social foundation for of 
interactive situations studied by game theory has only recently re-opened the way to new 
investigations on the epistemic background of this theory. 
 
1.2 The Dynamic Dimension of Interfacing 
 
  The static nature of game theory reasoning is derived from two features most generally 
attached to the concept of strategy. Being defined as  a set of all the players' movements chosen 
from the very beginning to the end of the game, the strategy appears as timeless. Furthermore, the 
well-known procedure of "backward induction", which is purely speculative and out of time, 
reinforces this picture, due to its close relation with players' rationality in game theory. If choosing 
rationally implies proceeding "backwards", there is apparently no room for time in strategic games. 
But, once again, some historical evidence questions the relevance of this common view. 
 
  During the academic years 1928-1929, Borel invited his friend, the great mathematician V. 
Volterra, to give several lectures on mathematical models of dynamic biology at the Institute Henri 
Poincaré, of which he was the director. An enlarged and revised version of those lectures were 
published later in French under the title /HoRQVVXUODWKpRULHPDWKpPDWLTXHGHODOXWWHSRXUODYLH 
(1931). Such a book is generally considered as a major precursor of evolutionary games (Maynard 
Smith, 1982). 
 
  The comparison between Borel's mathematical treatment of what he called "ODWKpRULHGX
MHX" between two players (Borel, 1921, 1924) and Volterra's models of animals fighting (1931) is 
really impressive. Starting with integral linear equation systems with a skew symmetric kernel 
where aij = aji, both authors utilized the possible permutations offered by such systems from which 
they derived their main results. But whereas Borel's topic is the confrontation between two sets of   110
"manners of playing", Volterra’s study concerned the interrelations between animal species in a 
crude opposition predator/prey (4). In addition, the problem to be raised is not the same in the two 
cases. Borel’s research is to find a precise rule for choosing a manner of playing which competes 
against all the opponent’s manners of playing. Volterra’s matter is to determine some dynamic laws 
of animal species’ fluctuations. But as Borel rightly observed in his first note: 
 
  "Numerous problems can thus be reduced to the study of integral equations with a skew 
symmetric kernel. This kernel depends on the conventions of the game, whilst the diverse 
forms of the integral equations depended on the problems posed" (Borel, [1921], 1953, 
p.99). 
 
  Indeed, the properties of the matrices’ coefficients can be studied either to determine the 
numerical solution, as for Borel’s problem, or for analysing the nature of the dynamic stability, as 
for Volterra’s question. This common mathematical support reveals the dynamic facet which 
necessarily complements the classical domain of game theory. Its best illustration is provided by a 
very simple example which can be found in Borel’s as well as in Volterra’s works translated in their 

































      F i g . 1  
 
  For Borel, it pictures the parlour game "paper", "rock", "scissors" (Borel, 1924, p.215). But 
it also portrays the situation studied by Volterra between three species A, B, C, where A beats B, B 
beats C, but C beats A (Volterra, 1931, p.63) This mathematical dress leads Borel to the conclusion 
that it is this the best rule for playing choosing by chance on the grounds that p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3. It 




  The fact that the same formal properties are used for studying these two situations and 
solving the problem they raised does not mean that "paper", "rock", "scissors" and the three species 
are two identical games. It clearly shows, however, why a dynamic perspective of interactive 
phenomena also belongs to the domain of the mathematical theory of games from its very 
beginning. 
 
  Surprisingly, we have no indication that Borel and Volterra were aware at that time of such a 
similarity (Schmidt 2001). The connection between these two complementary dimensions of a game 
was clarified twenty years later thanks to Nash and his renewal approach to game theory through 
non-cooperative games. 
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  Nash’s basic idea was a new mathematical concept of solutions, which became the well-
known Nash equilibrium. The definition of non-cooperative games was only derived from it to 
provide an interpretative support to this concept, initially defined in its pure logical acceptance 
(Nash, 1950b). Thus, the concept of equilibrium understood in a non-cooperative game gives rise to 
two different interpretations. A first interpretation called by Nash "Mass action" refers to 
populations of individuals which accumulated empirical evidence about consequences of the pure 
strategies at their disposal during the development of the game. According to it, the mixed strategies 
represent the average individual’s behaviour in each population corresponding to an equilibrium 
point. In a second interpretation, the equilibrium point is the result of a rational prediction of the 
behaviour to be expected of rational players in the game (Nash, 1950a). Thus the first one is 
connected to the notion of a stable distribution of strategies, whilst the second included a shared 
knowledge of mutual rational expectations. Let us observe, by the way, that a large number of 
players (population) is not a precondition for the dynamic interpretation of the equilibrium as a 
solution of a game: 
 
  "The population (according to the mass-action interpretation) needs not to be large if the 
assumptions still hold. There are situations in economics or international politics in which, 
effectively, a group of interests are involved in non-cooperative games without being aware 
of it" (Nash, 1950a). 
 
  At first glance, stability’s conditions in the dynamic interpretation seem to be a substitute for 
rationality in the static one. But things are much more complex. The information and the kind of 
knowledge are not the same in both cases. As for the stability, we know now that the conditions of 
stability for a Nash equilibrium are not sufficient to guarantee the asymptotic stability towards one 
equilibrating trajectory of a dynamic game. Once again, but for a different purpose, the previous 
example of the game "paper", "rock", "scissors" provided an illustrative example where the Nash 
equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to an E.S.S. (equilibrium stable strategy) which only 
guarantee the system against an unpredictable cycles when A ® B ® C ® A … (Maynard Smith, 
1982, p.20). Every E.S.S. is a Nash equilibrium, but the converse is false. 
 
  The main difference between "dynamics" for evolutionary games and "static (or strategic) 
games" is mainly a question of interpretation. While strategies are related to populations in the 
evolutionary games, they are associated with individuals in strategic games. Therefore, evolutionary 
games require an additional assumption for relaying individuals to populations. The biological 
concepts of "phenotypes" and Darwin "fitness" easily solve this question for animal populations. 
They cannot be directly transposed to human societies. Therefore, the formal black box of "dynamic 
replicator" necessitates considerable work to give rise to relevant interpretation of social 
phenomena. Anyway, game theory is no more intrinsically static in its content than individualistic 




2. From Solution Concepts of a Game to Social Organizations 
 
 
  The historical background of game theory offers serious arguments for restoring the 
institutional dimension of its topic. The landscape today, however, is not so clear due to several 
evolutions more or less generated by Nash's very innovative ideas. 
 
  First of all, the initial domain of game theory has been split into two separate fields, namely, 
the co-operative and the non-co-operative games. At first glance, the institutional dimension seems   112
more obvious in co-operative games, where the solutions are defined in terms of coalitional 
organizations which give rise to institutional interpretations. Such evidence disappears in non-co-
operative games where the players are assumed to operate in a totally decentralized world, free of 
any kind of institutions(5). Moreover, the evolutionary games have been developed from a non-co-
operative approach, as an extension of the dynamic interpretation of the Nash equilibrium. By 
contrast, the analytical framework of co-operative games remained static up to now. Thus, the link 
between the dynamics of interactive social processes and one or the other solution concept becomes 
less visible. 
 
  The implication of another evolution, namely Aumann’s investigation on the epistemic 
foundation of interactive situations, is much more complex for our purpose. Of course, Aumann 
stresses the logical distinction between the knowledge of an individual and the "common 
knowledge" of a set of individuals. Between these two extremities, Aumann points out the 
specificity of intermediate situations, such as, for example, the mutual knowledge between players. 
He also outlines the specificity of the knowledge that an individual can have on the others. 
Aumann’s canonical model, although straightforward, remains slightly disappointing. Such a 
knowledge, as would be a dictionary, does not provide any factual information to the players, but it 
is supposed to be commonly known by the process of its construction (Aumann, 1999). 
 
  If this syntax approach to the means of knowledge operators is formally convincing, its 
interpretation is not so clear. What is the actual status of players’ knowledge of a solution concept? 
Traditionally, it is assumed to be common knowledge between the players, on the disputable 
grounds that the solution is a component of the rules of the game. Such an assertion postpones the 
question which concerns the knowledge of the rules of the game. In an informal discussion of his 
canonical model, Aumann takes the example of a chess game. According to this model, a 
proposition like "player 1 and player 2 played a game of chess" implies that player 1 knows that 
player 2 won or knows that player 2 did not win and that this implication is commonly known by 
the players (Aumann, 1999, p.293). But this contradicts the metaphor of the letters of an alphabet 
(or the words in a dictionary). Therefore, the knowledge of the rules of the chess game can hardly 
be reduced to some kind of dictionary. Can the same result be applied to the solution concepts in 
game theory? 
 
  Part of the answer can be found in Aumann and Brandenburger’s paper where they 
investigate the conditions on players’ knowledge and beliefs for a Nash equilibrium (Aumann and 
Brandenburger, 1995). The two authors demonstrate that: 1) the knowledge of an equilibrium must 
only be a mutual knowledge, at least in the case of a two-person game(6); and 2) the model of belief 
which is attached to the game is commonly known by the players. There is some difficulty in 
combining these two statements into a clear unified construction. Anyhow, Aumann’s work 
remains, until now, limited to the Nash equilibrium solution. For other solution concepts, nothing 
has really been done in that direction. 
 
  In spite of these ambiguous signals, we persist in thinking that game theory is developing a 
relevant analytical framework for understanding the institutional foundations of social 
organizations. In order to establish the point, we will re-visit the notions of ’accepted standards of 
behaviour" and "established social order" picked out from T.G.E.B. in the light of new insights. 
These notions will be used as guide-lines for discussing various approaches to the question 




   113
  2.1 "Accepted Standard of Behaviour" and "Established Social Order" 
 
  Von Neumann and Morgenstern provided in T.G.E.B. some interesting suggestions in our 
direction, which have been largely neglected by their successors, through the notions of "standard 
of behaviour" and "established social order". At first sight, such notions seem to be elaborated only 
to give an intuitive interpretation for the mathematical solution of a game. A careful reading of the 
book reveals their much more important role in Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s intellectual 
construction. Indeed, they first appear in chapter 1 devoted to a re-interpretation of "the economic 
problem" in the new language of game theory (T.G.E.B., p.30-44). But they became imperative for 
the understanding of what they call the exact form of a solution (T.G.E.B. p.263-263) and support 
each attempt to extend the initial framework of the theory (T.G.E.B., p.471, 499, 501). 
 
  A footnote in chapter 1 gives the reason why the "standard of behaviour" can be used as a 
key for understanding the necessary social acceptance of the solution by the players. After recalling 
that the rules of the game are considered as given, it adds in a rather elliptic way: 
 
  "We suggest … that the reader forgets temporarily the analogy with games and thinks 
entirely in terms of social organisation" (T.G.E.B., p.41, note 1). 
 
  What does it mean? In parlour games, the solution concept is implicitly included in the rules 
of the game which are completely known by the players. Therefore, the solution concept of the 
game is given with its rules. The situation is not the same in the social world, where the rules of the 
game (i.e. the order of movements, the numbers of the sequences …) are free from a definite 
concept of solution. Thus, in parlour games the solution does not require an interpretation because 
the players adhere to the solution when they accept the rules of the game. In social games, on the 
contrary, the solution is not directly derived from the rules of the game and, therefore, must  be 
found by the theoretician. This is not sufficient, however, to implement it. In addition, the players 
must accept the solution proposed by the theoretician. In that perspective, the solution is to be 
attractive for the players in order to become a social organization. 
 
  Let us abandon the metaphor of parlour games to consider a more abstract game with a 
unique solution. Such a solution has to be interpreted for the reasons previously given. But its 
interpretation does not raise a specific problem, due to its unique associated standard of behaviour. 
A two-person zero-sum game is a good illustration. Its solution, derived from the famous theorem 
Maxmin = Minmax, is intimately linked to a well-known standard of behaviour, namely, the 
0D[LPLQ criterion. In other words, the interpretation of the solution is self-evident in this case. This 
explains, in retrospect, why Borel and Von Neumann (1928) did not care for it. 
 
  A new problem actually emerges when the solution concept is not given by the rules of the 
game, and when either the solution concept gives rise to different solutions, or when various 
solution concepts are consistent with the same data of the game. Following the two authors of 
T.G.E.B., we will start with the first case. 
 
  The relation between the standard of behaviour assigned to the players by the solution of a 
social game and the social order established by the implementation of the solution looks simple. To 
perform the social organization, the players have to adopt a specific standard of behaviour. On 
another side, the players will adopt this standard if they accept the social order which will follow 
the recommended behaviour. At this point, Von Neumann and Morgenstern make a disputable 
distinction between two categories of conditions on the social order(s) established by the solution. 
First of all, the solution of a game cannot lead to a self-defeating system. Second, it must satisfy 
some additional desiderata concerning, for example, the allocation of the final outcome between the   114
players. Whereas the first condition is supposed to be natural and reflect the "order of the things", 
the second conditions are derived from subjective considerations. 
 
  This way of setting the question is closely dependent on the solution concept chosen in 
T.G.E.B. by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, "the stable sets" where the absence of dominated 
imputations characterized ODWRVHQVX the "inner stability" of the corresponding organization. Such a 
stability can be viewed as an expression of the non self-defeating condition. Unfortunately, Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s "stable sets" can lead to different solutions which implies in T.G.E.B.’s 
terminology, various social orders and, consequently, several standards of behaviour. Such a 
multiplicity is just the consequence of the second conditions, i.e. the diversity of social desiderata. 
But this leads to a result which is not quite convincing, as suggested by the authors themselves: 
 
  "Several stable standards of behaviour, of course, exist for the same factual situation: Each 
of these would, of course, be stable and consistent in itself, but in conflict with all the 
others" (T.G.E.B., p.266). 
 
  No doubt the canvas sketched out by Von Neumann and Morgenstern is a fruitful starting 
point. But due to the time, several of its components reveal some weaknesses. The distinction 
between the solution of a game and the solution concept from which this solution is derived was 
still not drawn. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s initial quest is to discover a general solution for 
every game, but the solution they found was a set of different "imputations". In order to give a sense 
to these imputations, they associated a specific standard of behaviour to each of them. 
 
  Let us try to extend Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s ideas to other concepts, such as the 
Nash equilibrium. In most cases, a game possesses several Nash equlibria. Each of them, however, 
refers to the same standard of behaviour. If we consider that each equilibrium is a solution which 
belongs to the same concept, it seems correct to associate a definite standard of behaviour to the 
solution concept and not to its different solutions in a given game. That which is true for the Nash 
concept is also true for other solution concepts, including Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s stable 
sets solution. 
 
  Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s interpretation of the stability condition is also disputable. 
Obviously, any solution must have a minimum of stability to give rise to a social order. But one can 
wonder on what principle this stability is based. In a social situation, the stability most often results 
from the confidence of the players’ expectations on behaviour of the others. Incidentally, the two 
authors of T.G.E.B. surmise the existence of such a phenomenon. They notice that the "accepted 
standard of behaviour" is a necessary condition to maintain players’ faith in the definite solution 
(T.G.E.B., p.266). They cannot analyse more rigorously this because they lack a model of the 
players’ knowledge. 
 
  Once again, Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s intuition is derived from the solution they 
have elaborated in T.G.E.B. where the stability is a direct implication of non-dominated 
imputations. A glance at other solution concepts proves that their stability has nothing to do with a 
natural "order of things". The strategic stability of a Nash equilibrium only depends on the absence 
of an incentive to deviate from the strategy specified by the concept (Kolberg and Mertens, 1986). 
Even the Shapley value which escapes DSULRUL any stability conditions, can generate a social order 
"stable" at minima through a self-fulfilling mechanism (cf. supra p.25). These two examples show 
that, contrary to Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s interpretation, the stability of a solution concept 
must be understood as a desiderata for the corresponding social order. 
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  Finally, Von Neumann and Morgenstern are aware of a kind of vicious circle in the 
reasoning for relying on a standard of behaviour accepted by the players to the established social 
order. On the one hand, the existence of a social order depends on the implementation of a specific 
standard of behaviour by the players. On the other, a specific standard of behaviour must satisfy the 
social desiderata included in the expected social order to be accepted by the players. In order to 
avoid such a difficulty, Von Neumann and Morgenstern utilise the distinction previously criticized 
between the stability conditions and the other social desiderata. Beyond the necessary stability of 
whatever social order, their investigation does not concern the social norms imbedded in the social 
order corresponding to a solution of the game. Thus they quickly close the debate in the following 
terms: 
 
  "Our problem is not to determine what ought to be happening in pursuance of any set of 
necessarily arbitrary DSULRUL principles, but to investigate where the equilibrium of forces 
lies" (T.G.E.B., p.43). 
 
  This position becomes hardly acceptable if the stability conditions are no more disconnected 
from other social norms. There is nothing to object to the very general statement that the solution of 
a game is more or less directly derived from the investigation of the balance of forces. But, 
according to Von Neumann and Morgenstern, such a balance results from the implementation of 
standards of behaviour which are accepted by the players. On what grounds can the players accept 
this or that standard of behaviour, except the social norms directly or indirectly incorporated in the 
corresponding social order? Therefore contemporary game theorists must bravely face the problem 
raised by T.G.E.B. about the connection between the acceptance of the standard of behaviour by the 
players and the norms included in its corresponding social order. However, its investigation 
necessitates, on the contrary, the analyse of what ought to happen in pursuance of different sets of D
SULRUL principles. 
 
  This legacy from Von Neumann and Morgenstern can be developed in different directions. 





  2.2 Greenberg’s social situations 
 
  A first extension of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s seminal ideas is due to Greenberg. In 
an ambitious research programme, Greenberg has sketched out what he has called a "theory of 
social situations" for challenging game theory (Greenberg, 1990). Roughly speaking, a social 
situation pictures all the environmental features necessary for the players in order to reach a definite 
solution in the game theory terminology. Let us summarize how Greenberg revisits the old notions 
of "accepted standard of behaviour" and "established social orders" for his purpose. 
 
a) The solution of a game is tantamount to a set of rules which lead to a set of final outcomes when 
they are applied by the players. According to this, the standard of behaviour is an operator who 
transforms players’ behaviour to a game solution in a broad sense. Therefore it can be 
PDWKHPDWLFDOO\ZULWWHQDVDPDSSLQJ *ZKHUH*LVWKHGRPDLQRIWKHJDPH 
 
b) Only solutions which are not self-GHIHDWHGFDQUHIHUWRVRFLDORUGHUV&RQVHTXHQWO\ *PXVWEH
stable in this very weak meaning. 
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F *Ln itself is not dependent on a specific solution, but the interpretation of a solution concept 
necessitates the definition of an associated social situation (S.S.), which takes into account the 
institutional environment and the players’ beliefs. Thus, a correspondence can be shown between a 
definite standard of behaviour and a specific solution concept thanks to the social situation. In 
IRUPDO WHUPV 6 Û (S.S.), where S is the solution concept of the game G and S.S,. its 
corresponding social situation. 
 
d) The players of a game are always free to accept or to reject a definite standard of behaviour. 
$FFHSWLQJ 6LPSOLHVDFFHSWLQJWKHVRFLDOVLWXDWLRQWREHDVVRFLDWHGWRWKHVROXWLRQFRQFHSWRIWKH
game. So, either this social situation is a correct idealization of the players’ actual situation and the 
players normally accept the corresponding standard of behaviour, or it is not the case and they reject 
this standard of behaviour. If their actual situation cannot be translated into any kind of social 
situation derived from a game theory solution concept, a new solution is to be found. 
 
  Greenberg moves from Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s construction. With Greenberg, the 
standard of behaviour becomes the prescriptive version of the mathematical concept of a solution. 
In that spirit, the standard of behaviour offers an opportunity to unify almost all the different 
solution concepts of a game(7). On the other side, each solution concept gives rise to a social 
situation. This social situation induces constraints on the standard of behaviour and reveals, at the 
same time, a social order which can be established by the players. Greenberg’s notion of "social 
situation" brings the link between the standard of behaviour to be accepted by all the players and the 
social order established by their acceptance. 
 
  Unfortunately, a social situation jOD Greenberg is a baroque notion which put together two 
very different components: the institutional environment, on the one hand, which is given from 
outside, and the players’ beliefs, on the other, which are derived from assumptions about their 
cognitive ability. In Greenberg’s theory, the social situations provide a unique framework for the 
two purposes, namely to describe the process for implementing a definite game solution concept 
and to picture the real interactive situation where the players operate. The first target is hardly 
reached. As for the second, the point remains questionable, due to the mixture of its components. 
 
  Let us start with the weakness of the social situation as the procedure to be associated with a 
social concept. Nash equilibrium for example, is transformed in what Greenberg calls a Nash 
situation by means of the three following conditions (Greenberg, 1990, p.89): 
 
C1 = only simple players are allowed to deviate 
C2 = a deviating player is free to choose any strategy from his strategy set Zi 
C3 = the deviating player believes that all the players will stay put and pursue the same action they 
intend regardless of the action he chooses. 
 
 
  Indeed, a Nash equilibrium is a state where no individual player has an incentive to deviate 
from his corresponding strategy. One can easily understand why this set of conditions imposed on 
the deviating players is the cornerstone of a Nash situation. C1 and C2 belong to a supposed 
Nashian environment. But the real meaning of C3 about the players beliefs is much more 
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  What precisely does it mean for a player to deviate? According to the classical definition of 
a strategy, to deviate is to be understood as a part of a mental process in the deliberation for 
choosing a strategy. If, for instance, (A,a) is the starting point of player 1’s reasoning, he will 
mentally deviate from A to B because, thanks to C3, he believes that player 2 will stay with a. Thus 
he moves mentally in the game from the state (A,a) to the state (B,a). Let us imagine now that 
player 2, starting from (B,a) will also deviate from a to b for the reason previously given for the 
player 1. Can we still assert that a deviating player will stay put on the other player’s same strategy? 
 
  C3 entertains a confusion between two different kinds of player’s belief. Certainly, a 
deviating possibility in the Nash context of best reply to the other’s strategy implies that the other’s 
strategy is supposedly given for each player during his mental deliberation. But this does not 
preclude the players’ expectations on the strategy chosen by the others (and expectations on the 
other’s expectations ...). More precisely, as long as players do not have any belief about the strategy 
which is chosen by the other players, they consider the strategies of other players as potentially 
given according to C3. Players, however, must have some beliefs on others’ behaviour when they 
play in a Nash situation. 
 
  Let us come back to the example. According to C1, C2 and C3, player 1 knows that he must 
choose B against a, A against b and A, B or C against c. Suppose moreover, a perfect and complete 
information. Player 1 also knows that player 2 must choose a against A, b against B and a, b, or c 
against C. Does player 1 necessarily induce from this knowledge the belief that player 2 will choose 
c, and, consequently, that he must himself actually chose C? A positive answer requires additional 
knowledge. If Nash equilibrium, as the solution of the game, is a mutual knowledge between 
players 1 and 2, then player 1 will choose C, because he will take for sure that player 2 will choose 
c (and symmetrically for player 2). 
 
  What would happen if this mutual knowledge was dropped out? Player 1 will not choose C 
if he does not take for sure that player 2 will choose c because c is (weakly) dominated by A and B 
(and symmetrically for player 2). Therefore (C,c) which is the Nash equilibrium, will never be 
obtained(8). This belief is for this reason absolutely necessary and its roots can only be found in the 
knowledge of the mutual acceptance of this solution by the two players. 
 
  Greenberg would argue that the Nash equilibrium, as the solution of this game, is already 
incorporated in the standard of behaviour consistent with the corresponding social situation. As, by 
hypothesis, there is also a relevant standard of behaviour for this social situation, the players are 
supposed to infer the Nash solution from their knowledge of the situation. The UDLVRQG
rWUH of C3 is 
to assure the players that no state of the game, except the Nash equilibrium ((C,c) in the example))   118
is stable in Greenberg terms, but nothing more. Does it imply that the standard of behaviour 
associated with a Nash situation must necessarily be "accepted"? The answer is obviously positive 
for a theoretician in an almost tautological way. It cannot be extended, however, to the players of 
the game because there is no reason that C3 generates the confidence for each player in a mutual 
acceptance of this solution(9). 
 
  A major consequence of this deficiency is the impossibility of reducing a social order to a 
positive comparison between players’ real situations in an idealized DGKRF social situation. 
 
  2.3 Moulin’s modes of cooperation 
 
  Another tentative for attaching the different solution concepts to institutional organisations 
is due to Moulin. Contrary to Greenberg, Moulin does not refer to Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
notions. His starting point is a very broad definition of cooperation combined with a strict 
delimitation of its domain. According to the dominant economic tradition, Moulin’s cooperation is 
tantamount to a mutual assistance between selfish individuals (Moulin, 1995, p.4). He then 
differentiates three fundamental "modes of cooperation" that he respectively calls "direct 
agreement", "decentralized behaviour" and "justice". Each of these modes pick out a specific 
feature of the cooperation, as well as a type of institutional organization. Each mode of cooperation 
is modelled by a group of games. Their backgrounds are to be found in specific solution concepts. 
 
  We propose to sketch out Moulin’s approach by associating the "direct agreement" with the 
core solution, the "decentralized behaviour" with the Nash equilibrium, and the "justice mode" with 
Shapley’s value(10). 
 
  From an abstract point of view, the simplest mode of cooperation is the result of a direct 
agreement between the players. More precisely, there is a set of individual players. Each player is 
able to negotiate freely with all the other players of the game, in a face-to-face "bargaining process" 
This process takes the form of a hierarchical system of coalitions and sub-coalitions, where a 
coalition is a set (or a sub-set) of agreeing players. As for example, suppose three players, namely 
Player 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 considers successively possible agreements with 2, leaving out 3, or 
with 3, leaving out 2, or with 1 and 2 together. The solution is final agreement which is accepted by 
all the players of a game. In such a context the "core" is a serious candidate for a solution, because 
it singles out the set of possible agreements which cannot be challenged by any sub-coalition. In a 
world driven by direct agreements, the core frames stable social order(s), preserving individual 
rationality and satisfying to the Pareto optimality; three reasons to be accepted by the players. 
 
  In spite of that, the core is neither always a fair solution at variance with the justice mode of 
cooperation, nor necessarily the best issue of a bargain, in the decentralized behaviour mode. This 
point is illustrated by the two following examples: 
 
  Let us assume three players 1, 2, 3. Each of them knows the outcome of all the possible 
coalitions of the game 
 
({1,}) = ({2}) = ({3}) = 0 
({1,2}) = ({1,3}) = 1, ({2,3}) = 0 
({1,2,3}) = 1 
 
Player 1 can agree with player 2, or player 3 or both. He knows that an agreement between player 2 
and 3 is not fruitful. If player 1 receives 1 and the two other players nothing (the core solution), no 
player can object against this agreement. One can however legitimately contest this solution from a   119
justice point of view. Indeed, without player 2 and player 3, player 1 will never obtain the maximal 
outcome. In a more subtle way, player 2 and player 3 provide together a necessary information to 
player 1 in his face-to-face bargaining. This can be agreed, but in the case of the direct cooperation 
process DOD Moulin, player 1 and player 2 could hardly put forward these arguments. It would be 
different in the "justice mode". 
 
  In the second example, the following outcomes are associated with the coalitions: 
 
({1}) = ({2}) = ({3}) = 0 
({1,2}) = ({1,3}) = ({2,3}) = 8 
({1,2,3}) = 9 
 
  The outcome of the great coalition dominates the outcomes corresponding to all the possible 
sub-coalitions. According to Pareto’s optimality, the core is the result of a face-to-face bargaining 
between the three players in the grand coalition. One can wonder, however, if each individual 
player cannot really obtain a better pay-off in playing differently. As already pointed out by 
Aumann and Dreze, two of the three players can benefit from negotiating together, dropping the 
third (Aumann and Dreze, 1974). Thanks to the pure symmetry of the game, each of these players 
would reasonably expect a pay-off of 3 instead of2, if they open the bargaining to the third player in 
the great coalition as in the core solution. What does this prove? If the core does not contradict the 
players’ individual rationality, the pay-offs which are derived from it do not necessarily coincide 
with the best strategic choice of all the players. This is right, but reasoning in these terms implies 
endogenizing the coalition formation in a strategic process which is out of the direct agreement 
context. Thus, with the strategic choice of a coalitional structure, we progressively move to another 
mode of cooperation, "the decentralization of behaviour". 
 
  The same kind of analysis can be developed with the Nash solution for the "decentralized 
behaviour mode" of cooperation, and with the Shapley value (and others concepts of value) for the 
"justice mode of cooperation". Two additional observations have interesting consequences for 
institutions. In the decentralized behaviour mode, whereas the players have nothing to know about 
the other players, they must perfectly know the exact results of the game and know that the other 
players also know them (Moulin, 1998, p.28). As previously noted, the Nash equilibrium operates 
as a legal code which is a public information to be read by every citizen. The justice mode, on the 
other side, requires implementing the solution. This requirement can be realized by an arbitrator or 
through a social mechanism which is accepted by all the players, as for example, the rule of fair 
division to share a cake (Steinhaus, 1948). 
 
  However, Moulin’s most important contribution to our topic is elsewhere. Moulin offers the 
opportunity to elaborate this notion of cooperation in developing the basic ideas which underline 
these three modes of cooperation. It refers actually to two different meanings, namely to agree and 
to coordinate. An agreement between players necessarily entails a coordination between their 
actions, but the reverse is false. Players’ individual strategies can be coordinated without any 
agreement between the players, through a supposed mechanism (11). Furthermore, the players 
either can agree directly upon a substantive matter, as in a contract ("direct agreement"), or 
indirectly upon a Norm included in the solution concept ("justice"). As for coordination, it 
necessitates the existence of guidelines commonly understood by the players ("decentralized 
behaviour"). 
 
  These three modes of cooperation are not mutually exclusive. As, for example, two or three 
solution concepts related to different modes of cooperation can effectively give rise to the same 
result. In the well-known "stag-hunt" game, one of the two Nash pure equilibria is also the core of   120
the game viewing with cooperative spectacles. For Moulin, the main interest of this singularity is to 
open the way to a convergence between the different modes of cooperation. 
 
We do not share this position. The single fact that two solution concepts reach the same 
result in spite of their difference does not reduce the gap between their respective underlying social 
order. Let us come back to the stag-hunt game. By chance, one of the stag-hunt Nash equilibrium is 
also a cooperative situation. What does this mean? According to the specific configuration of the 
game (the pay-offs structure) the two players can coordinate their strategy in such a way that the 
outcome of the game is Pareto optimal and satisfies other conditions which belong to the direct 
agreement mode of cooperation. But this opportunity creates a new problem in the decentralized 
behaviour environment: How will the players choose between a coordination on the first 
equilibrium, which is "pay-off dominant", or on the second equilibrium, which is "risk dominant" 
according to Harsanyi and Selten’s terminology (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)? This second level of 
coordination problem has no room in the context of direct agreements. Indeed, a stag-hunt situation 
can be solved in following one or the other modes of cooperation ("decentralized behaviour" or 
"direct agreement", see Schmidt, 2001). Now, if the players can agree on a cooperative solution, 
whatever, it is not surprising that this solution also supports an implicit coordination. In some cases, 
as in the stag-hunt example, this coordination could take the form of a regulation by a Nash 
equilibrium. But, beyond the relation between "agreements" and "coordination", such a coincidence 




  2.4 Agreeing to agree or to coordinate? 
 
  Greenberg, with his personal interpretation of the standard of behaviour, as well as Moulin 
with his broad notion of cooperation, attempt, by different ways, to unify the various solution 
concepts of game theory. We will draw out, on the contrary, the background of their difference. Our 
purpose is to clarify the relation between the standard of behaviour "accepted" by the players and 
related to each solution concept and their corresponding social order. 
 
  A first step in that direction is to be found in the connection between the players’ acceptance 
of a standard of behaviour and a specific mode of cooperation jOD Moulin, which is based on 
agreements and/or coordination. To say that all the players of a game accept a given standard of 
behaviour is quite the same thing as if they agreed on this standard of behaviour. But this 
terminological change is not purely semantic. Agreeing to a standard of behaviour implies for the 
players that their acceptance is a common language between them. Agreeing means here that player 
1 accepts the standard and that he knows that player 2 accepts it also, and that he knows that player 
2 knows that he accepts it.... Consequently no player can disagree on an "accepted standard of 
behaviour"(12). In that sense, the first degree of agreement between the players of a game is the 
acceptance of a well-defined standard of behaviour. 
 
  As initially specified by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, the UDLVRQG
rWUH of a standard of 
behaviour is to lead to an "established" social order via a solution concept. The solution of a 
whichever game refers to two principal ideas: on one hand a kind of agreement between the players, 
on the other hand, a way to coordinate their individual decisions. Such a plain distinction must be 
refined. 
 
  First, the two extreme situations of "pure agreement" and "pure coordination" are to be 
eliminated, because an agreement between individuals and a coordination of their actions are not, 
by themselves, the theoretical solutions of a game. As previously noticed, the agents become the   121
players of a game when, prior to any decision or movement, they agree to a specific standard of 
behaviour. Players’ agreements which are derived from the accepted standard of behaviour belong 
to a second degree of agreements, at the same level as the coordinating processes. 
 
  Second, there exists a large spectrum of combinations between agreements and coordination 
among the various solution concepts. We propose the following table to classify by their goal 
orientation the different standards of behaviour associated with the various solutions: 
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  The first two columns of the table are "agreement oriented". They traditionally belong to the 
cooperative games. The two others are "coordination oriented" and are considered as non-
cooperative. But the difference between these four types of standard of behaviour is much more 
subtle. One can either make direct agreements (col.1) or agree indirectly through the adhesion to a 
social norm (col.2). In a strict non-cooperative interpretation, the disagreement points are nothing 
more than the revelation of a mutual incompatibility of the demands emerging from the players. But 
to coordinate the players’ strategies on an equilibrium through a process of best answers (col.4) is 
not identical to force their demand to be compatible demands with fixed threats (col.3). 
 
  All the pieces of the puzzle are now available. Players have at their disposal some 
information on the situation where they operate (the outcomes of the different coalitions in a 
cooperative, the possible individual pay-offs in a non-cooperative game, according to the traditional 
distinction). This information data can be complete or incomplete, symmetric or asymmetric, 
between the players. More generally, with these available data, players can organize different 
economic orders corresponding to different games and their solutions. The "established" order 
depends on players’ acceptance of a definite standard of behaviour rather than another which would 
also be consistent with the data. This acceptance is to be analysed as a prior agreement between the 
players. Such an agreement can be tacit or formal, as in voting procedures. Thanks to this 
agreement, the private knowledge of each individual approval becomes a common belief among the 
players. 
 
  The example 1 (p.19) well illustrates this general framework. The data are given by the 
different outcomes associated with each coalition. The three players are supposed to possess all this 
information. Two different solutions, at least, are consistent with these data and their knowledge by 
the players. Each of them organize a different social order, because the solution of its core gives the   122
pay-offs profile (1,0,0) and the Shapley value (4/6, 1/6, 1/6). To reach one or the other solution, the 
players must first agree on their respective standard of behaviour (see Table 2, columns 1 and 2). 
 
  The relation between the goal and the pattern of organization vary from a standard of 
behaviour to another. With the core, for instance, the pattern of organizational rules (direct 
agreements in Moulin’s terminology) dominates the definition of a strict norm for the goal. 
Therefore, several solutions can belong to the core. The priority is reverse with the Shapley value. 
(4/6, 1/6, 1/6) in our example, which is a simple application of a social norm, strictly defined as an 
allocation of the outcome of the game among the players. This norm allocates to each player his 
marginal contributions to the worth ("justice" in Moulin’s terminology). Different mechanisms, 
including the service of an agency can be used to perform this profile. Consequently, the content of 
the prior agreement is not exactly the same in each case. It means in the first case to agree on some 
procedural rules and to agree on a norm of justice in the second case. 
 
  The last step is to explain how the players can agree on a definite standard of behaviour 
when alternative standards, corresponding to different solutions, are consistent with their available 
information on the situation. We have stressed the difficulty due to their comparison. But the 
introduction of strategic considerations can help us to circumvent this difficulty. 
 
  It is clear in the example studied that player 1 would prefer the core solution, whilst player 2 
and player 3 prefer the Shapley value. Such an opposition results from their expected pay-offs in 
both cases. At first sight, it reinforces the difficulty for all the three players to agree previously on a 
same standard of behaviour. More reflection shows, however, that this conflict of interests might 
also open a way to solve it. Indeed, player 2 and player 3 can agree together to reject the core’s 
prescriptions. Doing that, neither player 2 nor player 3 adopt an irrational behaviour. They know 
that whatever their decision, they will obtain 0 in the core system. Player 1 on his side, cannot 
obtain anything by himself in staying alone. If player 2 and player 3 agree to refuse an agreement 
with player 1, player 1 has nothing to object. Finally, the three players will be penalized in that 
issue, but player 1 only can in addition regret it. 
 
  Following this line of reasoning, player 1 reasonably believes that player 2 and player 3 do 
not agree on the standard of behaviour which leads to the core solution. Such a conviction is a 
strong incentive for him to move from the core standard to the Shapley standard. As players 2 and 3 
cannot obtain more than in agreeing with player 1 on the Shapley solution, they will also tend to 
agree with him in its corresponding standard. Therefore, in this example, the Shapley order appears, 
for the reasons which have been developed, "socially more stable" than the core(12). Moreover, 
such a result does not emerge here from a prior common acceptance of Shapley’s norm of justice. 
 
  What we learn from this example remains modest and cannot be extended without great 
caution. Anyway, it proves that, at variance with a majority of game theorists, to understand the 
cognitive considerations for which players can agree on gaming standards belong to the domain of 
game theory in a comprehensive definition. Such an investigation is to be included in their future 
research agenda.   123
Notes 
 
(1)  The broad term of decision-maker is used here in order to make a distinction between the 
"agents" and the "players", which becomes relevant in every game in extensive forms. 
(2)  In game theory, what is called the selfishness of the players is no more than the assumption 
that each player only maximizes his own pay-offs, without taking into account the others’ 
pay-offs. Such an assumption is by no means necessary for the study of a game. One can 
easily assume, on the contrary, that players have preferences on the other players’ pay-offs, 
without modifying the structure of game theory. 
(3)  In the orthodox theory of individual decision under uncertainty, all the subjective probability 
distributions over unknown states of the world are supposed to be equally rational. This is 
not the case in game theory, because players’ uncertainty does not concern unknown states 
but rational beliefs to be held by the players about each other. Such a difference entails that 
the consequent axioms built for the theory of individual decision cannot be applied to multi-
person game situations (Hammond, 1994, 1996). 
(4)  In a series of models, Volterra makes distinctions between different situations: one and the 
same species with many individuals, two opposite species, more than two species (Volterra, 
1931). 
(5)  This judgement can be reversed on the grounds of other arguments: the description of non-
cooperative games is much more detailed than the cooperative games (see the extensive 
form in comparison with the coalitional form) including the mechanism of information 
transmission among the players. Consequently, the rules of a non-cooperative game are 
generally more precise, in connection with the corresponding solution concept. Those rules 
can also be viewed as the starting point of institutions (Shotter, 1981). 
(6)  When n>2, the Nash equilibrium must commonly be known by all the players. Incidentally, 
this clearly points out the rule of the number of the players in the analysis of information and 
knowledge conditions. 
(7)  With the important exceptions of the Shapley value. For an alternative interpretation, see 
p.25. 
(8)  Greenberg himself recognizes the point in his comment of a similar example. But he gives a 
different interpretation of this awkwardness. According to him, a rational recommendation 
to all the players of the game might conflict with the individual rationality of the players. 
Thus, standards of behaviour give recommendations and not predictions on players’ 
behaviour (Greenberg, 1990, p.166-167). 
(9)  It can be argued in an opposite direction, that according to c3 the players can refuse their 
strategies C and c with an easy mind, because each of them takes for sure that the other does 
not choose this strategy, no matter what the other player does. 
(10)  For Moulin, however, the three modes of cooperation cannot be treated as Greenberg’s social 
situations. Thus, there is no one to one correspondence between a given mode of 
cooperation and a specific solution concept. In that spirit, the core, the Nash equilibrium and 
the Shapley value are used here as illustrative examples. 
(11)  This is precisely the case with the Nash bargaining model, which gives rise to situations 
labelled as "anti-conflict" when player’s demands are more than mutually compatible (Nash, 
1950b). 
(12)  A standard of behaviour is neither an event nor a state of the world, but a code. To accept a 
code has a meaning for the players if, and only if, each player knows that the other players 
accept it, and knows that they know, and so on, to infinity. 
(13)  This example provides an intuitive argument against the intrinsic instability of the Shapley 
value, which has some connection with its so-called irrationality (Roth, 1980, 1986; 
Aumann, 1985).   124
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